This book examines US foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean and the region’s key role in the practice and evolution of American exceptionalism. The political developments in the Eastern Mediterranean during the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries, gave to the US opportunities to express, in the most explicit way, its anti-colonialism, the fervent support of open and democratic societies, and its willingness to openly confront tyranny and oppression whenever this was possible (or necessary) for American interests. Since that time, the region has been a testing ground for the core elements of American foreign policy deployed worldwide. The monograph shows the contributions of the United States during critical moments in the region, such as the First Barbary War (1801-1805), the introduction of Truman Doctrine, Washington’s role in the Suez Crisis, the Greek junta and the Imia Crisis of 1996. It also scrutinizes the different levels of the economic, military and diplomatic challenges which China, Russia and Turkey present today, while it also covers the American approach to the Arab Spring. From a ‘Shining City on a Hill’ to the current ‘Make America Great Again’ mottoes, this critique follows American Foreign Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean and the strong bonds that the nation established with the geostrategic, political and ideological features of the region. The pace of recent events, and the increasing complexity of this global corner, prove a challenge to America today; the future and clarion call that hard work and the finest ingenuity are necessary to keep its regional hegemony, and its course toward increased prosperity. This work’s goal is to inspire the conversations by academics, diplomats, leaders (both political and military) and most of all businessmen, to this end.

A publication of the Institute of International Studies, Yale University.

Originally published in 2007, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, by John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago and Stephen M. Walt of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, provoked both howls of outrage and cheers of gratitude for challenging what had been a taboo issue in America: the impact of the Israel lobby on U.S. foreign policy. A work of major importance, it remains as relevant today as it was in the immediate aftermath of the Israel-Lebanon war of 2006. Mearsheimer and Walt describe in clear and bold terms the remarkable level of material and diplomatic support that the United States provides to Israel and argues that this support cannot be fully explained on either strategic or moral grounds. This exceptional relationship is due largely to the political influence of a loose coalition of individuals and organizations that actively work to shape U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction. They provocatively contend that the lobby has a far-reaching impact on America's posture throughout the Middle East―in Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict―and the policies it has encouraged are in neither America's national interest nor Israel's long-term interest. The lobby's influence also affects America's relationship with important allies and increases dangers that all states face from global jihadist terror. The publication of The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy led to a sea change in how the U.S-Israel relationship was discussed, and continues to be one of the most talked-about books in foreign policy.

"Explores European foreign policy and the degree of European Union success in proposing itself as a valid international actor, drawing from the expertise of scholars and practitioners in many disciplines. Addresses issues past and present, theoretical and practice-oriented, and country- and region-specific"-- Provided by publisher.

By the time of Barack Obama's inauguration as the 44th president of the United States, he had already developed an ambitious foreign policy vision. By his own account, he sought to bend the arc of history toward greater justice, freedom, and peace; within a year he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, largely for that promise. In Bending History, Martin Indyk, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Michael O’Hanlon measure Obama not only against the record of his predecessors and the immediate challenges of the day, but also against his own soaring rhetoric and inspiring goals. Bending History assesses the considerable accomplishments as well as the failures and seeks to explain what has happened. Obama's best work has been on major and pressing foreign policy challenges—counterterrorism policy, including the daring raid that eliminated Osama bin Laden; the "reset" with Russia; managing the increasingly significant relationship with China; and handling the rogue states of Iran and North Korea. Policy on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, however, has reflected serious flaws in both strategy and execution. Afghanistan policy has been plagued by inconsistent messaging and teamwork. On important "softer" security issues—from energy and climate policy to problems in Africa and Mexico—the record is mixed. As for his early aspiration to reshape the international order, according greater roles and responsibilities to rising powers, Obama's efforts have been well-conceived but of limited effectiveness. On issues of secondary importance, Obama has been disciplined in avoiding fruitless disputes (as with Chavez in Venezuela and Castro in Cuba) and insisting that others take the lead (as with Qaddafi in Libya). Notwithstanding several missteps, he has generally managed well the complex challenges of the Arab awakenings, striving to strike the right balance between U.S. values and interests. The authors see Obama's foreign policy to date as a triumph of discipline and realism over ideology. He has been neither the transformative beacon his devotees have wanted, nor the weak apologist for America that his critics allege. They conclude that his grand strategy for promoting American interests in a tumultuous world may only now be emerging, and may yet be curtailed by conflict with Iran. Most of all, they argue that he or his successor will have to embrace U.S. economic renewal as the core foreign policy and national security challenge of the future.

This book offers a thorough reinterpretation of US engagement with the Mediterranean during World War II. Andrew Buchanan argues that the United States was far from being a reluctant participant in a 'peripheral' theater, and that Washington had a major grand-strategic interest in the region. By the end of the war the Mediterranean was essentially an American lake, and the United States had substantial political and economic interests extending from North Africa, via Italy and the Balkans, to the Middle East. This book examines the military, diplomatic, and economic processes by which this hegemonic position was assembled and consolidated. It discusses the changing character of the Anglo-American alliance, the establishment of post-war spheres of influence, the nature of presidential leadership, and the common interest of all the leaders of the 'Grand Alliance' in blocking the development of potentially revolutionary movements emerging from the chaos of war, occupation, and economic breakdown.

“America First” is “America Alone” Foreign policy is like physics: vacuums quickly fill. As the United States retreats from the international order it helped put in place and maintain since the end of World War II, Russia is rapidly filling the vacuum. Federiga Bindi’s new book assesses the consequences of this retreat for transatlantic relations and Europe, showing how the current path of US foreign policy is leading to isolation and a sharp decrease of US influence in international relations. Transatlantic relations reached a peak under President Barack Obama. But under the Trump administration, withdrawal from the global stage has caused irreparable damage to the transatlantic partnership and has propelled Europeans to act more independently. Europe and America explores this tumultuous path by examining the foreign policy of the United States, Russia, and the major European Union member states. The book highlights the consequences of US retreat for transatlantic relations and Europe, demonstrating that “America first” is becoming “America alone,” perhaps marking the end of transatlantic relations as we know it, with Europe no longer beholden to the US national interest.