The Paradox of Regulation is a tour de force of regulatory scholarship that successfully contextualizes the regulatory project as an effort to reduce multiple forms of risk. Three case studies of regulatory reforms, fascinating in their own right, when read together forcefully demonstrate why context matters to the actuarial assessments, political realities, and possibilities for insuring safety, security and integrity. Haines, penetrating analysis presents no simple answers to what works and why. The Paradox of Regulation nimbly demonstrates that the strengths and limits of a particular regulatory reform must be understood as a complicated response to a dynamic constellation of actuarial, political, and socio-cultural risks.,- Nancy Reichman, University of Denver, US , This new book by Fiona Haines is an elegant but sophisticated analysis of the three risks (technical, social and political) that regulation must address if it is to be effective. This analysis is original and fresh bringing together critiques of risk based regulation with empirical literature on compliance and effectiveness evaluation. This is exactly the sort of book we need more of to develop and deepen empirical and theoretical research in regulatory scholarship: - it helpfully melds together different literatures and theoretical approaches with her own empirical work on regulatory reforms to build a multi-layered theoretical analysis that really pushes forward our understanding of regulation, why it happens and how it fails and succeeds., - Christine Parker, Monash University, Australia ,This is an insightful and nuanced analysis of the strengths and limitations of regulation. Through a close grained analysis of three recent disasters, Haines demonstrates that regulation is not just a technical but also a political and a social project and how a failure to recognise its multiple dimensions can lead to regulatory failure. This book is a major contribution that enriches our understanding of the challenges of risk management and of how best to address them.'- Neil Gunningham, Australian National University, Canberra , Fiona Haines shows us that regulatory policy is complex and paradoxical in ways that should require us to attend to the substance and the politics of specific regulatory regimes. This book is a major contribution to the reconceptualisation of risk and regulation. It is a perceptive treatment of the role of crisis by one of the best scholars of regulation we have., - John Braithwaite, Australian National University, Canberra

Over the past fifteen years, the United States, Western Europe, and Japan have transformed the relationship between governments and corporations. The changes are complex and the terms used to describe them often obscure the reality. In Freer Markets, More Rules, Steven K. Vogel dispenses with euphemisms and makes sense of this recent transformation. In defiance of conventional wisdom, Vogel contends that the deregulation revolution of the 1980s and 1990s never happened. The advanced industrial countries moved toward liberalization or freer markets at the same time that they imposed reregulation or more rules. Moreover, the countries involved did not converge in regulatory practice but combined liberalization and reregulation in markedly different ways. The state itself, far more than private interest groups, drove the process of regulatory reform. Thus, the story of deregulation is one rich in paradox: a movement aimed at reducing regulation increased it; a movement propelled by global forces reinforced national differences; and a movement that purported to reduce state power was led by the state itself. Vogel's astute and far-reaching analysis compares deregulation in Britain and Japan, with special attention to the telecommunication and financial services industries. He also considers such important sectors as broadcasting, transportation, and utilities in the United States, France, and Germany.

The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.

A detailed analysis of the ethical, legal, and regulatory landscape of medical devices in the US and EU.

The "quality of life" concept of quality of life is a broad one. It incorporates basic needs but also extends beyond them to include capabilities, the "livability" of the environment, and life appreciation and happiness. Latin America's diversity in culture and levels of development provide a laboratory for studying how quality of life varies with a number of objective and subjective measures. These measures range from income levels to job insecurity and satisfaction, to schooling attainment and satisfaction, to measured and self-assessed health, among others. Paradox and Perception greatly improves our understanding of the determinants of well-being in Latin America based on a broad "quality of life" concept that challenges some standard assumptions in economics, including those about the relationship between happiness and income. The authors' analysis builds upon a number of new approaches in economics, particularly those related to the study of happiness and finds a number of paradoxes as the region's respondents evaluate their well-being. These include the paradox of unhappy growth at the macroeconomic level, happy peasants and frustrated achievers at the microlevel, and surprisingly high levels of satisfaction with public services among the region's poorest. They also have important substantive links with several of the region's realities, such as high levels of income inequality, volatile macroeconomic performance, and low expectations of public institutions and faith in the capacity of the state to deliver. Identifying these perceptions, paradoxes, and their causes will contribute to the crafting of better public policies, as well as to our understanding of why "populist" politics still pervade in much of the region.

This paper illustrates the paradox of prudential under-regulation in an economy that adopts financial reform, a reform which exposes the economy to future financial crises. There is individual-uncertainty about the crisis incidence, and the probability of the crisis is updated sequentially applying Bayesian inference. Costly regulation can mitigate the probability of the crisis. We identify conditions where the regulation level supported by the majority is positive after the reform, but below the socially optimal level. Tranquil time, when the crisis would not take place, reduces the regulation intensity. If the spell of no crisis is long enough, the regulation level may drop to zero, despite the fact that the socially optimal regulation level remains positive. The less informative is the prior regarding the probability of a crisis, the faster will be the drop in regulations induced by a no-crisis, good luck run. The challenges facing the regulator are aggravated by asymmetric information, as is the case when the public does not observe regulator's effort. Higher regulator effort, while helping avoiding a crisis, may be confused as a signal that the environment is less risky, reducing the posterior probability of the crisis, eroding the support for costly future regulation. The other side of the regulation paradox is that crisis resulting with unanticipated high costs may induce over-regulation and stagnation, as the parties that would bear the cost of the over regulation are underrepresented in the decision making process. We also outline a regulatory structure that mitigates the above concerns, including information disclosure; increasing the independence of the regulatory agency from the political process; centralizing the regulatory process and increasing its transparency; and adopting global standards of minimum prudential regulations and information disclosure, enforced by the domestic regulator.