"This book offers a well-argued and insightful critical assessment of the shortcomings of international trade and competition rules in tackling interventionist State measures in the context of an economic crisis. Dawar offers an evidence-rich account of the challenges that State protectionism creates for international trade liberalisation and for the protection of competition in international markets. Her insights will be particularly interesting in the context of current events leading to another surge of State economic interventionism, both for academics and for policy-makers with an interest in international trade." Dr Albert Sanchez-Graells, University of Bristol Law School "This book bursts the bubble of the self-congratulatory attitude that existing institutions, which were set up to discipline governments from a race to the bottom on economic policy, worked well after the financial crisis. These institutions may have prevented tariff wars, a big achievement compared to the time of the Great Depression. But they went along with the subsidies and state aid that governments put in place after 2007. Such flexibility on economic policy is essential in turbulent times. But these institutions are undermined if flexibility comes with a race to the bottom that shifts money away from policies for the more marginalized sections of society. At a time when the left behinds are changing the political landscape of the world, Kamala's book debunks the myth of the success of existing institutions in containing the economic fallout of the global financial crisis. It gives a sobering warning of what might unfold when institutions deal with economic challenges by turning a blind eye to their own rules for checking unfair competition." Dr Swati Dhingra, Senior Lecturer at the Department of Economics, London School of Economomics 'An impressive contribution to our understanding of the financial crisis. Dawar's reading of bailouts and buy national through the lens of competition law and government procurement law and policy is inspirational.' Professor Mary E Footer, University of Nottingham School of Law 'The diplomatic fiction that during the crisis years regional and global trade rules ensured a level commercial playing field is skewered by Dawar's trenchant legal analysis.' Professor Simon Evenett, University of St Gallen This book examines the international regulation of crises bailouts and buy national policies. It undertakes this research with specific reference to the crisis years 2008–2012. The book includes a comparative analysis of the regulation of public procurement and subsidies aid at both multilateral and regional levels, identifying the strengths and weakness in the WTO legal framework and selected regional trade agreements (RTAs). Ultimately, the aim of this work is to provide options for improving the consistency of these laws and the regulation of these markets. This is of immediate relevance for good economic governance, as well as for managing future systemic financial crises in the interests of citizens: as tax payers and consumers.

This book asks whether the current push to increase uniformity in substantive and procedural competition policy and enforcement in Europe, as well as in related institutional structures, is desirable. It focuses on European Union (EU) competition policy and enforcement (related to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the merger rules), the equivalent rules in the Member States, and the relationships between these different legal orders. Uniformity has many benefits; yet, the advantages of diversity are also legion, enabling more policy experimentation and innovation; and improving the ability to accommodate national preferences. Contrary to the overwhelming view of academics, practitioners and regulators in this area, the book argues that uniformity is insufficient and examines ways of achieving a better mix of uniformity and diversity (the EU's motto is 'United in Diversity'). To achieve this better mix, the book offers a new framework for European competition law: Co-ordinated Diversity. Finally, this book discusses whether Co-ordinated Diversity fits with the current legal order in the EU, as well as the EU constitutional settlement more generally, and suggests some ways that it might be made compatible with this order with relative ease. The book's impact could be significant: changing the results in individual cases; the way cases are argued; and what information is relevant. More importantly, it builds the theoretical foundations for fundamentally altering the way in which the EU and the Member States' competition authorities interact, allowing space for disagreement and uncertainty. The aim is to improve the effiiciency and effectiveness of competition policy-making and enforcement in Europe. It should also increase the legitimacy in this field (rebalancing towards the Member States). Co-ordinated Diversity provides a new way of seeing the EU that better blends difference, when this is demanded, with uniformity and its benefits, as necessary. A timely and ambitious work, this book will be read with interest by all practitioners and academics interested in EU competition law, as well as the related fields of political science and economics.

