The Mediterranean Fleet entered the 1930s looking back to the lessons of Jutland and the First World War but also seeking to incorporate new technologies, notably air power. Unfortunately in the depression years of the early 1930s there was a lack of funds to remedy deficiencies. The problem became critical during the Abyssinian crisis of 1935. The crisis wound down by mid-1936 but the respite did not last long. In June 1936 the Spanish Civil War broke out and the Mediterranean Fleet was soon involved in evacuations of British and other endangered foreigners from Spanish ports as well as the protection of British flagged merchant ships in the war zone. In addition to the Spanish Civil War there was an increase of tension with Germany in 1938 that culminated with the Czechoslovak crisis in September. The situation of the Mediterranean Fleet and its possible actions had the Munich agreement not been reached are described. The Spanish Civil War ended in 1939 with the victory of the Nationalists and the Mediterranean Fleet was again involved in evacuations. By now the prospect of war with Germany and possibly Italy was quite clear and serious preparations for war continued. The plans for war in the Mediterranean are reproduced in detail.

A comprehensive overview of the activities of the British navy in the Mediterranean from the earliest times until the present.

Brian Vale is a naval historian with degrees from Keele and King’s College London. A life-long member of the Society for Nautical Research and the Navy Records Society, he has long specialised in Anglo-South American maritime history. His books include Independence or Death! British sailors and Brazilian Independence, A Frigate of King George, The Audacious Admiral Cochrane and Cochrane in the Pacific: Fortune and Freedom in Spanish America.

This collection covers the period February 1862-March 1864, which constituted the final two years and one month that Rear-Admiral Sir Alexander Milne commanded the Royal Navy’s North America and West India Station. Its chief focus is upon Anglo-American relations in the midst of the American Civil War. Whilst the most high-profile cause of tension between the two countries — the Trent Affair — had been resolved in Britain’s favour by January 1862, numerous sources of discord remained. Most turned on American efforts to blockade the so-called Confederacy, efforts that often ran afoul of international law, not to mention British amour-propre. As commander of British naval forces in the theatre, Milne’s decisions and actions could and did have a major impact on the state of affairs between his government and that of the US. While noting in one private exchange with the British ambassador to Washington, Richard, Lord Lyons, that he had been "enjoined to abstain from any act likely to involve Great Britain in hostilities with the United States," Milne added ominously, "yet I am also instructed to guard our Commerce from all illegal interference" and it is plain from his correspondence that both he and the British government were prepared to use force in that undertaking. Thus, between apparently high-handed behaviour by the US Navy and Milne’s and the Palmerston government’s resolve not to be pushed beyond a certain point, the ingredients for a major confrontation between the two countries existed. Yet most of Milne’s efforts were directed toward preventing such a confrontation from occurring. In this endeavour he was joined by Lyons and by the British government. No vital British interest was at stake in the conflict raging between North and South, and thus the nation was unlikely to become directly involved in it unless provoked by rash US actions. Yet there was no shortage of such provocations: the seizure of British merchant vessels bound from one neutral port to another, detaining such ships without first conducting a search of their cargo for evidence of contraband of war, the de facto blockade of British colonial ports, apparent violations of British territorial waters, the seizure of British merchantmen off the neutral port of Matamoros, Mexico, and the use of neutral ports as bases of operations by US warships among them. In responding to these and other sources of dispute between the US and Britain, Milne proved adept at pouring oil on troubled waters, so much so that in a late 1863 letter to Foreign Secretary Lord Russell, Lyons lamented his impending departure from the station: "I am very much grieved at his leaving....No change of admirals could be for the better." This collection centres upon Milne’s private correspondence, especially that between him and Lyons, First Lord of the Admiralty the Duke of Somerset and First Naval Lord Vice Admiral Sir Frederick Grey. It also includes private letters to and from many of Milne’s other professional correspondents and important official correspondence with the Admiralty.

Examines how military culture forms and changes, as well as its impact on the effectiveness of military organizations.

The chapters in this book focus on the security of the British position in the Middle East between 1935 and 1939. In 1935 Britain was still able to rush reinforcements to the Middle East to forestall hostilities towards Egypt. However, by 1939 the international situation had changed irrevocably.