The idea of the more economic approach marks the long-awaited review of EU prohibition of abuse of dominance. This work depicts the development of the more economic approach under Article 102 TFEU, and in particular analyses two Commission's documents: the 2005 Discussion Paper and the 2009 Priorities Paper. It also explains what the more economic approach in abuse of dominance cases means for EU institutions, namely the Commission's practice, and the case law of the CJEU. The author argues that despite the fact that the trend of the more economic approach in Europe is hallmarked by the clash between the Commission's policy and the jurisprudence of the CJEU, it appears undeniable that the process of the EU institutions' transition towards a more economic approach to Article 102 TFEU has begun. Finally, the work also provides a comparison between the US and EU abuse of market power regimes, and points to the most important similarities and discrepancies.

“A reference book in this area of EU competition law and a must-have companion for academics, enforcers and practitioners alike, as well as EU and national judges.” Judge Nils Wahl, Court of Justice of the European Union This seminal text offers an authoritative and integrated treatment of the legal and economic principles that underpin the application of Article 102 TFEU to the behaviour of dominant firms. Traditional concerns of monopoly behaviour, such as predatory pricing, refusals to deal, excessive pricing, tying and bundling, discount practices and unlawful discrimination are treated in detail through a review of the applicable economic principles, the case law and decisional practice and more recent economic and legal writings. In addition, the major constituent elements of Article 102 TFEU, such as market definition, dominance, effect on trade and applicable remedies are considered at length. The third edition involves a net addition of over 250 pages, with a substantial new chapter on Abuses In Digital Platforms, an extensively revised chapter on standards, and virtually all chapters incorporating substantial revisions reflecting key cases such as Intel, MEO, Google Android, Google Shopping, AdSense, and Qualcomm.

In the late 1990s, the European Commission embarked on a long process of introducing a 'more economic approach' to EU Antitrust law. One by one, it reviewed its approach to all three pillars of EU Antitrust Law, starting with Article 101 TFEU, moving on to EU merger control and concluding the process with Article 102 TFEU. Its aim was to make EU antitrust law more compatible with contemporary economic thinking. On the basis of an extensive empirical analysis of the Commission's main enforcement tools, this book establishes the changes that the more economic approach has made to the Commission's enforcement practice over the past fifteen years. It demonstrates that the more economic approach not only introduced modern economic assessment tools to the Commission's analyses, but fundamentally changed the Commission's interpretation of the law. Emulating one of the key credos of the US Antitrust Revolution thirty years earlier, the Commission reinterpreted the EU antitrust rules as aiming at the enhancement of economic consumer welfare only, and amended its understanding of key legal concepts accordingly. This book argues that the Commission's new understanding of the law has many benefits. Its key principles are logical, translate well into workable legal concepts and promise a great degree of accuracy. However, it also has a number of serious drawbacks as it stands. Most worryingly, its revised interpretation of the law is to large extents incompatible with the case law of the European Court of Justice, which has not been swayed by the exclusive consumer welfare aim. This situation is undesirable from the point of view of legal certainty and the rule of law.

In the late 1990s, the European Commission embarked on a long process of introducing a 'more economic approach' to EU Antitrust law. One by one, it reviewed its approach to all three pillars of EU Antitrust Law, starting with Article 101 TFEU, moving on to EU merger control and concluding the process with Article 102 TFEU. Its aim was to make EU antitrust law more compatible with contemporary economic thinking. On the basis of an extensive empirical analysis of the Commission's main enforcement tools, this book establishes the changes that the more economic approach has made to the Commission's enforcement practice over the past fifteen years. It demonstrates that the more economic approach not only introduced modern economic assessment tools to the Commission's analyses, but fundamentally changed the Commission's interpretation of the law. Emulating one of the key credos of the US Antitrust Revolution thirty years earlier, the Commission reinterpreted the EU antitrust rules as aiming at the enhancement of economic consumer welfare only, and amended its understanding of key legal concepts accordingly. This book argues that the Commission's new understanding of the law has many benefits. Its key principles are logical, translate well into workable legal concepts and promise a great degree of accuracy. However, it also has a number of serious drawbacks as it stands. Most worryingly, its revised interpretation of the law is to large extents incompatible with the case law of the European Court of Justice, which has not been swayed by the exclusive consumer welfare aim. This situation is undesirable from the point of view of legal certainty and the rule of law.

During the last decade the European Commission has progressively adopted what is called a and‘more economic approachand’ toward competition policy. This approach, which draws on U.S. antitrust policy, puts greater emphasis on possible welfare effects of business practices and is less concerned with competitive market structures. Under this school of thought concentration cannot be said to impede effective competition to the extent that efficiency gains outweigh market distortions. In order to stimulate the debate on this basic reorientation, in January 2009 the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law at Hamburg convened economists, legal scholars, and practitioners for an exchange of views on these and‘newand’ methodological foundations of EU competition policy and competition law. Two especially controversial elements were chosen for in-depth discussion: the prohibition of abuses of dominant positions and the review of State aid. This book reproduces fourteen papers from this conference, representing the considered views of prominent European lawyers, economists, academics, policymakers, and enforcement officials in the competition field on matters such as: the objectives of EU competition law; the current enforcement guidelines of the EU Commission regarding Article 102 TFEU and? measuring market power; abusive low pricing strategies; the economics of competition law enforcemennt; recent developments in EU State aid law; economic justifications for State aid. A critical assessment of the Commissionand’s State aid action plan by the German Monopolies Commission is appended in English. Applying law and economics theory to competition law, this book shows that the and‘more economicand’ approach is exerting a considerable impact on various sectors of competition law. The authors clearly demonstrate the progress that can be made when lawyers and economists take notice of and respect the characteristics of each otherand’s discipline. Moreover, the authors show how new insights of economic theory may be integrated into the relevant legal analysis. The book will therefore be appreciated by academics, practitioners, and officials representing both fields.

Article 102 TFEU constitutes that a firm holding a dominant position in its market is not allowed to abuse this dominant market power through unilateral conduct. Although this provision is clearly of great importance in curbing the adverse effects of market power, it remains far from clear when dominant firms exclusionary conduct is in breach of this provision. This book presents an in-depth analysis of the limited case law, soft law, and theory in the field of law and economics on the matter, confronting the complex issues raised by the effects-based approach used to determine whether competition law has been breached, and clarifying how this approach can best be applied in future cases. Among the issues and topics covered are the following: – relevant case law, notably Post Danmark I, Tomra, and Intel; – analyses and discussions of when and how to apply the effect-based approach, including by object restrictions; – economic theories in the context of Article 102 TFEU; and – predation versus exclusion. While the book is grounded in the legal framework it also applies a law and economics based approach with the aim of supporting the legal arguments and conclusions, and thereby providing more robust arguments for the reached conclusions. As the first study to offer a much-needed clarification of the assessment relating to exclusionary conduct within Article 102 TFEU after the Post Danmark I case, this book provides suggestions on how to structure the approach, thus creating greater legal certainty for dominant firms (and their competitors) and providing a sound basis for both practice and research in this area. It is sure to be read and studied widely by practitioners and academics concerned with the application of Article 102 TFEU.