The immediate human toll of the 1994 Flight 427 disaster was staggering: all 132 people aboard died on a Pennsylvania hillside. The subsequent investigation was a maze of politics, bizarre theories, and shrouded answers. Bill Adair, an award-winning journalist, was granted special access to the five-year inquiry by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) while its investigators tried to determine if the world's most widely used commercial jet, the Boeing 737, was really safe. Their findings have had wide-ranging effects on the airline industry, pilots, and even passangers. Adair takes readers behind the scenes to show who makes decisions about airline safety—and why.

Flying is an extremely safe way to travel. Fewer than 14,000 individuals perished in U.S. airline disasters during the twentieth century. In contrast, nearly three times as many people lose their lives in automobile accidents every year. Yet plane crashes have a tremendous impact on public perceptions of air safety in the United States. When a crash occurs domestically, media coverage is immediate and continuous. Government teams rush to investigate, elected officials offer condolences and promise to find the cause, and airlines and plane manufacturers seek to avoid responsibility. Regulations are frequently proposed in response to a particular incident, but meaningful change often does not occur. In The Plane Truth, Roger Cobb and David Primo examine the impact of high-visibility plane crashes on airline transportation policy. Regulation is disjointed and reactive, in part due to extensive media coverage of airline disasters. The authors describe the typical responses of various players—elected officials, investigative agencies, airlines, and the media. While all agree that safety is the primary concern in air travel, failure to agree on a definition of safety leads to policy conflicts. Looking at all airline crashes in the 1990s, the authors examine how particular features of an accident correspond to the level of media attention it receives, as well as how airline disasters affect subsequent actions by the National Transportation Safety Board, Federal Aviation Administration, and others. Three accidents are considered in detail: USAir flight 427 (September 1994), ValuJet flight 592 (May 1996), and TWA flight 800 (July 1996). The authors also discuss how the September 11 terrorist attacks turned attention away from safety and toward security. Cobb and Primo make several policy recommendations based on their findings. These include calling on lawmakers and regulators to avoid reactive regulation and instead to focus on systematic problems in a

This study of the Boeing 737 airliner focuses on US Airways Flight 427, which crashed in March 1994, near Pittsburgh, killing all 132 aboard. The author relates how that crash kicked off years of painstaking research by the NTSB, the FAA, and Boeing that finally uncovered a minor, yet lethal flaw that had been designed into the aircraft.

On December 20, 1995, American Airlines Flight 965, a Boeing 757-223, was on a scheduled passenger flight from Miami, Florida, U.S.A., to Cali, Colombia. Close to its final destination the pilots erroneously cleared the approach waypoints from their navigation computer. When the controller asked the pilots to check back in over Tulua, north of Cali, it was no longer programmed into the computer. They were lost and the aircraft crashed into a mountain. Of the 163 people on board, 4 passengers survived miraculously the accident.

On April 15, 2002, Air China flight 129, a Boeing 767-200ER, operated by Air China, en route from Beijing, China to Busan, Korea, crashed on Mt. Dotdae, near Gimhae Airport, Busan. Of the 166 persons on board, 37 persons survived the crash, while 129 occupants were killed. The Korean Aviation Accident Investigation Board (KAAIB) determined that the probable cause of the crash was pilot error due to poor crew resource management and lost situational awareness during the circling approach of the runway. The Chinese investigation team pointed out that the Korean ATC was not fully licensed and mistakenly directed the airliner to descend to a wrong altitude and that the airport did not inform the crew of the weather conditions at the time. A contributing factor was that the airline made all announcements in Chinese and English, while most passengers were Korean.

On 4 October 1992, El Al Israel Airlines Flight 1862, a Boeing 747-200 Freighter, departed from Schiphol Airport, Amsterdam, on its way to Tel Aviv, Israel. Seven minutes after take-off the plane lost engine no. 3 and 4 and crashed in an apartment block just outside Amsterdam, killing 43 people. The investigation concluded that the design and certification of the B 747 pylon was inadequate to provide the required level of safety. Furthermore the system to ensure structural integrity by inspection failed.

During the night of 04th May 2007, the B737-800, registration 5Y-KYA, operated by Kenya Airways as flight KQA 507 from Abidjan international airport (C te d'Ivoire), to the Jomo Kenyatta airport Nairobi (Kenya), made a scheduled stop-over at the Douala international airport (Cameroon). The weather was stormy. A number of departing planes decided to wait for the weather to improve. Kenya Airways, however, decided to depart. Shortly after take-off at about 1000 ft, the aircraft entered into a slow right roll that increased continuously and eventually ended up in a spiral dive. On the 5th May 2007 at approximately 0008 hrs, the airplane crashed in a mangrove swamp South-South/East of Douala. All 114 people on board were killed and the airplane was completely destroyed. The airplane crashed after loss of control by the crew as a result of spatial disorientation, after a long slow roll, during which no instrument scanning was done, and in the absence of external visual references in a dark night.