The observation that collection lags combine with inflation to erode fiscal revenues has long been a strong argument against seigniorage (Tanzi (1978)). However, with the exception of Dixit (1991), who used a general equilibrium model to reject this argument, the optimal tax literature has not analyzed how collection lags affect desired tax structures. In this paper, this issue is re-examined using an overlapping generations version of Dixit’s model. It is shown that depending on the specification of the collection cost function and the size of government spending in GDP, collection lags may increase, leave unchanged, or reduce the desired rate of inflation.

When there are collection lags in the tax system, inflation reduces the real revenues. This is often offered as an argument for less reliance on the inflation tax. But the optimal rates of other taxes should also be reconsidered in the light of collection lags. When this is done, the focus shifts from the revenues (which can be recouped by changing the rates of these taxes), to the associated costs of collection. In a benchmark case where the average costs of collection are constant, the optimal inflation tax is independent of the collection lag.

When there are collection lags in the tax system, inflation reduces the real revenues. This is often offered as an argument for less reliance on the inflation tax. But the optimal rates of other taxes should also be reconsidered in the light of collection lags. When this is done, the focus shifts from the revenues (which can be recouped by changing the rates of these taxes), to the associated costs of collection. In a benchmark case where the average costs of collection are constant, the optimal inflation tax is independent of the collection lag.

This paper analyzes the relationship between inflation tax and the level of government spending in a public finance context. The key feature of the model developed is that it recognizes the possibility that conventional taxes, such as the consumption tax, may carry increasing marginal collection costs. As a result, and unlike previous findings in the literature, the inflation tax becomes an increasing function of government spending. Furthermore, the more inefficient the tax collection system, the larger the increase in the inflation tax for a given increase in government spending. A numerical analysis of the model provides additional insights into these relationships.

This paper analyzes, in a public finance context, how the optimal use of the inflation and the consumption tax is affected by incorporating into the model constraints on policy decisions that are likely to develop in the context of the EMS by 1992. Two main questions are addressed: first, how the constraint of having to share a common inflation tax, in order to preserve fixed-exchange rates, influences the optimal policy decisions concerning the inflation tax; secondly, how the harmonization of consumption taxes affects the spread between national inflation rates, and hence the probability of having to resort to realignments.