In an ideal world, the laws of Congress--known as federal statutes--would always be clearly worded and easily understood by the judges tasked with interpreting them. But many laws feature ambiguous or even contradictory wording. How, then, should judges divine their meaning? Should they stick only to the text? To what degree, if any, should they consult aids beyond the statutes themselves? Are the purposes of lawmakers in writing law relevant? Some judges, such as Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, believe courts should look to the language of the statute and virtually nothing else. Chief Judge Robert A. Katzmann of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit respectfully disagrees. In Judging Statutes, Katzmann, who is a trained political scientist as well as a judge, argues that our constitutional system charges Congress with enacting laws; therefore, how Congress makes its purposes known through both the laws themselves and reliable accompanying materials should be respected. He looks at how the American government works, including how laws come to be and how various agencies construe legislation. He then explains the judicial process of interpreting and applying these laws through the demonstration of two interpretative approaches, purposivism (focusing on the purpose of a law) and textualism (focusing solely on the text of the written law). Katzmann draws from his experience to show how this process plays out in the real world, and concludes with some suggestions to promote understanding between the courts and Congress. When courts interpret the laws of Congress, they should be mindful of how Congress actually functions, how lawmakers signal the meaning of statutes, and what those legislators expect of courts construing their laws. The legislative record behind a law is in truth part of its foundation, and therefore merits consideration.

The Need for Interpretation expresses the growing reaction within the ranks of analytically-trained philosophers against the professed aims of current Anglo-American philosophy. The contributors challenge received dogmas on different philosophical topics, covering central issues from both Anglo-American and Continental traditions. Written in non-sectarian language for non-specialists, students and professional philosophers, these reflections of philosophy concern not only how it is done, but how it ought to be done

This book tells the story of Wittgenstein interpretation during the past eighty years. It provides different interpretations, chronologies, developments, and controversies. It aims to discover the motives and motivations behind the philosophical community's project of interpreting Wittgenstein. It will prove valuable to philosophers, scholars, interpreters, students, and specialists, in both analytic and continental philosophy.

Mastering Statutory Interpretation explains the methods of interpreting statutes, including a discussion of the various theories and canons of interpretation. The book begins by exploring these theories and identifying the sources of meaning the theorists use to interpret statutes, including intrinsic, extrinsic, and policy-based. Throughout, the text uses the major cases in each area of study to explain how the canons work in practice. Finally, each chapter provides a concise roadmap and summary to introduce and encapsulate the most important material. The second edition adds one new chapter to address the administrative issues that faculty teaching legislation and regulation need, as well as a running hypothetical to help students better implement what they are learning.

Barrister Chad Jacobi has created a unique and practical reference work in Interpretation Acts: Origins and Meaning. It is based on the premise that the Interpretation Acts, which are key tools to reading legislation in the various Australian jurisdictions, themselves need to be read as statutes, the meanings of which must be ascertained. Lawyers are often confronted with the - sometimes urgent - need to understand these provisions in the context of litigation, particularly in areas highly affected by statutory interpretation, like public law as well as criminal law, succession law, industrial law and tax. This text helps practitioners grasp the "how, what and why" of these provisions by looking to their origins: how they have come about, what has changed and what the authoritative decisions on their meaning are today. It is the first publication of its kind in Australia, presenting history that is not merely interesting on its own terms, but is important in the very practical context of law in operation. It is a must for every law library, private and public.

In this provocative book James K. A. Smith, one of the most engaging Christian scholars of our day, offers an innovative approach to hermeneutics. The second edition of Smith's well-received debut book provides updated interaction with contemporary hermeneutical discussions and responds to criticisms.