Belgium was once described as the 'dagger held at the throat of England', a collection of provinces that had long been a critical factor in British foreign policy, and the traditional concern was that Belgium, and especially the Flanders coast, would fall into the hands of the strongest continental power. In 1914, Germany's occupation of Belgium brought about the spectre of enemy ships only seventy miles from the British coast, and the coast of Flanders became, effectively, the naval flank of the Western Front.?Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz was one of the few within the German navy who recognised the strategic potential of the three ports of Ostend, Zeebrugge and Brugges; that they were closer to England than the Helgoland Bight for access by small craft, and brought Germany to within a few hours sailing of the Thames estuary. This new book tells the story of the creation, purpose, operations and career of the MarineKorps Flandern. The Flanders harbours should have allowed the German navy to strike dangerous blows at vital British traffic in the Channel and southern North Sea but the MarineKorps was unable to fulfill the great expectations of von Tirpitz. The author not only explains how the German conducted operations, but also explains how the opportunites presented by the Flemish occupation were wasted away. A significant and insightful book on an important theatre of the War

Palazzo's study is convincing in demonstrating that the British military command was not, contrary to the common belief, unwilling to adapt innovations in technology for use on the battlefield."-Virginia Quarterly Review.

The War for England's Shores examines the Kriegsmarine's S-Boat offensive along the English Channel and the North Sea from 1940 to 1945, together with British and, later, Allied responses to nullify that threat. Very fast, and armed with torpedoes and mines, S-Boats posed a serious threat to the convoys that were forced to run close along the British coast on a daily basis. Despite the significance of this campaign and the real threat to the whole British war economy, it has been, until now, strangely overlooked by historians. Indeed, the book highlights issues around the maritime identity of those states and navies that see themselves in oceanic terms, at the expense of engagement with, and operations in, coastal waters. Using an array of archival materials from Britain, Germany and the USA, The War for England’s Shores examines why the Germans failed to make the most of this opportunity to disrupt British trade. G H Bennett analyzes how the British slowly countered the threat by embracing new technologies and developing a system of sea control that gradually forced the German S-Boat arm from the offensive against Britain's coastal convoys, and on to the defensive in the months leading up to the invasion of France. The author also looks at the S-Boat campaign along these convoy routes in the context of present-day interest in littoral warfare, so that the work has a vital and current appeal and offers significant and surprising insights. The book offers an unparalleled exploration of a key moment in the development of coastal warfare, and will appeal to historians and enthusiasts as well as defense analysts and naval personnel.

This book takes a fresh look at the undersea war as a whole and all the complex factors bearing on the campaign, only one of which was convoy. Its analysis is original, and its conclusions thought-provoking – an important contribution to the naval history of the Great War.

This book is a study of Anglo-French relations and military policy making in the First World War, which considers the strategic policies and operational planning of the British and French armies in the joint campaign fought on the western front. It examines the influence of incompatible British and French strategic objectives, the role of the allies' military and political leaders and the institutional development of the military alliance, on the alliance relationship and military policy making.