The idea that a radical transformation of the Presidency took place during the FDR administration has become one of the most widely accepted tenets of contemporary scholarship. According to this view, the Constitutional Presidency was a product of the Founders' fear of arbitrary power. Only with the development of a popular extra-Constitutional Presidency did the powerful "modern Presidency" emerge. David K. Nichols argues to the contrary that the "modern Presidency" was not created by FDR. What happened during FDR's administration was a transformation in the size and scope of the national government, rather than a transformation of the Presidency in its relations to the Constitution or the other branches of government. Nichols demonstrates that the essential elements of the modern Presidency have been found throughout our history, although often less obvious in an era where the functions of the national government as a whole were restricted. Claiming that we have failed to fully appreciate the character of the Constitutional Presidency, Nichols shows that the potential for the modern Presidency was created in the Constitution itself. He analyzes three essential aspects of the modern Presidency--the President's role in the budgetary process, the President's role as chief executive, and the War Powers Act--that are logical outgrowths of the decisions made at the Constitutional Convention. Nichols concludes that it is the authors of the American Constitution, not the English or European philosophers, who provide the most satisfactory reconciliation of executive power and limited popular government. It is the authors of the Constitution who created the modern Presidency.

The Myth of Presidential Representation evaluates the nature of American presidential representation, questioning the commonly held belief that presidents represent the community at large.

This book examines the contact relationships between U.S. presidents and America's intellectuals since 1960.

Throughout American history, presidents have shown a startling power to act independently of Congress and the courts. On their own initiative, presidents have taken the country to war, abolished slavery, shielded undocumented immigrants from deportation, declared a national emergency at the border, and more, leading many to decry the rise of an imperial presidency. But given the steep barriers that usually prevent Congress and the courts from formally checking unilateral power, what stops presidents from going it alone even more aggressively? The answer, Dino P. Christenson and Douglas L. Kriner argue, lies in the power of public opinion. With robust empirical data and compelling case studies, the authors reveal the extent to which domestic public opinion limits executive might. Presidents are emboldened to pursue their own agendas when they enjoy strong public support, and constrained when they don’t, since unilateral action risks inciting political pushback, jeopardizing future initiatives, and further eroding their political capital. Although few Americans instinctively recoil against unilateralism, Congress and the courts can sway the public’s view via their criticism of unilateral policies. Thus, other branches can still check the executive branch through political means. As long as presidents are concerned with public opinion, Christenson and Kriner contend that fears of an imperial presidency are overblown.

This sterling collection of original, never-before-published essays on six fascinating contemporary presidents by some of the leading presidential biographers of our time is must reading for anyone interested in American politics, the history of the American presidency, or the lives of the presidents. Each essay -- extending and elaborating on lectures originally delivered as part of the Montgomery Lecture Series at Dartmouth University -- explores how a particular president came to power, wielded power, and was changed by power, and how each presidency affected the power of the office itself. The presidencies addressed are those of Roosevelt, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Reagan, and Clinton. Published as our nation begins the process of electing the 43rd president, during a time when some believe the independence of the office itself is at stake, Power and the Presidency is a timely and thought-provoking look at the nature of power in American democracy.

"The extraordinary nature of the Trump presidency has spawned a resurgence in the study of the presidency and a rising concern about the power of the office. In Power Shifts: Congress and Presidential Representation, John Dearborn explores the development of the idea of the representative presidency, that the president alone is elected by a national constituency, and thus the only part of government who can represent the nation against the parochial concerns of members of Congress, and its relationship to the growth of presidential power in the 20th century. Dearborn asks why Congress conceded so much power to the Chief Executive, with the support of particularly conservative members of the Supreme Court. He discusses the debates between Congress and the Executive and the arguments offered by politicians, scholars, and members of the judiciary about the role of the president in the American state. He asks why so many bought into the idea of the representative, and hence, strong presidency despite unpopular wars, failed foreign policies, and parochial actions that favor only the president's supporters. This is a book about the power of ideas in the development of the American state"--

America’s model of representational government rests on the premise that elected officials respond to the opinions of citizens. This is a myth, however, not a reality, according to James N. Druckman and Lawrence R. Jacobs. In Who Governs?, Druckman and Jacobs combine existing research with novel data from US presidential archives to show that presidents make policy by largely ignoring the views of most citizens in favor of affluent and well-connected political insiders. Presidents treat the public as pliable, priming it to focus on personality traits and often ignoring it on policies that fail to become salient. Melding big debates about democratic theory with existing research on American politics and innovative use of the archives of three modern presidents—Johnson, Nixon, and Reagan—Druckman and Jacobs deploy lively and insightful analysis to show that the conventional model of representative democracy bears little resemblance to the actual practice of American politics. The authors conclude by arguing that polyarchy and the promotion of accelerated citizen mobilization and elite competition can improve democratic responsiveness. An incisive study of American politics and the flaws of representative government, this book will be warmly welcomed by readers interested in US politics, public opinion, democratic theory, and the fecklessness of American leadership and decision-making.