In the wake of Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea and subsequent military support to separatists fighting in Eastern Ukraine, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has deployed Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) forces to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland to reassure NATO's members and to deter Russian aggression. The EFP suggests policy makers consider a Russian incursion into the Baltic States a significant possibility. This study explores the nature of Russia's threat to NATO's EFP. It details Russia's national security strategy, military doctrine, and foreign policy toward the Baltic States to assess Russia's political-strategic objectives. It analyzes Russia's military reforms, recent performance in Ukraine and Syria, and organization and training for combat to assess the combat potential Russia could bring to bear against NATO's EFP. The research suggests Russia is conducting information operations to achieve policy objectives in the Baltic States and does not seek to cross the threshold into open, armed conflict with NATO. The EFP presents a viable military deterrent against Russian armed aggression through its trip-wire function, which would lead to deterrence by punishment. However, the Baltic States, and thereby NATO, remain vulnerable to Russian political and social influence by way of energy dependence, malign state influence in the information sphere, and Estonia and Latvia's own divisive citizenship policies. NATO's ability to develop consensus on and codify what actions constitute an information operations attack will enhance NATO's ability to deter Russian information warfare. I. INTRODUCTION * A. BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE * B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS * C. LITERATURE REVIEW * D. POTENTIAL HYPOTHESIS * II. REASSURANCE, DETERRENCE, AND DEFENSE IN THE BALTIC STATES * A. THE IMPETUS FOR NATO ACTION * 1. Covert Invasion and Annexation of Crimea * 2. Russian-Backed Separatist Campaign in the Donbas * B. NATO RESPONSE * 1. NATO's Readiness Action Plan and the European Reassurance Initiative * 2. Enhanced Forward Presence * III. RUSSIAN POLICY AND STRATEGY * A. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY * B. MILITARY DOCTRINE * C. RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE BALTIC STATES * 1. Pre-Soviet Relations * 2. Post-Soviet Relations * D. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BALTIC STATES * 1. Concept and Aims of Hybrid Warfare * 2. Russia's Hybrid Warfare Goals and Methods in the Baltic States * 3. Susceptibility of the Baltic States to Russian Hybrid Tactics * IV. RUSSIAN MILITARY CAPABILITY * A. REFORMS * 1. Serdyukov, Makarov, and the New Look * 2. Shoigu * 3. Organizational Reforms * 4. Material Reforms * B. CONTEMPORARY PERFORMANCE * 1. Ukraine * 2. Syria * C. GROUND FORCE CAPABILITY * 1. Western Military District Composition and Disposition * 2. The Battalion Tactical Group and its Organization and Equipment * 3. Training in the Western Military District * V. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS * A. PERSONNEL * B. LOGISTICS * 1. GPV * C. FORCE GENERATION AND DEPLOYMENT * D. OPPORTUNITIES * VI. CONCLUSION

How should the countries in the Baltic Sea region and their allies meet the strategic challenges posed by an openly aggressive and expansionist Russia? NATO and the nonaligned states in the region are now more concerned about an external threat than they have been since the end of the Cold War. Russia has been probing air space, maritime boundaries, and even land borders from the Baltic republics to Sweden. Russia's undermining of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea worries former Soviet republics with Russian minority populations, nonaligned Sweden and Finland are enhancing their cooperation with NATO, and the Trump presidency has created some doubt about America's willingness to follow through on NATO's collective defense commitment. Ann-Sofie Dahl brings together an international group of experts to examine Baltic security issues on a state-by-state basis and to contemplate what is needed to deter Russia in the region. The contributors analyze ways to strengthen regional cooperation, and to ensure that security in the region stays at the top of the agenda at a time of many competing strategic perspectives in the transatlantic community. This book will be of great interest to foreign policy and defense practitioners in the US and Europe as well as scholars and students of international relations.

In 2004 the Baltic states - Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania - finalized their return to the West by joining NATO and the EU after definitively throwing off their 'captive nations' status by regaining independence in 1991. This has not, however, halted resurgent Russian revanchism in the region; given Russia's aggressive actions starting in Ukraine in 2014, defense of the Baltic has gained a new urgency and prominence. In The West's East, Lukas Milevski places the Baltic states in strategic and historical perspective. Through these nations' experiences, he sheds light on how independent states have been able to persist, despite being surrounded by predatory great powers. The work offers a deep overview of the region's history, from the indigenous Baltic tribes which populated it to the post-Cold War era, followed by recent political analogies of West-Russia relations. Analyses of today's strategic balance in the region indicate the various actors' geopolitical outlooks, strategic cultures, military capabilities, and non-military security vulnerabilities. As Milevski argues, the NATO-Russia relationship will play the major role in any potential conflict in the Baltic, but neutrals Finland and Sweden must also be factored into the strategic analysis. Using the logic of strategy he anticipates potential military interaction in the region step by step-from deterrence, to Russia's choice of offensive strategy, to area denial and NATO's return and break into the Baltic theater, and finally war termination-to determine the answer to the ultimate question: how much defense for the Baltic is enough? The West's East gives both experts and policymakers alike the background and framework for thinking strategically about a region that has re-emerged as a significant geopolitical concern in the Putin-Trump era.

