The need for another study on the doctrine of analogy in the writings ofSt Thomas may not be obvious, since a complete bibliography in this area would doubtless assume depressing proportions. The present work is felt to be justified because it attempts a full-fledged alternative to the interpretation given in Cajetan's De nominum analogia, an interpretation which has provided the framework for subsequent discussions of the question. Recently, it is true, there has been growing dissatisfaction with Cajetan's approach; indeed there have been wholesale attacks on the great commentator who is alleged to have missed the clef de voute of the metaphysics of his master. Applied to our problem, this criticism leads to the view that Cajetan was not metaphysical enough, or that he was metaphysical in the wrong way, in his discussion of the analogy of names. As its title indicates, the present study is not in agreement with Cajetan's contention that the analogy of names is a metaphysical doctrine. It is precisely a logical doctrine in the sense that "logical" has for St Thomas. We have no desire to be associated with attacks on Cajetan, the meta physician, attacks we feel are quite wrongheaded. If Cajetan must be criticized for his interpretation of the analogy of names, it is imperative that he be criticized for the right reasons. Moreover, criticism ofCajetan in the present study is limited to his views on the analogy of names.

Some sentences in natural languages like English have multiple meanings. Steinhart (William Paterson U. of New Jersey) divides the meanings into literal and metaphorical, denies that they are the same, and denies that the metaphorical function is necessarily false or necessarily true. He argues that most metaphors are based on analogies, which he defines as the relative structural indiscernibility of parts of worlds, and that a metaphor is true for a particular world if and only if certain parts of that world are relatively structurally indiscernible, that is, are analogous. c. Book News Inc.

The Logic of Analogy is a study of the valid logical forms of qualitative and quantitative analogical argument, and the rules pertaining to them. It investigates equally valid conflicting arguments, statistics-based arguments and their utility in science, arguments from precedent used in law-making or law-application, and examines subsumption in analogical terms. Included for purposes of illustration is a large section on Talmudic use of analogical reasoning.

The concept of analogy is of central concern to modern cognitive scientists, whereas it has been largely neglected in linguistics in the past four decades. The goal of this thought-provoking book is (1) to introduce a cognitively and linguistically viable notion of analogy; and (2) to re-establish and build on traditional linguistic analogy-based research. As a starting point, a general definition of analogy is offered that makes the distinction between analogy-as-structure and analogy-as-process. Chapter 2 deals with analogy as used in traditional linguistics. It demonstrates how phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, and diachronic linguistics make use of analogy and discusses linguistic domains in which analogy does or did not work. The appendix gives a description of a computer program, which performs such instances of analogy-based syntactic analysis as have long been claimed impossible. Chapter 3 supports the ultimate (non-modular) 'unity of the mind' and discusses the existence of pervasive analogies between language and such cognitive domains as vision, music, and logic. The final chapter presents evidence for the view that the cosmology of every culture is based on analogy. At a more abstract level, the role of analogy in scientific change is scrutinized, resulting in a meta-analogy between myth and science.

1. Metaphors and Logic Metaphors are among the most vigorous offspring of the creative mind; but their vitality springs from the fact that they are logical organisms in the ecology of l- guage. I aim to use logical techniques to analyze the meanings of metaphors. My goal here is to show how contemporary formal semantics can be extended to handle metaphorical utterances. What distinguishes this work is that it focuses intensely on the logical aspects of metaphors. I stress the role of logic in the generation and int- pretation of metaphors. While I don't presuppose any formal training in logic, some familiarity with philosophical logic (the propositional calculus and the predicate c- culus) is helpful. Since my theory makes great use of the notion of structure, I refer to it as the structural theory of m etaphor (STM). STM is a semant ic theory of m etaphor : if STM is correct, then metaphors are cognitively meaningful and are n- trivially logically linked with truth. I aim to extend possible worlds semantics to handle metaphors. I'll argue that some sentences in natural languages like English have multiple meanings: "Juliet is the sun" has (at least) two meanings: the literal meaning "(Juliet is the sunkIT" and the metaphorical meaning "(Juliet is the sun)MET". Each meaning is a function from (possible) worlds to truth-values. I deny that these functions are identical; I deny that the metaphorical function is necessarily false or necessarily true.

Helps students become familiar with the question format on standardized tests and learn how to apply logic and reasoning skills to word knowledge. Focuses on exact word definitions and secondary word meanings, relationships between words and how to draw logical conclusions about possible answer choices. Identifies analogies, cause/effect, part/whole, type/category, synonyms, and antonyms.