The mission of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) is to understand current and future biological threats; assess vulnerabilities and determine potential consequences; and provide a national capability for conducting forensic analysis of evidence from bio-crimes and bio-terrorism. The NBACC is operational, with a program office and several component centers occupying interim facilities. A laboratory facility dedicated to executing the NBACC mission and to contain two NBACC component centers is being built at Fort Detrick, Maryland, as part of the National Interagency Biodefense Campus. The laboratory facility, with an estimated construction cost of $141 million, will be the first Department of Homeland Security laboratory specifically focused on biodefense. Its programmatic contents and component organization appear to be evolving, as conflicting information has been provided during previous budget cycles. Congressional oversight of programs, especially those performed in federal facilities for homeland security purposes, is considered key to maintaining transparency in biodefense. Policy issues that may interest Congress include the operation of the NBACC facility as a federally funded research and development center, transparency and oversight of research activities performed through the center, and the potential for duplication and coordination of research effort between the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.

The construction of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC), with an estimated construction cost of $128 million, will be the first Department of Homeland Security laboratory specifically focused on biodefense. Its programmatic contents and component organization are unclear, as conflicting information has been provided during each of the past three budget cycles. Congressional oversight of programs, especially those performed in federal facilities for homeland security purposes, is considered key to maintaining transparency in biodefense. Policy issues which may interest Congress include funding for the construction of the NBACC facility, transparency of research activities performed through the center, and the potential for duplication of effort between the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.

The fed. gov¿t. responded to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent anthrax attacks with increased focus on and funding for biodefense. High-containment labs. (HCL) play a critical role in the biodefense effort, offering the hope of better responses to an attack and a better understanding of the threat posed by bioterrorism. However, they also could increase the risk of a biological attack by serving as a potential source of materials or training. Policymakers have become increasingly interested in the oversight of these facilities following reports of accidents, regulatory noncompliance, and community resistance. A key task for policymakers is to define their goals for enhancing oversight of HCL. Illustrations

The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the impacts of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. (These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases.) Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and impact of a successful terrorist attack. To safeguard the United States against animal disease, Congress has appropriated funds to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to engage in research at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), off the coast of New York, on animal diseases not native to the United States. When creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, Congress transferred the PIADC facility from USDA to DHS. Both USDA and DHS, in cooperation with USDA, conduct foreign animal disease research at PIADC, but PIADC has been identified as outdated and too limited to continue as the primary facility for this research. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 tasks the Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security to develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories for research and development of diagnostic capabilities and medical countermeasures for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. To partially meet these obligations, DHS has requested Congress to appropriate funds to construct a new facility, the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). This facility would house high-containment laboratories able to handle the pathogens currently under investigation at PIADC, as well as other pathogens of interest. Six candidate sites have been identified, one of which is Plum Island. The DHS plans to select the site in 2008 and open NBAF in 2014.

The Directorate of Science and Technology (DST) is the primary organization for R&D in the Dept. of Homeland Security. With an budget of $932.6 million in FY 2009, it conducts R&D in several labs. of its own and funds R&D conducted by other gov¿t. agencies, the Dept. of Energy nat. labs., industry, and univ. The directorate consists of six divisions: Chemical and Biological; Explosives; Command, Control, and Interoperability; Borders and Maritime Security; Infrastructure and Geophysical; and Human Factors. Additional offices have responsibilities, such as lab. facilities and univ. programs, that cut across the divisions. In the past, there has been criticism of the DST¿s performance. Although management changes have somewhat muted this criticism in recent years, fundamental issues remain, which this paper discusses. Charts and tables.

To safeguard the U.S. against animal disease, research has been conducted at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), off the coast of N.Y., on animal diseases not native to the U.S. PIADC is outdated and too limited to continue as the primary facility for this research. A plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-art agriculture bio-containment labs for R&D of diagnostic capabilities and medical counter-measures for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases has been approved. A new facility will be constructed which would house high-containment labs able to handle the pathogens currently under investigation at PIADC, as well as others. Community concerns about safety and security are being voiced about NBAF. This is a print on demand report.