The most solemn obligation of any president is to safeguard the nation's security. But the president cannot do this alone. He needs help. In the past half century, presidents have relied on their national security advisers to provide that help. Who are these people, the powerful officials who operate in the shadow of the Oval Office, often out of public view and accountable only to the presidents who put them there? Some remain obscure even to this day. But quite a number have names that resonate far beyond the foreign policy elite: McGeorge Bundy, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice. Ivo Daalder and Mac Destler provide the first inside look at how presidents from John F. Kennedy to George W. Bush have used their national security advisers to manage America's engagements with the outside world. They paint vivid portraits of the fourteen men and one woman who have occupied the coveted office in the West Wing, detailing their very different personalities, their relations with their presidents, and their policy successes and failures. It all started with Kennedy and Bundy, the brilliant young Harvard dean who became the nation's first modern national security adviser. While Bundy served Kennedy well, he had difficulty with his successor. Lyndon Johnson needed reassurance more than advice, and Bundy wasn't always willing to give him that. Thus the basic lesson -- the president sets the tone and his aides must respond to that reality. The man who learned the lesson best was someone who operated mainly in the shadows. Brent Scowcroft was the only adviser to serve two presidents, Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush. Learning from others' failures, he found the winning formula: gain the trust of colleagues, build a collaborative policy process, and stay close to the president. This formula became the gold standard -- all four national security advisers who came after him aspired to be "like Brent." The next president and national security adviser can learn not only from success, but also from failure. Rice stayed close to George W. Bush -- closer perhaps than any adviser before or since. But her closeness did not translate into running an effective policy process, as the disastrous decision to invade Iraq without a plan underscored. It would take years, and another national security aide, to persuade Bush that his Iraq policy was failing and to engineer a policy review that produced the "surge." The national security adviser has one tough job. There are ways to do it well and ways to do it badly. Daalder and Destler provide plenty of examples of both. This book is a fascinating look at the personalities and processes that shape policy and an indispensable guide to those who want to understand how to operate successfully in the shadow of the Oval Office.

Never before in the history of mankind have so few people had so much power over so many. The people at the top of the American national security establishment, the President and his principal advisors, the core team at the helm of the National Security Council, are without question the most powerful committee in the history of the world. Yet, in many respects, they are among the least understood. A former senior official in the Clinton Administration himself, David Rothkopf served with and knows personally many of the NSC's key players of the past twenty-five years. In Running the World he pulls back the curtain on this shadowy world to explore its inner workings, its people, their relationships, their contributions and the occasions when they have gone wrong. He traces the group's evolution from the final days of the Second World War to the post-Cold War realities of global terror -- exploring its triumphs, its human dramas and most recently, what many consider to be its breakdown at a time when we needed it most. Drawing on an extraordinary series of insider interviews with policy makers including Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, Henry Kissinger, senior officials of the Bush Administration, and over 130 others, the book offers unprecedented insights into what must change if America is to maintain its unprecedented worldwide leadership in the decades ahead.

This revelatory history of the elusive National Security Council shows how staffers operating in the shadows have driven foreign policy clandestinely for decades. When Michael Flynn resigned in disgrace as the Trump administration’s national security advisor the New York Times referred to the National Security Council as “the traditional center of management for a president’s dealings with an uncertain world.” Indeed, no institution or individual in the last seventy years has exerted more influence on the Oval Office or on the nation’s wars than the NSC, yet until the explosive Trump presidency, few Americans could even name a member. With key analysis, John Gans traces the NSC’s rise from a collection of administrative clerks in 1947 to what one recent commander-in-chief called the president’s “personal band of warriors.” A former Obama administration speechwriter, Gans weaves extensive archival research with dozens of news-making interviews to reveal the NSC’s unmatched power, which has resulted in an escalation of hawkishness and polarization, both in Washington and the nation at large.

“Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?” “Who will be guarding the guardians?”—Juvenal The U.S. president’s decisions on national security and foreign policy reverberate around the world. The National Security Council (NSC) and the national security advisor are central to the decision making process. But how was the role of the national security advisor originally understood, and how has that understanding changed over time? Above all, how has the changing role of the national security advisor affected executive decisions and the implementation of policy? Now, presidential scholar John P. Burke systematically and thoroughly addresses these questions. In Honest Broker?, he reviews the office of national security advisor from its inception during the Eisenhower presidency to its latest iteration in the White House of George W. Bush. He explores the ways in which the original conception of the national security advisor—as an “honest broker” who, rather than directly advocate for any certain policy direction, was instead charged with overseeing the fairness, completeness, and accuracy of the policymaking process—has evolved over time. In six case studies he then analyzes the implications of certain pivotal changes in the advisor’s role, providing thoughtful and sometimes critical reflections on how these changes square with the role of “honest broker.” Finally, Burke offers some prescriptive consideration of how the definition of the national security advisor’s role relates to effective presidential decision making and the crucial issues of American national security. Honest Broker? will be an important resource for scholars, students, political leaders, and general readers interested in the U.S. presidency, foreign policy, and national security

The National Security Council is the most important formal institution inthe government of the United States for the creation and implementation offoreign and defense policy. The Council's four principal members - thePresident, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense - areresponsible for incredibly vast decisions of war and peace, diplomacy,international trade, and covert operations. Yet, despite its obvious importance,the NSC has been subject to relatively little scholarly scrutiny, and remainsmisunderstood by most IR students. This edited collection, built upon the firstedition originally published under the title Decisions of the Highest Order atBrooks-Cole, presents a collection of seminal articles, essays, and documentsdrawn from a variety of sources, that will offer revealing coverage of keytopics such as the rise of the National Security Adviser to a position ofprominence, key challenges to the NSC, and the role of the NSC in a post-ColdWar environment.

"America's network of international relationships is its foremost strategic asset, even as the agency charged with advancing U.S. interests through diplomacy-the Department of State (DOS)-has fallen into a deep and sustained period of crisis," write former diplomats Uzra S. Zeya and Jon Finer. In Revitalizing the State Department and American Diplomacy, they argue that "left unaddressed, the challenges that DOS faces risk causing irreparable damage to America's standing and influence in the world, ability to advance its interests overseas, and security and prosperity at home." The authors note that "despite the decades-long failure to implement essential reforms-and even in the face of sustained hostility from the [Donald J. Trump] administration-diplomacy remains the best tool the United States has to advance its foreign policy interests." "But many of the challenges facing the DOS have existed for decades," they explain. "Deficits in diversity, institutional culture, and professionalization are endemic to the State Department as an institution, and a diminished policy role for career officials persisted under previous administrations." Zeya and Finer identify areas in greatest need of reform and offer the following recommendations for the next secretary of state: Twenty-First-Century Statecraft. The State Department should develop "greater expertise in the range of issues that will be essential to American leadership in the twenty-first century," which include climate change, pandemic disease, shifting global power, economic competitiveness, equity, anticorruption, and technological transformation. Institutional Reform. "Make the State Department a diverse, equitable, and inclusive institution" by underscoring diversity as a national security priority, overcoming a risk-averse culture, delayering and decentralizing decision-making, and bridging the career-noncareer divide. Workforce Expansion. "Urgent attention needs to be devoted to revitalizing the professional path and retention of the current DOS workforce," which has seen "a brain drain of senior talent" and "Civil Service staffing frozen at 2017 levels." The authors suggest greater flexibility in career paths and enabling return, as well as rebooting and expanding training and continuous learning. Beyond the Near Term. "The State Department would also benefit from some longer-term thinking" including amending the Foreign Service Act, implementing unified national security budgeting, and establishing a Diplomatic Reserve Corps. "When properly empowered and entrusted with significant responsibilities, American diplomats play essential roles in consequential outcomes for the country," the authors write. Revitalizing the State Department and restoring diplomacy "means addressing deficiencies in DOS policy focus and capacity, institutional culture, and workforce diversity and flexibility, while laying the groundwork to cement these and other changes through legislation," the authors conclude. Finer was chief of staff and director of policy planning at the U.S. Department of State. He is currently on leave as an adjunct senior fellow at CFR. Zeya is CEO and president of the Alliance for Peacebuilding and previously had a twenty-seven-year diplomatic career.