Environmental tragedies such as Chernobyl and the Exxon Valdez remind us that catastrophic accidents are always possible in a world full of hazardous technologies. Yet, the apparently excellent safety record with nuclear weapons has led scholars, policy-makers, and the public alike to believe that nuclear arsenals can serve as a secure deterrent for the foreseeable future. In this provocative book, Scott Sagan challenges such optimism. Sagan's research into formerly classified archives penetrates the veil of safety that has surrounded U.S. nuclear weapons and reveals a hidden history of frightening "close calls" to disaster.

In The Fragile Balance of Terror, the foremost experts on nuclear policy and strategy offer insight into an era rife with more nuclear powers. Some of these new powers suffer domestic instability, others are led by pathological personalist dictators, and many are situated in highly unstable regions of the world—a volatile mix of variables. The increasing fragility of deterrence in the twenty-first century is created by a confluence of forces: military technologies that create vulnerable arsenals, a novel information ecosystem that rapidly transmits both information and misinformation, nuclear rivalries that include three or more nuclear powers, and dictatorial decision making that encourages rash choices. The nuclear threats posed by India, Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea are thus fraught with danger. The Fragile Balance of Terror, edited by Vipin Narang and Scott D. Sagan, brings together a diverse collection of rigorous and creative scholars who analyze how the nuclear landscape is changing for the worse. Scholars, pundits, and policymakers who think that the spread of nuclear weapons can create stable forms of nuclear deterrence in the future will be forced to think again. Contributors: Giles David Arceneaux, Mark S. Bell, Christopher Clary, Peter D. Feaver, Jeffrey Lewis, Rose McDermott, Nicholas L. Miller, Vipin Narang, Ankit Panda, Scott D. Sagan, Caitlin Talmadge, Heather Williams, Amy Zegart

Environmental tragedies such as Chernobyl, the Exxon Valdez, and Bhopal remind us that catastrophic accidents are always possible in a modern world full of hazardous technologies. Yet, the safety record appears to be extraordinarily good with nuclear weapons, the most dangerous technology of all. This safety record has led scholars, policy-makers, and the public alike to believe that nuclear weapons can serve as a safe and secure deterrent into the foreseeable future in the post-Cold War era. In this provocative and path-breaking book, Scott Sagan challenges such optimistic beliefs. Sagan's painstaking research into formerly classified archives penetrates the veil of safety that has surrounded U.S. nuclear weapons operations. Guided by theories of reliability in complex organizations, Sagan has uncovered a hidden history of frightening "close calls" to disaster: lost nuclear-armed bombers fly into the Russian warning net, Air Force officers tamper with missiles to be able to launch them without orders, B-52 bombers crash with thermonuclear weapons aboard and then vanish from the official histories, an unstable pilot deliberately turns on the two arming switches on his aircraft's nuclear bombs, and false warnings during the Cuban missile crisis lead pilots and radar operators to believe that the United States is under nuclear attack. Incomprehension, political maneuvering, and even cover-ups have limited what we have learned from these dangerous incidents, and Sagan maintains that many hidden bugs in the system remain. While the risk of deliberate nuclear war has been reduced with the end of the Cold War, the risk of serious accidents, even accidental war, remains unacceptably high. The inheritance of nuclear missiles by Soviet successor states, the continuing spread of the bomb to developing nations, and misplaced confidence in the safety of our own arsenal should produce deep concerns. Unless we radically change the posture of our nuclear arsenal, over the long run, when we least expect it, a serious accident will occur. The key factors that scholars believe lead to high organizational reliability - redundant back-up systems, personnel discipline, and trial-and-error learning - have not produced a safe nuclear arsenal. This book therefore challenges our beliefs, not only about nuclear weapons safety, but also about our ability to control the many other hazardous technologies on which modern society is based.

This book—the culmination of a truly collaborative international and highly interdisciplinary effort—brings together Japanese and American political scientists, nuclear engineers, historians, and physicists to examine the Fukushima accident from a new and broad perspective. It explains the complex interactions between nuclear safety risks (the causes and consequences of accidents) and nuclear security risks (the causes and consequences of sabotage or terrorist attacks), exposing the possible vulnerabilities all countries may have if they fail to learn from this accident. The book further analyzes the lessons of Fukushima in comparative perspective, focusing on the politics of safety and emergency preparedness. It first compares the different policies and procedures adopted by various nuclear facilities in Japan and then discusses the lessons learned—and not learned—after major nuclear accidents and incidents in other countries in the past. The book's editors conclude that learning lessons across nations has proven to be very difficult, and they propose new policies to improve global learning after nuclear accidents or attacks.

Normal Accidents analyzes the social side of technological risk. Charles Perrow argues that the conventional engineering approach to ensuring safety--building in more warnings and safeguards--fails because systems complexity makes failures inevitable. He asserts that typical precautions, by adding to complexity, may help create new categories of accidents. (At Chernobyl, tests of a new safety system helped produce the meltdown and subsequent fire.) By recognizing two dimensions of risk--complex versus linear interactions, and tight versus loose coupling--this book provides a powerful framework for analyzing risks and the organizations that insist we run them. The first edition fulfilled one reviewer's prediction that it "may mark the beginning of accident research." In the new afterword to this edition Perrow reviews the extensive work on the major accidents of the last fifteen years, including Bhopal, Chernobyl, and the Challenger disaster. The new postscript probes what the author considers to be the "quintessential 'Normal Accident'" of our time: the Y2K computer problem.

Nuclear Safety provides the methods and data needed to evaluate and manage the safety of nuclear facilities and related processes using risk-based safety analysis, and provides readers with the techniques to assess the consequences of radioactive releases. The book covers relevant international and regional safety criteria (US, IAEA, EUR, PUN, URD, INI). The contents deal with each of the critical components of a nuclear plant, and provide an analysis of the risks arising from a variety of sources, including earthquakes, tornadoes, external impact and human factors. It also deals with the safety of underground nuclear testing and the handling of radioactive waste. - Covers all plant components and potential sources of risk including human, technical and natural factors. - Brings together information on nuclear safety for which the reader would previously have to consult many different and expensive sources. - Provides international design and safety criteria and an overview of regulatory regimes.

Shows how targeting decisions have reflected the judgments of various American administrations on what will and won't deter a nuclear attack.