The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC is a comprehensive, integrated treatment of the legal and economic principles that underpin the application of Article 82 EC to the behaviour of dominant firms. Traditional concerns of monopoly behaviour, such as predatory pricing, refusals to deal, excessive pricing, tying and bundling, discount practices, and unlawful discrimination are treated in detail through a review of the applicable economic principles, the case law and decisional practice, and more recent economic and legal writings. In addition, the major constituent elements of Article 82, such as market definition, dominance, effect on trade, and applicable remedies are considered at length. Jointly authored by a lawyer and an economist, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC contains an integrated approach to the legal and economic principles that frame competition policy in this major area of competition policy. Although written primarily with practitioners and in-house lawyers in mind, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC is essential reading for anyone with an interest in competition-law enforcement against monopoly behaviour.

This is the first EU competition law treatise that fully integrates economic reasoning in its treatment of the decisional practice of the European Commission and the case-law of the European Court of Justice. Since the European Commission's move to a "more economic approach" to competition law reasoning and decisional practice, the use of economic argument in competition law cases has become a stricter requirement. Many national competition authorities are also increasingly moving away from a legalistic analysis of a firm's conduct to an effect-based analysis of such conduct, indeed most competition cases today involve teams composed of lawyers and industrial organisation economists. Competition law books tend to have either only cursory coverage of economics, have separate sections on economics, or indeed are far too technical in the level of economic understanding they assume. Ensuring a genuinely integrated approach to legal and economic analysis, this major new work is written by a team combining the widely recognised expertise of two competition law practitioners and a prominent economic consultant. The book contains economic reasoning throughout in accessible form, and, more pertinently for practitioners, examines economics in the light of how it is used and put to effect in the courts and decision-making institutions of the EU. A general introductory section sets EU competition law in its historical context. The second chapter goes on to explore the economics foundations of EU competition law. What follows then is an integrated treatment of each of the core substantive areas of EU competition law, including Article 101 TFEU, Article 102 TFEU, mergers, cartels and other horizontal agreements and vertical restraints.

“A reference book in this area of EU competition law and a must-have companion for academics, enforcers and practitioners alike, as well as EU and national judges.” Judge Nils Wahl, Court of Justice of the European Union This seminal text offers an authoritative and integrated treatment of the legal and economic principles that underpin the application of Article 102 TFEU to the behaviour of dominant firms. Traditional concerns of monopoly behaviour, such as predatory pricing, refusals to deal, excessive pricing, tying and bundling, discount practices and unlawful discrimination are treated in detail through a review of the applicable economic principles, the case law and decisional practice and more recent economic and legal writings. In addition, the major constituent elements of Article 102 TFEU, such as market definition, dominance, effect on trade and applicable remedies are considered at length. The third edition involves a net addition of over 250 pages, with a substantial new chapter on Abuses In Digital Platforms, an extensively revised chapter on standards, and virtually all chapters incorporating substantial revisions reflecting key cases such as Intel, MEO, Google Android, Google Shopping, AdSense, and Qualcomm.

This is the twelfth in a series on EU Competition Law and Policy produced by the Robert Schuman Centre of the European University Institute in Florence. The volume reproduces the written contributions and transcripts in connection with a roundtable debate which examined the EU's enforcement policy as regards the abuse of a dominant position under Article 82 EC. The workshop participants included: senior enforcement officials and policy makers from the European Commission, from the national competition authorities of certain EU Member States and from the US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission; and renowned international academics, legal practitioners and professional economists. In an intense, intimate environment, this group of experts debated a number of legal and economic issues structured according to three broad lines of discussion: 1) comparisons of the concept of monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act with that of abuse of dominance under Article 82 EC; 2) a reformed approach to exclusionary unilateral conduct; and 3) exploitative unilateral conduct and related remedies.

Three questions surround the interpretation and application of Article 82 of the EC Treaty. What is its underlying purpose? Is it necessary to demonstrate actual or likely anticompetitive effects on the market place when applying Article 82? And how can dominant undertakings defend themselves against a finding of abuse? Instead of the usual discussion of objectives, Liza Lovdahl Gormsen questions whether the Commission's chosen objective of consumer welfare is legitimate. While many Community lawyers would readily accept and indeed welcome the objective of consumer welfare, this is not supported by case law. The Community Courts do not always favour consumer welfare at the expense of economic freedom. This is important for dominant undertakings' ability to advance efficiencies and for understanding why the Chicago and post-Chicago School arguments cannot be injected into Article 82.

Monti explores the development of EC competition law through an interdisciplinary approach, focusing on the political and economic considerations that affect the way the rules are interpreted. Written with competition law students in mind, it should also be of interest to undergraduate and postgraduate students of EU politics and economics.

The objective(s) of Article 102 TFEU, what exactly makes a practice abusive and the standard of harm under Article 102 TFEU have not yet been settled. This lack of clarity creates uncertainty for businesses and, coupled with the current state of economics in this area, raises an important question of legitimacy. Using law and economic approaches, this book inquires into the possible objectives of Article 102 TFEU and proposes a modern approach to interpreting 'abuse'. In doing so, this book establishes an overarching concept of 'abuse' that conforms to the historical roots of the provision, to the text of the provision itself, and to modern economic thinking on unilateral conduct. This book therefore inquires into what Article 102 TFEU is about, what it can be about and what it should be about regarding both objectives and scope. The book demonstrates that the separation of exploitative abuse from exclusionary abuse is artificial and unsound. It examines the roots of Article 102 TFEU and the historical context of the adoption of the Treaty, the case law, policy and literature on exploitative abuses and, where relevant, on exclusionary abuses. The book investigates potential objectives, such as fairness and welfare, as well as the potential conflict between such objectives. Finally, it critically assesses the European Commission's modernisation of Article 102 TFEU, before proposing a reformed approach to 'abuse' which is centred on three necessary and sufficient conditions: exploitation, exclusion and a lack of an increase in efficiency.