Military historian Caleb Carr’s groundbreaking work anticipated America’s current debates on preemptive military action against terrorist sponsor states, reorganization of the American intelligence system, and the treatment of terrorists as soldiers in supranational armies rather than as criminals. Carr’s authoritative exploration demonstrates that the practice of terrorism, employed by national armies as well as extremists since the days of ancient Rome, is ultimately self-defeating. Far from prompting submission, it stiffens enemy resolve and never leads to long-lasting success. Controversial on its initial publication in 2002, The Lessons of Terror has been repeatedly validated by subsequent events. Carr’s analysis of individual terrorist acts, and particularly of the history of the Middle East conflict, is fundamental to a deep understanding of the roots of terrorism as well as the steps and reforms that must be taken if the continuing threat of terrorist behavior is to be met effectively today and, finally, eradicated tomorrow.

In the wake of the attacks on New York and Washington many people believe we have entered a new world, but in this thought-provoking and thorough examination of the history of terrorism we can take comfort from the fact that we have been in this new world before - and survived. By drawing on the examples of history from the ancient, mediaeval and early modern worlds, Caleb Carr demonstrates how attempts to control civilian populations with the use of terror grew into a persistent problem in human history. Moving forward into more recent times he then demonstrates how and why such tactics have consistently failed their perpetrators - from the British scorched earth policy during the American War of Independence to terror at sea during WWI to the Japanese rape of China in WWII to the war in Vietnam and, ultimately, to the actions of Islamic extremists today. An important and timely book which throws much needed light on many of the questions being posed today.

A decade after 9/11, it is increasingly difficult to deny that terror has prevailed - not as a specific enemy, but as a way of life. This book examines the social, cultural, and political drivers of the war on terror through the framework of a 'political moral panic'.

In the world of terrorism, knowledge is a critical asset. Recent studies have revealed that, among international terrorists, there is a global sharing of ideas, tactics, strategies, and lessons learned. Teaching Terror examines this sharing of information in the terrorist world, shaping our understanding of, and response to, the global threat of terrorism. Chapters cover various aspects of individual and organizational learning, some using a general level of analysis and others presenting case studies of individual terrorist groups. These groups teach each other through a variety of means, including training camps and the Internet. Terrorist networks are also learning organizations, drawing on situational awareness, adapting their behavior, and, to give one example, improving not just their use of improvised explosive devices, but also rendering technology such as unmanned aerial vehicles and satellite phones ineffective. This book provides a wealth of insights on the transfer of knowledge in the world of terrorism, and offers policy implications for counterterrorism professionals, scholars, and policymakers.

Guidance for maintaining national security without abandoning the rule of law and our democratic values. In an age of global terrorism, can the pursuit of security be reconciled with liberal democratic values and legal principles? During its “global war on terrorism,” the Bush administration argued that the United States was in a new kind of conflict, one in which peacetime domestic law was irrelevant and international law inapplicable. From 2001 to 2009, the United States thus waged war on terrorism in a “no-law zone.” In Laws, Outlaws, and Terrorists, Gabriella Blum and Philip Heymann reject the argument that traditional American values embodied in domestic and international law can be ignored in any sustainable effort to keep the United States safe from terrorism. They demonstrate that the costs are great and the benefits slight from separating security and the rule of law. They call for reasoned judgment instead of a wholesale abandonment of American values. They also argue that being open to negotiations and seeking to win the moral support of the communities from which the terrorists emerge are noncoercive strategies that must be included in any future efforts to reduce terrorism.

Since September 2001, the United States has waged what the government initially called the global war on terrorism (GWOT). Beginning in late 2005 and early 2006, the term Long War began to appear in U.S. security documents such as the National Security Council's National Strategy for Victory in Iraq and in statements by the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS. The description Long War—unlimited in time and space and continuing for decades—is closer to reality and more useful than GWOT. Colonel Robert Cassidy argues that this protracted struggle is more correctly viewed as a global insurgency and counterinsurgency. Al Qaeda and its affiliates, he maintains, comprise a novel and evolving form of networked insurgents who operate globally, harnessing the advantages of globalization and the information age. They employ terrorism as a tactic, subsuming terror within their overarching aim of undermining the Western-dominated system of states. Placing the war against al Qaeda and its allied groups and organizations in the context of a global insurgency has vital implications for doctrine, interagency coordination, and military cultural change-all reviewed in this important work. Cassidy combines the foremost maxims of the most prominent Western philosopher of war and the most renowned Eastern philosopher of war to arrive at a threefold theme: know the enemy, know yourself, and know what kind of war you are embarking upon. To help readers arrive at that understanding, he first offers a distilled analysis of al Qaeda and its associated networks, with a particular focus on ideology and culture. In subsequent chapters, he elucidates the challenges big powers face when they prosecute counterinsurgencies, using historical examples from Russian, American, British, and French counterinsurgent wars before 2001. The book concludes with recommendations for the integration and command and control of indigenous forces and other agencies.