This edited collection seeks to address and analyse the ramifications of terrorism and terrorist activities at a world-level, with a specific focus on the economies and political systems in the Afro-Asian regions.

"Focusing principally on four of the most significant terrorist organizations of the last fifty years (al-Qaida, the Provisional IRA, Hamas, and ETA), and using a wealth of interview material with former terrorists as well as those involved in counterterrorism, [English] argues that we need a far more honest understanding of the degree to which terrorism actually works--as well as a more nuanced insight into the precise ways in which it does so"--Dust jacket flap.

The tragedy of September 11, 2001 was so sudden and devastating that it may be difficult at this point in time to write dispassionately and objectively about its effects on the U.S. economy. This retrospective review will attempt such an undertaking. The loss of lives and property on 9/11 was not large enough to have had a measurable effect on the productive capacity of the United States even though it had a very significant localized effect on New York City and, to a lesser degree, on the greater Washington, D.C. area. Thus, for 9/11 to affect the economy it would have had to have affected the price of an important input, such as energy, or had an adverse effect on aggregate demand via such mechanisms as consumer and business confidence, a financial panic or liquidity crisis, or an international run on the dollar. It was initially thought that aggregate demand was seriously affected, for while the existing data showed that GDP growth was low in the first half of 2001, data published in October showed that GDP had contracted during the 3rd quarter. This led to the claim that "The terrorist attacks pushed a weak economy over the edge into an outright recession." We now know, based on revised data, this is not so. At the time of 9/11 the economy was in its third consecutive quarter of contraction; positive growth resumed in the 4th quarter. This would suggest that any effects from 9/11 on demand were short lived. While this may be true, several events took place before, on, and shortly after 9/11, that made recovery either more rapid than it might have been or made it possible to take place. First, the Federal Reserve had eased credit during the first half of 2001 to stimulate aggregate demand. The economy responds to policy changes with a lag in time. Thus, the public response may have been felt in the 4th quarter giving the appearance that 9/11 had only a limited effect. Second, the Federal Reserve on and immediately after 9/11 took appropriate action to avert a financial panic and liquidity shortage. This was supplemented by support from foreign central banks to shore up the dollar in world markets and limited the contagion of 9/11 from spreading to other national economies. Nevertheless, U.S. trade with other countries, especially Canada, was disrupted. While oil prices spiked briefly, they quickly returned to their pre-9/11 levels. Thus, it can be argued, timely action contained the short run economic effects of 9/11 on the overall economy. Over the longer run 9/11 will adversely affect U.S. productivity growth because resources are being and will be used to ensure the security of production, distribution, finance, and communication.

The Political Economy of Terrorism presents a widely accessible political economy approach to the study of terrorism. It applies economic methodology – theoretical and empirical – combined with political analysis and realities to the study of domestic and transnational terrorism. In so doing, the book provides both a qualitative and quantitative investigation of terrorism in a balanced up-to-date presentation that informs students, policy makers, researchers and the general reader of the current state of knowledge. Included are historical aspects, a discussion of watershed events, the rise of modern-day terrorism, examination of current trends, the dilemma of liberal democracies, evaluation of counterterrorism, analysis of hostage incidents and much more. The new edition expands coverage of every chapter, adds a new chapter on terrorist network structures and organization, accounts for changes in the Department of Homeland Security and the USA Patriot Act and insurance against terrorism. Rational-actor models of terrorist and government behavior and game-theoretic analysis are presented for readers with no prior theoretical training. Where relevant, the authors display graphs using data from International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE), the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), and other public-access data sets.

Brutality is the defining characteristic of terrorism. It is despairing to learn that this brutality is the outcome of purposeful, rational, human behaviour. In this purposefulness, however, there lies the key to the interpretation, explanation and understanding of terrorist behaviour. Ultimately, it is in this purposefulness that we shall also find the key to overcoming terrorism. Economic analysis highlights this purposefulness, this rationality, and in doing so provides a different perspective from which to approach the threat of terrorism and the task of pre-empting and pursuing its perpetrators. This book develops this economic perspective within a series of important contexts, each characterised by particular types of terrorist behaviour, choices and strategies. The Economics of Terrorism brings new insights on how to deal with such challenges as the terrorist group¿s choice of attack method and target location, terrorist financing and ¿copycat¿ behaviour.

Evaluates the macroeconomic impacts of the 9/11 attack on U.S. real GDP growth and the unemployment rate by examining how forecasts of these variables were revised after the attack occurred. By this approach, the immediate impact of the 9/11 attack was to reduce real GDP growth in 2001 by 0.5%, and to increase the unemployment rate by 0.11% (reduce employment by 598,000 jobs). Forecasted real GDP growth in 2002 fell dramatically immediately after the 9/11 attack but then recovered fully. The forecasted unemployment rate in 2002 rose sharply immediately after the 9/11 attack, but unlike real GDP growth, it never subsequently returned to a pre-9/11 level. Illustrations. This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication.