"The authors revisit the debt overhang question. They first use nonparametric techniques to isolate a panel of countries on the downward sloping section of a debt Laffer Curve. In particular, overhang countries are ones where a threshold level of debt is reached in sample, beyond which (initial) debt ends up lowering (subsequent) growth. On average, significantly negative coefficients appear when debt face value reaches 60 percent of GDP or 200 percent of exports, and when its present value reaches 40 percent of GDP or 140 percent of exports. Second, the authors depart from reduced form growth regressions and perform direct tests of the theory on the thus selected sample of overhang countries. In the spirit of event studies, they ask whether, as the overhang level of debt is reached: (1) investment falls precipitously as it should when it becomes optimal to default; (2) economic policy deteriorates observably, as it should when debt contracts become unable to elicit effort on the part of the debtor; and (3) the terms of borrowing worsen noticeably, as they should when it becomes optimal for creditors to preempt default and exact punitive interest rates. The authors find a systematic response of investment, particularly when property rights are weakly enforced, some worsening of the policy environment, and a fall in interest rates. This easing of borrowing conditions happens because lending by the private sector virtually disappears in overhang situations, and multilateral agencies step in with concessional rates. Thus, while debt relief is likely to improve economic policy (and especially investment) in overhang countries, it is doubtful that it would ease their terms of borrowing or the burden of debt. "--World Bank web site.

The authors revisit the debt overhang question. They first use nonparametric techniques to isolate a panel of countries on the downward sloping section of a debt Laffer Curve. In particular, overhang countries are ones where a threshold level of debt is reached in sample, beyond which (initial) debt ends up lowering (subsequent) growth. On average, significantly negative coefficients appear when debt face value reaches 60 percent of GDP or 200 percent of exports, and when its present value reaches 40 percent of GDP or 140 percent of exports. Second, the authors depart from reduced form growth regressions and perform direct tests of the theory on the thus selected sample of overhang countries. In the spirit of event studies, they ask whether, as the overhang level of debt is reached: (1) investment falls precipitously as it should when it becomes optimal to default; (2) economic policy deteriorates observably, as it should when debt contracts become unable to elicit effort on the part of the debtor; and (3) the terms of borrowing worsen noticeably, as they should when it becomes optimal for creditors to preempt default and exact punitive interest rates. The authors find a systematic response of investment, particularly when property rights are weakly enforced, some worsening of the policy environment, and a fall in interest rates. This easing of borrowing conditions happens because lending by the private sector virtually disappears in overhang situations, and multilateral agencies step in with concessional rates. Thus, while debt relief is likely to improve economic policy (and especially investment) in overhang countries, it is doubtful that it would ease their terms of borrowing or the burden of debt.

We study the long-run relationship between public debt and growth in a large panel of countries. Our analysis takes particular note of theoretical arguments and data considerations in modeling the debt-growth relationship as heterogeneous across countries. We investigate the issue of nonlinearities (debt thresholds) in both the cross-country and within-country dimensions, employing novel methods and diagnostics from the time-series literature adapted for use in the panel. We find some support for a nonlinear relationship between debt and long-run growth across countries, but no evidence for common debt thresholds within countries over time.

A long-missing manuscript from a famous eighteenth-century philosopher with a dark secret, the late twentieth-century murder in Paris of a prominent Princeton professor—and the connection between the two—form the core of this fast-paced mystery novel. Set primarily in Paris and Oxford, Rousseau's Ghost weaves a riveting tale of scholarly intrigue and murder. An urgent but cryptic request from Professor Ted Porter summons his old friend and former Rhodes Scholar Jack Davis to Paris. Once there Jack finds his friend dead, apparently electrocuted by a faulty laptop computer. The Parisian police rule the death an accident and close the case. But Jack well knew his friend's deep aversion to modern technology, and to computers in particular, and believes the computer was not Ted's and his death no accident. Unable to convince the police, Jack begins his own investigation, aided by Danielle, a beautiful young French woman who claims to have been Ted's research assistant and sometime lover. Sifting through Ted's notes and an unfinished manuscript titled Rousseau's Ghost, he finds a mysterious entry: "Inst Pol??!!" Not knowing what this might mean, he travels to Oxford to see his old tutor, who surmises that Ted's shorthand query refers to the Institutions Politiques, a manuscript on which Rousseau worked in the 1750s but later abandoned and burned, except for the small section we now know as the Social Contract. Could the rest of the manuscript have survived? Could Ted have found it? If so, was he murdered for his discovery? Could Jack and Danielle be next?

Securing the Global Economy explores how and why the G8 and other institutions of global governance deal with increasingly comprehensive and complex economic-security connections. These connections are explored from an interdisciplinary perspective, with economists, political scientists and those in the policy world bringing their insights to bear. Moreover, this volume explores this economic-security connection from a constitutional or institutional perspective. In a classical liberal spirit, it is concerned with the organizing principles of a liberal international economic order and the framework of rules that enables it to survive and flourish. Security issues, national trade policies, the multilateral trade system and the detailed technical issues they subsume are analysed from this higher vantage point. This is thus a work about global governance as a whole and at its core, rather than a problem-solving manual for a few of the issues now at centre stage. Furthermore, it applies this larger vision to the current G8 and global economic-security agenda to generate a set of policy recommendations about how the global community, through and outside the G8, can better cope with the complex interconnected challenges it now confronts. Its innovative policy recommendations are especially timely when the recent global financial crisis, economic recession and fragile recovery place great strains on the liberal economic order, while new challenges from Iran, ongoing terrorist threats and corruption make this security-economic connection critically important.

This book deals with the recent debt crises in developing countries and analyzes the design and implementation of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, by providing background concepts, pointing out the main drawbacks and suggesting a different approach to debt sustainability and debt relief programs. The authors merge academic, operational and institutional expertise, in order to provide an evaluation as complete and balanced as possible on the much-debated effectiveness of debt relief in fostering economic growth, reducing poverty and reaching debt sustainability. Marco Arnone and Andrea F. Presbitero assess the joint evolution of external and domestic public debt and produce original empirical evidence on the potential effects of public debt on investment, economic growth and institution-building in low- and middle-income countries. The book also explores relevant and up-to-date policy issues, such as the loans-grants mix and the development of responsible lending strategies in foreign assistance, the surge of non-concessional and domestic borrowing by low-income countries, and the impact of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis on debt sustainability.

Do highly indebted countries suffer from a debt overhang? Can debt relief foster their growth rates? To answer these important questions, this article looks at how the debt-growth relation varies with indebtedness levels, as well as with the quality of policies and institutions, in a panel of developing countries. The main findings are that, in countries with good policies and institutions, there is evidence of debt overhang when the net present value of debt rises above 20–25 percent of GDP; however, debt becomes irrelevant above 70–80 percent. In countries with bad policies and institutions, thresholds appear to be lower, but the evidence of debt overhang is weaker and we cannot rule out that debt is always irrelevant. Indeed, in such countries, as well as in countries with high indebtedness levels, investment does not depend on debt levels. The analysis suggests that not all countries are likely to profit from debt relief, and thus that a one-size-fits-all debt relief approach might not be the most appropriate one.