Belgium was once described as the 'dagger held at the throat of England', a collection of provinces that had long been a critical factor in British foreign policy, and the traditional concern was that Belgium, and especially the Flanders coast, would fall into the hands of the strongest continental power. In 1914, Germany's occupation of Belgium brought about the spectre of enemy ships only seventy miles from the British coast, and the coast of Flanders became, effectively, the naval flank of the Western Front.?Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz was one of the few within the German navy who recognised the strategic potential of the three ports of Ostend, Zeebrugge and Brugges; that they were closer to England than the Helgoland Bight for access by small craft, and brought Germany to within a few hours sailing of the Thames estuary. This new book tells the story of the creation, purpose, operations and career of the MarineKorps Flandern. The Flanders harbours should have allowed the German navy to strike dangerous blows at vital British traffic in the Channel and southern North Sea but the MarineKorps was unable to fulfill the great expectations of von Tirpitz. The author not only explains how the German conducted operations, but also explains how the opportunites presented by the Flemish occupation were wasted away. A significant and insightful book on an important theatre of the War

Palazzo's study is convincing in demonstrating that the British military command was not, contrary to the common belief, unwilling to adapt innovations in technology for use on the battlefield."-Virginia Quarterly Review.

The War for England's Shores examines the Kriegsmarine’s S-Boat offensive along the English Channel and the North Sea from 1940 to 1945, together with British (later Allied) responses to nullify that threat. The campaign against the convoys running along the coast of Britain has been overlooked by historians. Swift and armed with torpedoes and mines, the S-Boat posed a serious threat to the convoys forced to run along the British coast as often as six days out of every seven. Using an array of archival materials from Britain, Germany, and the United States, The War for England’s Shores examines why the Germans failed to make the most of this opportunity to disrupt the British war economy. G. H. Bennett analyzes how the British slowly nullified the threat by embracing new technologies and developing a system of sea control to gradually force the German S-Boat arm to transition from offensive action against Britain's coastal convoys to the defensive posture of waiting for an invasion of France. Considering the war along Britain's coastal convoy routes in the context of twenty-first-century interest in littoral warfare, this work has vital, current appeal using the German S-Boat campaign of 1940 to 1945 to offer significant and surprising new insights.