Moscow's use of its military abroad in recent years has radically reshaped perceptions of Russia as an international actor. With the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the invasion of eastern Ukraine and sustainment of an insurgency there, and (in particular) the 2015 intervention in Syria, Russia repeatedly surprised U.S. policymakers with its willingness and ability to use its military to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Despite Russia's relatively small global economic footprint, it has engaged in more interventions than any other U.S. competitor since the end of the Cold War. In this report, the authors assess when, where, and why Russia conducts military interventions by analyzing the 25 interventions that Russia has undertaken since 1991, including detailed case studies of the 2008 Russia-Georgia War and Moscow's involvement in the ongoing Syrian civil war. The authors suggest that Russia is most likely to intervene to prevent erosion of its influence in its neighborhood, particularly following a shock that portends such an erosion occurring rapidly. If there were to be a regime change in a core Russian regional ally, such as Belarus or Armenia, that brought to power a government hostile to Moscow's interests, it is possible (if not likely) that a military intervention could ensue.

Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces The mighty Soviet Army is no more. The feckless Russian Army that stumbled into Chechnya is no more. Today's Russian Army is modern, better manned, better equipped and designed for maneuver combat under nuclear-threatened conditions. This is your source for the tactics, equipment, force structure and theoretical underpinnings of a major Eurasian power. Here's what the experts are saying: "A superb baseline study for understanding how and why the modern Russian Army functions as it does. Essential for specialist and generalist alike." -Colonel (Ret) David M. Glantz, foremost Western author on the Soviet Union in World War II and Editor of The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. "Congratulations to Les Grau and Chuck Bartles on filling a gap which has yawned steadily wider since the end of the USSR. Their book addresses evolving Russian views on war, including the blurring of its nature and levels, and the consequent Russian approaches to the Ground Forces' force structuring, manning, equipping, and tactics. Confidence is conferred on the validity of their arguments and conclusions by copious footnoting, mostly from an impressive array of primary sources. It is this firm grounding in Russian military writings, coupled with the authors' understanding of war and the Russian way of thinking about it, that imparts such an authoritative tone to this impressive work." -Charles Dick, former Director of the Combat Studies Research Centre, Senior Fellow at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, author of the 1991 British Army Field Manual, Volume 2, A Treatise on Soviet Operational Art and author of From Victory to Stalemate The Western Front, Summer 1944 and From Defeat to Victory, The Eastern Front, Summer 1944. "Dr. Lester Grau's and Chuck Bartles' professional research on the Russian Armed Forces is widely read throughout the world and especially in Russia. Russia's Armed Forces have changed much since the large-scale reforms of 2008, which brought the Russian Army to the level of the world's other leading armies. The speed of reform combined with limited information about their core mechanisms represented a difficult challenge to the authors. They have done a great job and created a book which could be called an encyclopedia of the modern armed forces of Russia. They used their wisdom and talents to explore vital elements of the Russian military machine: the system of recruitment and training, structure of units of different levels, methods and tactics in defense and offence and even such little-known fields as the Arctic forces and the latest Russian combat robotics." -Dr. Vadim Kozyulin, Professor of Military Science and Project Director, Project on Asian Security, Emerging Technologies and Global Security Project PIR Center, Moscow. "Probably the best book on the Russian Armed Forces published in North America during the past ten years. A must read for all analysts and professionals following Russian affairs. A reliable account of the strong and weak aspects of the Russian Army. Provides the first look on what the Russian Ministry of Defense learned from best Western practices and then applied them on Russian soil." -Ruslan Pukhov, Director of the Moscow-based Centre for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST) and member of the Public Council of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense. Author of Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine, Russia's New Army, and The Tanks of August.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine and swift annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 put the West on notice. To reassert the prestige lost since the Cold War's end, Russian President Vladimir Putin galvanized his political base with the promise of revanchism. The recent case of Ukraine is particularly alarming not only due to the forceful seizure of territory but also the "hybrid" warfighting techniques employed by Russian forces. The Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, former Soviet Republics with fledgling Western governments located on Russia's immediate border and, importantly, members of the NATO alliance, seem a logical future target for aggression. For the United States and NATO, the costs of failing to deter Russia's revanchist ambitions are clear; either initiating a costly campaign to liberate an Alliance member or allowing Russia to remake the post-Cold War order.In the context of the recent conflict in Ukraine and the binding nature of NATO's collective security "guarantee," this paper will examine the steps the U.S. and NATO can reasonably take to deter Russia's revanchist ambitions in the Baltic republics, particularly from the threat of hybrid warfare. It will begin by providing a brief history of the Baltic Republics and the threat posed by Russia and hybrid warfare. Next, this paper will explore the strategic interests of the main protagonists and consider the requirements for an effective deterrent strategy. Finally, it will examine various ways and means across the various instruments of power that might be applied to deter Russian aggression in the Baltics, especially from the threat of hybrid warfare. In the final analysis, it is only through resolute action in implementing policy recommendations that encompass all instruments of power that the U.S. and NATO will be able to effectively deter Russian aggression and achieve their strategic interests in the region.This compilation includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.