John Locke (1632–1704) is considered one of the most important philosophers of the modern era and the first of what are often called ‘the Great British Empiricists.’ His major work, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, was the single most widely read academic text in Britain for fifty years after its publication and set new limits to the scope and certainty of what we can claim to know about ourselves and the natural world. The Declaration of Independence and the United States Constitution were both highly influenced by Locke’s libertarian philosophical ideas, and Locke continues to have an impact on political thought, both conservative and liberal. It is less commonly known that Locke was a practicing physician, an influential interpreter of the Bible, and a policy maker in the English Carolina colonies. The Lockean Mind provides a comprehensive survey of Locke’s work, not only placing it in its historical context but also exploring its contemporary significance. Comprising almost sixty chapters by a superb team of international contributors, the volume is divided into twelve parts covering the full range of Locke’s thought: Historical Background Locke’s Interlocutors Locke’s Epistemology Locke’s Philosophy of Mind Locke on Philosophy of Language and Logic Locke’s Metaphysics Locke’s Natural Philosophy Locke’s Moral Philosophy Locke on Education Locke’s Political Philosophy Locke’s Social Philosophy Locke on Religion Essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy, Locke’s work is central to epistemology; metaphysics; philosophy of mind; philosophy of language; natural philosophy; ethical, legal-political, and social philosophy; as well as philosophy of education and philosophy of religion. This volume will also be a valuable resource to those in related humanities and social sciences disciplines with an interest in John Locke.

This book begins with a survey of various readings of Locke as a materialist, as a substance dualist, and as a property dualist, and demonstrates that these inconsistent interpretations result from a general failure of modern commentators to notice the significance of Locke's 'mind-body nominalism'. By illuminating this largely overlooked aspect of Locke's philosophy, this book reveals a common mistake of previous interpretations: that of treating what Locke conceives to be 'nominal' as real. The nominal symmetry that Locke posits between mind and body is distinct from any form of metaphysical dualism, whether substance dualism or property dualism. It is a brand of naturalism, but does not insist that the material is ontologically more basic than the mental or that the former determines the latter. On this view, the material and the mental both relate solely to a certain set of functional roles, rather than to an intrinsic property that plays these roles. The term 'matter' is thus rendered vague, and materialism is conceived as a precariously grounded ontological doctrine. Elaborating on this interpretation of Locke's Essay, this book examines the insightful readings of Locke developed by seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers such as Richard Burthogge, William Carroll, and Joseph Priestley. This book also seeks to clarify what Locke's position would look like in a modern setting by noting some significant parallels with the ideas of leading contemporary philosophers such as Donald Davidson, David Lewis, and Colin McGinn.

John Locke (1632-1704) is a central figure in the history of thought, and in liberal doctrine especially. This major study brings a range of his wider views to bear upon his political theory. Every political theorist has a vision, a view about the basic features of life and society, as well as technique which mediates this into propositions about politics. Locke's vision spanned questions concerning Christian worship, ethics, political economy, medicine, the human understanding, revealed theology and education. This study shows how the character of these wider concerns informed Two Treatises of Government, especially in respect of a view of divine teleology, and situated a distinctive view of politics which treated the state and the church in parallel terms.

This book begins with a survey of various readings of Locke as a materialist, as a substance dualist, and as a property dualist, and demonstrates that these inconsistent interpretations result from a general failure of modern commentators to notice the significance of Locke’s ‘mind-body nominalism’. By illuminating this largely overlooked aspect of Locke’s philosophy, this book reveals a common mistake of previous interpretations: that of treating what Locke conceives to be ‘nominal’ as real. The nominal symmetry that Locke posits between mind and body is distinct from any form of metaphysical dualism, whether substance dualism or property dualism. It is a brand of naturalism, but does not insist that the material is ontologically more basic than the mental or that the former determines the latter. On this view, the material and the mental both relate solely to a certain set of functional roles, rather than to an intrinsic property that plays these roles. The term ‘matter’ is thus rendered vague, and materialism is conceived as a precariously grounded ontological doctrine. Elaborating on this interpretation of Locke’s Essay, this book examines the insightful readings of Locke developed by seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers such as Richard Burthogge, William Carroll, and Joseph Priestley. This book also seeks to clarify what Locke’s position would look like in a modern setting by noting some significant parallels with the ideas of leading contemporary philosophers such as Donald Davidson, David Lewis, and Colin McGinn.

An Essay Concerning Human Understanding by John Locke is a foundational text in the philosophy of empiricism, exploring the nature of human knowledge and the mind. Published in 1689, this Enlightenment masterpiece challenges the notion of innate ideas, proposing instead that the mind begins as a "tabula rasa" or blank slate, shaped by experience. Locke meticulously dissects the formation of ideas, distinguishing between simple ideas derived from sensory experience and complex ideas constructed by the mind. He examines primary and secondary qualities, emphasizing that our perception of the world is mediated by these qualities. Locke's exploration of personal identity introduces a psychological criterion, laying the groundwork for modern discussions on self and consciousness. The essay also delves into language, knowledge, and belief, offering insights into intuition, mathematics, and moral philosophy. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding remains a pivotal work in the categories of Philosophy, Epistemology, and Enlightenment Studies, influencing thinkers like David Hume and George Berkeley. Locke's clear and methodical approach invites readers to reconsider the origins and limits of human understanding.

In Regimens of the Mind, Sorana Corneanu proposes a new approach to the epistemological and methodological doctrines of the leading experimental philosophers of seventeenth-century England, an approach that considers their often overlooked moral, psychological, and theological elements. Corneanu focuses on the views about the pursuit of knowledge in the writings of Robert Boyle and John Locke, as well as in those of several of their influences, including Francis Bacon and the early Royal Society virtuosi. She argues that their experimental programs of inquiry fulfill the role of regimens for curing, ordering, and educating the mind toward an ethical purpose, an idea she tracks back to the ancient tradition of cultura animi. Corneanu traces this idea through its early modern revival and illustrates how it organizes the experimental philosophers’ reflections on the discipline of judgment, the study of nature, and the study of Scripture. It is through this lens, the author suggests, that the core features of the early modern English experimental philosophy—including its defense of experience, its epistemic modesty, its communal nature, and its pursuit of “objectivity”—are best understood.

Shelley Weinberg argues that the idea of consciousness as a form of non-evaluative self-awareness runs through and helps to solve some of the thorniest issues in Locke's philosophy: in his philosophical psychology and in his theories of knowledge, personal identity, and moral agency. Central to her account is that perceptions of ideas are complex mental states wherein consciousness is a constituent. Such an interpretation answers charges of inconsistency in Locke's model of the mind and lends coherence to a puzzling aspect of Locke's theory of knowledge: how we know individual things (particular ideas, ourselves, and external objects) when knowledge is defined as the perception of an agreement, or relation, of ideas. In each case, consciousness helps to forge the relation, resulting in a structurally integrated account of our knowledge of particulars fully consistent with the general definition. This model also explains how we achieve the unity of consciousness with past and future selves necessary for Locke's accounts of moral responsibility and moral motivation. And with help from other of his metaphysical commitments, consciousness so interpreted allows Locke's theory of personal identity to resist well-known accusations of circularity, failure of transitivity, and insufficiency for his theological and moral concerns. Although virtually every Locke scholar writes on at least some of these topics, the model of consciousness set forth here provides for an analysis all of these issues as bound together by a common thread.