An Economist Best Book of 2018 New York Times Book Review Editor’s Pick “Gripping [and] splendid.… An enormous contribution to our understanding of Marshall.”—Washington Post At the end of World War II, General George Marshall took on what he thought was a final mission—this time not to win a war, but to stop one. In China, conflict between Communists and Nationalists threatened to suck in the United States and escalate into revolution. Marshall’s charge was to cross the Pacific, broker a peace, and prevent a Communist takeover, all while staving off World War III. At first, the results seemed miraculous. But as they started to come apart, Marshall was faced with a wrenching choice—one that would alter the course of the Cold War, define the US-China relationship, and spark one of the darkest-ever turns in American political life. The China Mission offers a gripping, close-up view of the central figures of the time—from Marshall, Mao, and Chiang Kai-shek to Eisenhower, Truman, and MacArthur—as they stood face-to-face and struggled to make history, with consequences and lessons that echo today.

An Economist Best Book of 2018 New York Times Book Review Editor’s Pick “Gripping [and] splendid.… An enormous contribution to our understanding of Marshall.”—Washington Post At the end of World War II, General George Marshall took on what he thought was a final mission—this time not to win a war, but to stop one. In China, conflict between Communists and Nationalists threatened to suck in the United States and escalate into revolution. Marshall’s charge was to cross the Pacific, broker a peace, and prevent a Communist takeover, all while staving off World War III. At first, the results seemed miraculous. But as they started to come apart, Marshall was faced with a wrenching choice—one that would alter the course of the Cold War, define the US-China relationship, and spark one of the darkest-ever turns in American political life. The China Mission offers a gripping, close-up view of the central figures of the time—from Marshall, Mao, and Chiang Kai-shek to Eisenhower, Truman, and MacArthur—as they stood face-to-face and struggled to make history, with consequences and lessons that echo today.

Conventional wisdom informs us that "only Nixon could go to China." In fact, in 1944, nearly thirty years before his historic trip, the American military established the first liaison and intelligence-gathering mission with the Chinese Communists in Yenan. Commonly referred to as the Dixie Mission, the detached military unit sent to Yenan was responsible for transmitting weather information, assisting the Communists in their rescue of downed American flyers, and laying the groundwork for an eventual rapprochement between the Communists and Nationalists, the two sides struggling in the ongoing Chinese Civil War. Following extensive use of archival sources and numerous interviews with the men who traveled and served in Yenan, Carolle Carter argues that while Dixie fulfilled its assignment, the members steered the mission in different directions from its original, albeit loosely described, intent. As the months and years passed, the Dixie Mission increasingly emphasized intelligence gathering over evaluating their Communist hosts' contribution to the war effort against Japan. Some American politicians in the 1950s portrayed the participants in the Dixie Mission as too sympathetic to the Chinese Communists. But during the 1970s many looked back at these individuals as wise but ignored oracles who could have prevented the "loss of China." Carter strips away these simplistic portrayals to reveal a diverse and dedicated collection of soldiers, diplomats, and technicians who had ongoing contact with the Chinese Communists longer than any other group during World War II, but who were destined to be a largely unused resource during the Cold War.

This book breaks new ground in our understanding of a pivotal period in the history of American foreign policy, the early Cold War, and the struggle for dominance in China between the Nationalists and Communists. The famous Marshall Mission to China has been the focus of intense scrutiny ever since General George C. Marshall returned home in January 1947 and full-scale civil war consumed China. Yet until recently, there was little new to add to the story of the failure to avert war between the Chinese Nationalists, under Chiang Kai-shek, and the Chinese Communists, led by Mao Zedong. Drawing on a newly discovered insider's account, Roger B. Jeans makes an invaluable contribution to our understanding of Marshall's failed mediation effort and the roles played by key Chinese figures. Working from the letters and diary of U.S. Army Colonel John Hart Caughey, Jeans offers a fresh interpretation of the mission. From beginning to end, Caughey served as Marshall's executive officer, in effect his right-hand man, assisting the general in his contacts with the Chinese and drafting key documents for him. Through his writings, Caughey provides a rare behind-the-scenes view of the general's mediation efforts as well as intimate glimpses of the major Chinese figures involved, including Chiang Kai-shek, Madame Chiang, and Zhou Enlai. In addition to daily contact with Marshall, Caughey often rubbed shoulders with these major Nationalist and Communist figures. As a meticulous eyewitness to history in the making, Caughey offers crucial insight into a key moment in post-World War II history.