As the global war on terror enters its second decade, the United States military is engaged with militant Islamic insurgents on multiple fronts. But the post-9/11 war against terrorists is not the first time the United States has battled such ferocious foes. The forgotten Moro War, lasting from 1902 to 1913 in the islands of the southern Philippines, was the first confrontation between American soldiers and their allies and a determined Muslim insurgency. The Moro War prefigured American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan more than superficially: It was a bitter, drawn-out conflict in which American policy and aims were fiercely contested between advocates of punitive military measures and proponents of conciliation. As in today's Middle East, American soldiers battled guerrillas in a foreign environment where the enemy knew the terrain and enjoyed local support. The deadliest challenge was distinguishing civilians from suicidal attackers. Moroland became a crucible of leadership for the U.S. Army, bringing the force that had fought the Civil War and the Plains Indian Wars into the twentieth century. The officer corps of the Moro campaign matured into the American generals of World War I. Chief among them was the future general John Pershing-who learned lessons in the island jungles that would guide his leadership in France. Rich with relevance to today's news from the Middle East, and a gripping piece of storytelling, The Moro War is a must-read to understand a formative conflict too long overlooked and to anticipate the future of U.S. involvement overseas.

Underlying all the manifestations of a complex conflict in the southern Philippines is a straightforward political-economic explanation. This study contends that landlessness and the continuing weakness of state institutions in implementing agrarian reform and enforcing ancestral domain claims are fundamental issues whose resolution may well hold the key to establishing long-term peace in the southern Philippines.

This book makes a significant interdisciplinary contribution to existing scholarship on ethnicity, conflict, nation-making, colonial history and religious minorities in the Philippines, which has been confronted with innumerable issues relating to their ethnic and religious minority populations. Using Sarangani Bay as a research site, the book zones in on the lives of the Muslim Sinamas and the Christianized indigenous B'laans as they navigate the effects of the ongoing turmoil in the Bangsamoro region in Muslim Mindanao—a multi-faceted conflict involving numerous armed groups, as well as clans, criminal gangs and political elites. This work considers the factors affecting the Muslim Moro people, who have long been struggling for their right to self-determination. The conflict in the Moro areas has evolved over the past five decades from an ethnonationalist struggle between an aggrieved minority and a thorny issue for the central government: a highly fragmented conflict with multiple overlapping causes of violence. The book provides a framework for understanding the ethnic separatism in the case of the southern part of the country, framed by the concept of ethnic boundaries. Providing an excellent blend of theory and empirical evidence, the author confronts how ethno-religious divisions adversely impact the quality of life and unpacks how these divisions challenge multiculturalist policies. Weaving together multiple branches of the social sciences, this book is of interest to policymakers, researchers and students interested in international relations and political science, Asian studies, ethnic studies, Philippines’ history, sociology and anthropology.

Making Moros offers a unique look at the colonization of Muslim subjects during the early years of American rule in the southern Philippines. Hawkins argues that the ethnological discovery, organization, and subsequent colonial engineering of Moros was highly contingent on developing notions of time, history, and evolution, which ultimately superseded simplistic notions about race. He also argues that this process was highly collaborative, with Moros participating, informing, guiding, and even investing in their configuration as modern subjects. Drawing on a wealth of archival sources from both the United States and the Philippines, Making Moros presents a series of compelling episodes and gripping evidence to demonstrate its thesis. Readers will find themselves with an uncommon understanding of the Philippines' Muslim South beyond its usual tangential place as a mere subset of American empire.

Why were Moro insurgents unable to sustain their authority and legitimacy after gaining access to political power? The study shows how rebels who surrendered their arms in exchange for formal authority were unable to compete with powerful clans and local elites who provided basic security; captured increasing amounts of internal revenue allotments under a regime of devolution; and, enabled the spread of a shadow economy that boosted their power and allowed citizens to secure their livelihoods with little taxation by the state. The implications are quite startling. Political legitimacy is not necessarily about building a strong state, but about weakening it. Legitimacy may be less about building peace, and more about demonstrating an ability to inflict violence. This books is useful to scholars interested in other contexts of insurgency and rebellion, and in understanding the challenges that lie behind sub-national state building and political settlements.