Derivative criminal liability includes inchoate offenses (criminal attempt, conspiracy, preparatory offenses, etc.), complicity (joint perpetration, perpetration through another, incitement, solicitation, accessoryship, etc.), organized crime, natural and probable consequences liability, post-crime aid, enterprise liability, terrorism and terrorist infrastructure, and many more forms of criminal liability, clearly making it a major pillar of modern criminal law. Although derivative criminal liability affects countries worldwide, there is still no general legal theory that covers this issue. The objective of the present book is to develop a comprehensive, general, legally sophisticated, and at the same time practical theory of derivative criminal liability. The book emphasizes the practicality of the theory to enable courts, lawyers, legislators, attorneys, students, and academics to apply it in their daily professional occupations.

This book challenges the assumptions of modern criminal law that insanity is a natural, legally and medically defined phenomenon (covering a range of medical disorders). By doing so, it paves the way for a new perspective on insanity and can serve as the basis for a new approach to insanity in modern criminal law. The book covers the following aspects: the structure of the principle of fault in modern criminal law, the development of the insanity defense in criminal law, tangential in personam defenses in criminal law and their implications for insanity and the legal mechanism of reproduction of fault. The focus is on the Anglo-American and European-Continental legal systems. Given the attention consistently drawn by international and domestic events in this context, the book will be of interest to a broad and growing international audience.

This study is the second in the four-part series entitled “Rethinking the Essentials of International Criminal Law and Transitional Justice”. While the first volume, The Concept of Universal Crimes in International Law, explored the parameters and theories related to crimes under international law, this book examines the notion of punishable participation in such crimes. It presents a general theory of personal criminal liability and provides a comprehensive overview of all forms of criminal participation in international law. The authors examine numerous primary materials in international and transnational criminal law, both historical and current, relating to both international and domestic jurisprudence. They also review academic literature that attempts to explain and bring consistency to the jurisprudence, as well as other sources such as reports of the International Law Commission. This rich empirical tapestry is then used to test and further develop an overarching conceptual theory and matrix that provides a better understanding of the boundaries of personal criminal liability lex lata and lex ferenda and of the relationship between the various forms of punishable participation in universal crimes. Like the first volume, this book makes a valuable contribution to a more coherent and practical understanding of international criminal law.

The book develops a general legal theory concerning the liability for offenses involving artificial intelligence systems. The involvement of the artificial intelligence systems in these offenses may be as perpetrators, accomplices or mere instruments. The general legal theory proposed in this book is based on the current criminal law in most modern legal systems. In most modern countries, unmanned vehicles, sophisticated surgical systems, industrial computing systems, trading algorithms and other artificial intelligence systems are commonly used for both industrial and personal purposes. The question of legal liability arises when something goes wrong, e.g. the unmanned vehicle is involved in a car accident, the surgical system is involved in a surgical error or the trading algorithm is involved in fraud, etc. Who is to be held liable for these offenses: the manufacturer, the programmer, the user, or, perhaps, the artificial intelligence system itself? The concept of liability for crimes involving artificial intelligence systems has not yet been widely researched. Advanced technologies are forcing society to face new challenges, both technical and legal. The idea of liability in the specific context of artificial intelligence systems is one such challenge that should be thoroughly explored.

The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law reflects the continued transformation of criminal law into a global discipline, providing scholars with a comprehensive international resource, a common point of entry into cutting edge contemporary research and a snapshot of the state and scope of the field. To this end, the Handbook takes a broad approach to its subject matter, disciplinarily, geographically, and systematically. Its contributors include current and future research leaders representing a variety of legal systems, methodologies, areas of expertise, and research agendas. The Handbook is divided into four parts: Approaches & Methods (I), Systems & Methods (II), Aspects & Issues (III), and Contexts & Comparisons (IV). Part I includes essays exploring various methodological approaches to criminal law (such as criminology, feminist studies, and history). Part II provides an overview of systems or models of criminal law, laying the foundation for further inquiry into specific conceptions of criminal law as well as for comparative analysis (such as Islamic, Marxist, and military law). Part III covers the three aspects of the penal process: the definition of norms and principles of liability (substantive criminal law), along with a less detailed treatment of the imposition of norms (criminal procedure) and the infliction of sanctions (prison law). Contributors consider the basic topics traditionally addressed in scholarship on the general and special parts of the substantive criminal law (such as jurisdiction, mens rea, justifications, and excuses). Part IV places criminal law in context, both domestically and transnationally, by exploring the contrasts between criminal law and other species of law and state power and by investigating criminal law's place in the projects of comparative law, transnational, and international law.

As computational power, the volume of available data, IT systems’ autonomy, and the human-like capabilities of machines increase, robots and AI systems have substantial and growing implications for the law and raise a host of challenges to current legal doctrines. The main question to be answered is whether the foundations and general principles of private law and criminal law offer a functional and adaptive legal framework for the “autonomous systems” phenomena. The main purpose of this book is to identify and explore possible trajectories for the development of civil and criminal liability; for our understanding of the attribution link to autonomous systems; and, in particular, for the punishment of unlawful conduct in connection with their operation. AI decision-making processes – including judicial sentencing – also warrant close attention in this regard. Since AI is moving faster than the process of regulatory recalibration, this book provides valuable insights on its redesign and on the harmonization, at the European level, of the current regulatory frameworks, in order to keep pace with technological changes. Providing a broader and more comprehensive picture of the legal challenges posed by autonomous systems, this book covers a wide range of topics, including the regulation of autonomous vehicles, data protection and governance, personality rights, intellectual property, corporate governance, and contract conclusion and termination issues arising from automated decisions, blockchain technology and AI applications, particularly in the banking and finance sectors. The authors are legal experts from around the world with extensive academic and/or practical experience in these areas.

Does an offender have the right to be punished? "The right to be punished" may sound like an oxymoron, but it is not necessarily so. With the emergence of modern criminal law, the offender gained the right to be punished by rational criminal law rather than being lynched by an angry mob. The present-day offender may have the right to be punished by doctrinal sentencing rather than being subjected to verdicts based on vague, unclear, and uncertain principles. In modern criminal law, the imposition of criminal liability follows accurate and strict rules, whereas there are no similar rules for the imposition of punishment. The process of sentencing is vague and obscure, as are the considerations used for the imposition of punishments. The objective of the present book is to propose a comprehensive, general, and legally sophisticated theory of modern doctrinal sentencing. The challenges of such a legal theory are plenty and complex. In addition to increasing clarity and certainty, modern doctrinal sentencing must deal with modern types of delinquency (e.g. organized crime, recidivism, corporate offenders, high-tech offenses, etc.) and modern principles of criminal law. Modern doctrinal sentencing must serve to ensure optimal sentencing.