Today’s philosophy of knowledge usually takes into consideration only two leading components: the material world in which we live, and the ideal world of the human brain. They contradict and, at the same time, complement each other, while their cooperation creates new knowledge and its practical implications. This book propounds quite a different conception of producing new ideas, and introduces onto the scene the semiotic reality: signs and sign systems (progenies of human mind). According to this view, the material world is transformed in our mind, where it receives its sign vesture. Then, it can be explained and understood by various audiences, and enters the depository of human wisdom. As the book shows, the interplay of the three realities (ontological, semiotic and virtual) gives rise to many new notions, like metathinking and the second scientific period of our civilization, among others.

This bold and brilliant book asks the ultimate question of the life sciences: How did the human mind acquire its incomparable power? In seeking the answer, Merlin Donald traces the evolution of human culture and cognition from primitive apes to artificial intelligence, presenting an enterprising and original theory of how the human mind evolved from its presymbolic form.

Edwin Hutchins combines his background as an anthropologist and an open ocean racing sailor and navigator in this account of how anthropological methods can be combined with cognitive theory to produce a new reading of cognitive science. His theoretical insights are grounded in an extended analysis of ship navigation—its computational basis, its historical roots, its social organization, and the details of its implementation in actual practice aboard large ships. The result is an unusual interdisciplinary approach to cognition in culturally constituted activities outside the laboratory—"in the wild." Hutchins examines a set of phenomena that have fallen in the cracks between the established disciplines of psychology and anthropology, bringing to light a new set of relationships between culture and cognition. The standard view is that culture affects the cognition of individuals. Hutchins argues instead that cultural activity systems have cognitive properties of their own that are different from the cognitive properties of the individuals who participate in them. Each action for bringing a large naval vessel into port, for example, is informed by culture: the navigation team can be seen as a cognitive and computational system. Introducing Navy life and work on the bridge, Hutchins makes a clear distinction between the cognitive properties of an individual and the cognitive properties of a system. In striking contrast to the usual laboratory tasks of research in cognitive science, he applies the principal metaphor of cognitive science—cognition as computation (adopting David Marr's paradigm)—to the navigation task. After comparing modern Western navigation with the method practiced in Micronesia, Hutchins explores the computational and cognitive properties of systems that are larger than an individual. He then turns to an analysis of learning or change in the organization of cognitive systems at several scales. Hutchins's conclusion illustrates the costs of ignoring the cultural nature of cognition, pointing to the ways in which contemporary cognitive science can be transformed by new meanings and interpretations. A Bradford Book

An argument that there are perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in cognitively and conceptually unmediated ways and that this sheds light on various philosophical issues. In Cognition and Perception, Athanassios Raftopoulos discusses the cognitive penetrability of perception and claims that there is a part of visual processes (which he calls “perception”) that results in representational states with nonconceptual content; that is, a part that retrieves information from visual scenes in conceptually unmediated, “bottom-up,” theory-neutral ways. Raftopoulos applies this insight to problems in philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and epistemology, and examines how we access the external world through our perception as well as what we can know of that world. To show that there is a theory-neutral part of existence, Raftopoulos turns to cognitive science and argues that there is substantial scientific evidence. He then claims that perception induces representational states with nonconceptual content and examines the nature of the nonconceptual content. The nonconceptual information retrieved, he argues, does not allow the identification or recognition of an object but only its individuation as a discrete persistent object with certain spatiotemporal properties and other features. Object individuation, however, suffices to determine the referents of perceptual demonstratives. Raftopoulos defends his account in the context of current discussions on the issue of the theory-ladenness of perception (namely the Fodor-Churchland debate), and then discusses the repercussions of his thesis for problems in the philosophy of science. Finally, Raftopoulos claims that there is a minimal form of realism that is defensible. This minimal realism holds that objects, their spatiotemporal properties, and such features as shape, orientation, and motion are real, mind-independent properties in the world.

This classic work, first published in 1912, has never been supplanted as an approachable introduction to the theory of philosophical enquiry. It gives Russell's views on such subjects as the distinction between appearance and reality, the existence and nature of matter, idealism, knowledge by acquaintance and by description, induction, truth and falsehood, the distinction between knowledge, error and probable opinion, and the limits and value of philosophical knowledge.

A major contribution to the history of philosophy in the later medieval period (1250-1350).

Seminar paper from the year 2004 in the subject English Language and Literature Studies - Linguistics, grade: 2+ (B), University of Cologne (English Seminar), language: English, abstract: Language, in general, has always been an intricate matter for research. In the course of development of the linguistics as a field of studies particularly dedicated to the task of exploring the language faculty and its features a lot of breakthrough discoveries have been made. With respect to the particular point of research, there are several subcategories of linguistics that are the direct result of the interactive research on a particular phenomenon. The cognitive linguistics is, doubtlessly, one of the few such linguistic branches, that is composed of the research fields of sciences such as: psychology, anthropology, philosophy and computer science. However, cognitive linguistics does not focus on particular features of language or particular parts of the grammar, but attempts to discover its interplay with perception of the world, that is, the reality that surrounds the human beings. In its characterisation of the language as part of the cognitive system and not an independent feature, the cognitive linguistics is in opposition to the generative linguistics and the Chomskyan postulation that language faculty is inborn. Moreover, Chomsky claims that language is “modular”, that is, it exists individually from the other cognitive faculties. The main aim of the cognitive linguistics is to discover the laws of structure of natural language categorisation as well as the intricate connection between language and thought. Terry Regier defines its function in the following manner: “In the domain of semantics in particular, cognitive linguistics seeks to ground meaning not directly in the world, but in mental and perceptual representations of the world“. (1996: 27) As the methodology and historical development of this field of studies are quite extensive, this paper will rather focus on the analysis of the main division of classical, also known as Aristotelian and modern theory. In the analysis of these two juxtaposed theories the pioneer work of the linguist William Labov and the psychologist Elisabeth Rosch would be taken into consideration. An emphasis would be put on Eleanor Rosch ́s findings with respect to the extent of her contribution to the new ways of understanding categorisation of entities and clarification of certain aspects. Furthermore, some critical approaches of her findings would be regarded.