This book charts the emergence of experimentalist governance in the implementation of EU competition law as a response to uncertainty and the limits of hierarchical enforcement in an increasingly dynamic and heterogeneous economic environment. It contributes to ongoing debates about the current state of EU competition law and provides an innovative account of emergent enforcement trends and its future direction. It also argues that an experimentalist evolution of competition law and market regulation attenuates concerns about the competitive strictures of EU law on national economic and regulatory institutions. Through its focus on experimentalist governance, the book provides guidance on completing experimentalist infrastructures for market regulation, as well as on the role of courts in triggering and sustaining experimentalist solutions. As such, it offers a novel perspective on implementing competition law in the EU and beyond.

The gap between the rich and poor is widening across the globe. This book explores whether this major societal challenge of our time can be addressed by the means of competition law. The primary goal of today's competition law is to ensure that market power does not lead to an inefficient production of goods and services. Nevertheless, even such efficiency-oriented curbing of market power may arguably contribute to the reduction of differences in how much people own and earn. Furthermore, many competition law regimes do take into account distributive considerations too. The chapters investigate the relationship between competition law and economic (in)equality from philosophical, historical, and economic perspectives. Their inquiries concern the conceptual foundations of competition law and doctrinal frameworks of individual jurisdictions, as well as specific problems and markets. As such, the book provides a novel and comprehensive overview of whether and how competition law can contribute to more equality in both developed and developing countries. The book is a must-read for researchers, public officials, judges, and practitioners within the competition law community. It will also appeal to anyone more broadly interested in issues of inequality and economic policy.

In recent years, market definition has come under attack as an analytical tool of competition law. Scholars have increasingly questioned its usefulness and feasibility. That criticism comes into sharper relief in dynamic, innovation-driven markets, which do not correspond to the static markets on which the concept of the relevant market was modelled. This book explores that controversy from a comparative legal perspective, taking into account both EU competition and US antitrust law. It examines the manifold ways in which courts and competition authorities in the EU and US have factored innovation-related considerations into market delineation, covering: innovative product markets, product differentiation, future markets, issues going beyond market definition proper – such as innovation competition, innovation markets and potential competition –, intellectual property rights, innovative aftermarkets and multi-sided platforms. This book finds that going forward, the role of market definition in dynamic contexts needs to focus on its function of market characterisation rather than on the assessment of market power.

What constitutes a fair procedure when it comes to EU competition law? This innovative book seeks to understand the philosophical considerations at the core of conflicting procedural fairness arguments in EU competition law practice. The author argues for a conceptualisation of procedural fairness as a distributional issue that can be solved by a practical fairness theory and a comprehensive methodology. To illustrate the usefulness of the conceptualisation, three procedural fairness problems from recent EU competition law practice are analysed: - the KME–Chalkor cases; - the Groupe Gascogne cases; - the regulatory question about using a collective redress mechanism for private enforcement of EU competition law. This unique approach provides a robust philosophical and methodological foundation for arguing about a wide range of procedural fairness dilemmas. The book is a must-read for academics and practitioners seeking an imaginative perspective on the philosophical foundations of arguments about procedural fairness in EU competition law and beyond.

A Critical Account of Article 106(2) TFEU: Government Failure in Public Service Provision offers a sceptical perspective on how EU law applies to public services. Article 106(2) provides that other Treaty rules may be disapplied in order to sustain a Service of General Economic Interest (SGEI). The rhetorical presentation of Article 106(2) is as a strict exception. As a result, Article 106(2) is often presented as a threat to Europe's public service tradition. This book challenges those shibboleths by using the concept of government failure. It is concerned with instances of government intervention that are unnecessary, generate avoidable inefficiencies, or that can be bettered so as to realise general interest goals more efficaciously. As an element of the government failure critique, a market feasibility test incorporating the concept of market failure is used to expose laxity in the review of general interests under Article 106(2). Complementing that, the process of disapplying other Treaty rules under Article 106(2) is shown to have evolved from being strict to being highly indulgent of SGEI providers, with a relatively recent but only partial correction post Altmark. Overall, the strict exception label for Article 106(2) does not hold. Moreover, it is contingent and presents no legitimate general interest related threat to the organisation and delivery of public services. A comprehensive re-orientation of Article 106(2) on issues of proof is required, as is greater reliance on market counterfactuals, and much more careful separation of objectives and means in SGEI operation and design. Through these measures, the toleration of government failure can be stemmed and Article 106(2)'s contingency reduced.