Beschrijving van de slag bij Bouvines tegen de achtergrond van het middeleeuwse krijgsbedrijf.

The reign of Basil II (976-1025), the longest of any Byzantine emperor, has long been considered as a 'golden age', in which his greatest achievement was the annexation of Bulgaria. This, we have been told, was achieved through a long and bloody war of attrition which won Basil the grisly epithet Voulgartoktonos, 'the Bulgar-slayer'. In this new study Paul Stephenson argues that neither of these beliefs is true. Instead, Basil fought far more sporadically in the Balkans and his reputation as 'Bulgar-slayer' was created only a century and a half later. Thereafter the 'Bulgar-slayer' was periodically to play a galvanizing role for the Byzantines, returning to centre-stage as Greeks struggled to establish a modern nation state. As Byzantium was embraced as the Greek past by scholars and politicians, the 'Bulgar-slayer' became an icon in the struggle for Macedonia (1904-8) and the Balkan Wars (1912-13).

"The leading academic vehicle for scholarly publication in the field of medieval warfare." Medieval WarfareThe twenty-first volume of the Journal of Medieval Military History begins with three studies examining aspects of warfare in the Latin East: an archaeological report on the defenses of Jerusalem by Shimon Gibson and Rafael Y. Lewis; a study of how military victories and defeats (viewed through the lens of carefully shaped reporting) affected the reputation, and the flow of funds and recruits to, the Military Orders, by Nicolas Morton; and an exploration of how the Kingdom of Jerusalem quickly recovered its military strength after the disaster of Hattin by Stephen Donnachie. Turning to the other side of the Mediterranean, Donald J. Kagay analyzes how Jaime I of Aragon worked to control violence within his realms by limiting both castle construction and the use of mechanical artillery. Guilhem Pépin also addresses the limitation of violence, using new documents to show that the Black Prince's sack of Limoges in 1370 was not the unrestrained bloodbath described by Froissart. The remaining three contributions deal with aspects of open battle. Michael John Harbinson offers a large-scale study of when and why late-medieval men-at-arms chose to dismount and fight on foot instead of acting tactically as cavalry. Laurence W. Marvin reconsiders the Battle of Bouvines, concluding that it was far from being a ritualized mass duel. Finally, Michael Livingston elucidates some principles for understanding medieval battles in general, and the battle of Agincourt in particular.moges in 1370 was not the unrestrained bloodbath described by Froissart. The remaining three contributions deal with aspects of open battle. Michael John Harbinson offers a large-scale study of when and why late-medieval men-at-arms chose to dismount and fight on foot instead of acting tactically as cavalry. Laurence W. Marvin reconsiders the Battle of Bouvines, concluding that it was far from being a ritualized mass duel. Finally, Michael Livingston elucidates some principles for understanding medieval battles in general, and the battle of Agincourt in particular.moges in 1370 was not the unrestrained bloodbath described by Froissart. The remaining three contributions deal with aspects of open battle. Michael John Harbinson offers a large-scale study of when and why late-medieval men-at-arms chose to dismount and fight on foot instead of acting tactically as cavalry. Laurence W. Marvin reconsiders the Battle of Bouvines, concluding that it was far from being a ritualized mass duel. Finally, Michael Livingston elucidates some principles for understanding medieval battles in general, and the battle of Agincourt in particular.moges in 1370 was not the unrestrained bloodbath described by Froissart. The remaining three contributions deal with aspects of open battle. Michael John Harbinson offers a large-scale study of when and why late-medieval men-at-arms chose to dismount and fight on foot instead of acting tactically as cavalry. Laurence W. Marvin reconsiders the Battle of Bouvines, concluding that it was far from being a ritualized mass duel. Finally, Michael Livingston elucidates some principles for understanding medieval battles in general, and the battle of Agincourt in particular.ingston elucidates some principles for understanding medieval battles in general, and the battle of Agincourt in particular.

This book traces the relations between the organization of violence and social and political order from ancient Rome to early modern Europe. Following the work of Michel Foucault, the author studies the ways authority, obedience and forms of self-conduct were produced by the micro-techniques used to govern the bodies of violence deployed in different forms of warfare.

In 1974, the Brazilian sports official João Havelange was elected FIFA’s president in a two-round election, defeating the incumbent Stanley Rous. The story told by Havelange himself describes a private odyssey in which the protagonist crisscrosses two thirds of the world canvassing for votes and challenging the institutional status quo. For many scholars, Havelange’s triumph changed FIFA’s (International Federation of Football Association) identity, gradually turning it into a global and immensely wealthy institution. Conversely, the election can be analyzed as a historical event. It can be thought of as a political window by means of which the international dynamic of a specific moment in the Cold War can be perceived. In this regard, this book seeks to understand which actors were involved in the election, how the networks were shaped, and which political agents were directly engaged in the campaign.

The Damietta Crusade, which is often referred to as the 'Fifth Crusade', was the first of the numbered crusades to be targeted against Egypt. Rather than directly targeting Jerusalem, its architects believed that by threatening the economic hub of Cairo the Ayyubid sultan would gladly give up Jerusalem in exchange. Here Laurence Marvin offers the first book-length treatment of the Damietta Crusade in almost 40 years. Written in accessible language and driven by a narrative and analysis firmly grounded in the primary sources in multiple languages, Marvin emphasizes what made this campaign unique, from its planning, choice of target, "brown-water" or amphibious nature, course, and result. He presents a multi-sided perspective by amply describing and analyzing the Egyptians and other groups in the eastern Mediterranean who played an important role in mounting a successful defense against Latin Christian forces. Marvin contends that the crusade in Egypt failed not because it derived from an unachievable or flawed grand strategy, but because of shifting operational goals, leadership issues, the social dynamics within the army, arrivals and departures of participants, and the effective defense led by Egypt's sultan, al-Kamil. This detailed analysis of an understudied event of thirteenth century history brings the latest methodologies of military history to bear on a wide range of primary sources, raising important questions about the complex nature of warfare and crusade in the medieval Mediterranean.