Despite its failure to unseat King James II, the Monmouth Rebellion had a profound influence upon English politics. In particular, it reignited the debate about whether the country should rely on a professional army under direct royal control or local country militias made up of part-time soldiers. King James favoured the former, and used criticism of the militia’s performance during the rebellion to support his argument. Contemporary commentators and historians alike all certainly seemed to agree that the king’s victory was won in spite of - not because of - the militia. But is this a fair judgement? Drawing upon a wealth of information gathered from personal accounts, private papers, letters, financial records, diaries and memoirs, this book revisits the events of 1685 to assess the militia’s performance in helping to defeat the so-called ’pitchfork rebellion’. Through an extensive investigation into the militia itself, its social composition, role, training, armament and leadership the study sets a benchmark for what could have been realistically expected of these part-time soldiers, and then sets this against the actual tasks that were asked of it in 1685. The results that emerge from this exercise paint a very different picture of the militia’s role in the rebellion than has hitherto been accepted by historians. Judged by these criteria, a convincing case is made that the militia was in fact an efficient military organisation according to contemporary expectations and demands made of it. Criticisms of it, it is argued, stem more from political expediency than impartial judgment. As well as being of interest to military and social historians, this book demonstrates the dangers to all historians of taking at face value contemporary comments. It shows how subtle and interlocking forces, that may at first glance appear unrelated, can work together to colour opinions of events and organisations.

Despite its failure to unseat King James II, the Monmouth Rebellion had a profound influence upon English politics. In particular, it reignited the debate about whether the country should rely on a professional army under direct royal control or local country militias made up of part-time soldiers. King James favoured the former, and used criticism of the militia’s performance during the rebellion to support his argument. Contemporary commentators and historians alike all certainly seemed to agree that the king’s victory was won in spite of - not because of - the militia. But is this a fair judgement? Drawing upon a wealth of information gathered from personal accounts, private papers, letters, financial records, diaries and memoirs, this book revisits the events of 1685 to assess the militia’s performance in helping to defeat the so-called ’pitchfork rebellion’. Through an extensive investigation into the militia itself, its social composition, role, training, armament and leadership the study sets a benchmark for what could have been realistically expected of these part-time soldiers, and then sets this against the actual tasks that were asked of it in 1685. The results that emerge from this exercise paint a very different picture of the militia’s role in the rebellion than has hitherto been accepted by historians. Judged by these criteria, a convincing case is made that the militia was in fact an efficient military organisation according to contemporary expectations and demands made of it. Criticisms of it, it is argued, stem more from political expediency than impartial judgment. As well as being of interest to military and social historians, this book demonstrates the dangers to all historians of taking at face value contemporary comments. It shows how subtle and interlocking forces, that may at first glance appear unrelated, can work together to colour opinions of events and organisations.

The American militia system fulfilled many roles in colonial America. It offered protection for the colonists, provided a sense of community to the new settlers, and was an instrument of integration for subsequent immigrants. In the Revolution the militia did home-guard duty and acted as a reservoir of trained manpower for the Continental Line, although many militiamen fought alongside the regular army in crucial engagements.

American Military History provides the United States Army-in particular, its young officers, NCOs, and cadets-with a comprehensive but brief account of its past. The Center of Military History first published this work in 1956 as a textbook for senior ROTC courses. Since then it has gone through a number of updates and revisions, but the primary intent has remained the same. Support for military history education has always been a principal mission of the Center, and this new edition of an invaluable history furthers that purpose. The history of an active organization tends to expand rapidly as the organization grows larger and more complex. The period since the Vietnam War, at which point the most recent edition ended, has been a significant one for the Army, a busy period of expanding roles and missions and of fundamental organizational changes. In particular, the explosion of missions and deployments since 11 September 2001 has necessitated the creation of additional, open-ended chapters in the story of the U.S. Army in action. This first volume covers the Army's history from its birth in 1775 to the eve of World War I. By 1917, the United States was already a world power. The Army had sent large expeditionary forces beyond the American hemisphere, and at the beginning of the new century Secretary of War Elihu Root had proposed changes and reforms that within a generation would shape the Army of the future. But world war-global war-was still to come. The second volume of this new edition will take up that story and extend it into the twenty-first century and the early years of the war on terrorism and includes an analysis of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq up to January 2009.

A study in English politics and local government and how the militia was molded by those same politics. The study is taken after the Restoration and before the main conflict with Napoleon Bonaparte.