The late Byzantine period was a time characterized by both civil strife and foreign invasion, framed by two cataclysmic events: the fall of Constantinople to the western Europeans in 1204 and again to the Ottoman Turks in 1453. Mark C. Bartusis here opens an extraordinary window on the Byzantine Empire during its last centuries by providing the first comprehensive treatment of the dying empire's military. Although the Byzantine army was highly visible, it was increasingly ineffective in preventing the incursion of western European crusaders into the Aegean, the advance of the Ottoman Turks into Europe, and the slow decline and eventual fall of the thousand-year Byzantine Empire. Using all the available Greek, western European, Slavic, and Turkish sources, Bartusis describes the evolution of the army both as an institution and as an instrument of imperial policy. He considers the army's size, organization, administration, and the varieties of soldiers, and he examines Byzantine feudalism and the army's impact on society and the economy. In its extensive use of soldier companies composed of foreign mercenaries, the Byzantine army had many parallels with those of western Europe; in the final analysis, Bartusis contends, the death of Byzantium was attributable more to a shrinking fiscal base than to any lack of creative military thinking on the part of its leaders.

The late Byzantine period was a time characterized by both civil strife and foreign invasion, framed by two cataclysmic events: the fall of Constantinople to the western Europeans in 1204 and again to the Ottoman Turks in 1453. Mark C. Bartusis here opens an extraordinary window on the Byzantine Empire during its last centuries by providing the first comprehensive treatment of the dying empire's military. Although the Byzantine army was highly visible, it was increasingly ineffective in preventing the incursion of western European crusaders into the Aegean, the advance of the Ottoman Turks into Europe, and the slow decline and eventual fall of the thousand-year Byzantine Empire. Using all the available Greek, western European, Slavic, and Turkish sources, Bartusis describes the evolution of the army both as an institution and as an instrument of imperial policy. He considers the army's size, organization, administration, and the varieties of soldiers, and he examines Byzantine feudalism and the army's impact on society and the economy. In its extensive use of soldier companies composed of foreign mercenaries, the Byzantine army had many parallels with those of western Europe; in the final analysis, Bartusis contends, the death of Byzantium was attributable more to a shrinking fiscal base than to any lack of creative military thinking on the part of its leaders.

In this first general book on the Byzantine army, the author traces the army's impact on the Byzantine state and society from the army's reorganization under Diocletian until its disintegration in the aftermath of the battle of Manzikert.

This book examines Byzantine attitudes towards warfare at a time of crisis when the empire ceased to be a first rate power in the Mediterranean. It investigates the correspondence between official rhetoric and propaganda, on the one hand, and military realities, on the other. It explores the military ethos of the late Byzantine aristocracy and examines Byzantine perceptions of military leadership in comparison to contemporary western European military thinking. The organisation and nature of military operations and the role of the various groups of soldiers are explored to set Byzantine warfare in the wider geographical and cultural context. In addition, this book provides a comprehensive analysis of the influences other medieval cultures exerted on Byzantine military thought, organisation and practice.

This book explores the professional and social lives of the soldiers who served in the army of the Byzantine Empire in the sixth century. More than just a fighting force, this army was the setting in which hundreds of thousands of men forged relationships and manoeuvred for promotion. The officers of this force, from famous generals like Belisarius and Narses to lesser-known men like Buzes and Artabanes, not only fought battles but also crafted social networks and cultivated their relationships with their emperor, fellow officers, families, and subordinate soldiers. Looming in the background were differences in identity, particularly between Romans and those they identified as barbarians. Drawing on numerical evidence and stories from sixth-century authors who understood the military, Justinian’s Men highlights a sixth-century Byzantine army that was vibrant, lively, and full of individuals working with and against each other.

The Byzantines had a remarkably sophisticated approach to politics and military strategy. Unlike most of their contemporaries, they learnt very early in their history that winning a battle did not necessarily win a war, and they frequently bought off their enemies with treaties and bribes rather than squander men and matériel in potentially fruitless campaigns. The Byzantine army of the 10th and early 11th centuries, at the height of its power and efficiency, was the best-organised, best-trained, best-equipped and highest-paid in the known world. This splendid book by Ian Heath examines the Byzantine Armies from 886-1118, including the lusty, hard-fighting, hard-drinking 'barbarian' Varangian guard.

The Byzantine Empire's disastrous defeat by the Seljuk Turks at Manzikert in 1071 effectively marked the end of what is often described as the 'middle' period of Byzantine history. Thereafter, surrounded on all sides by younger, more vigorous nations, the once all-powerful Empire slipped into a steady decline which, ultimately, was to prove terminal. However, the Empire's demise was anything but peaceful, and, one way or another, for much of the last four centuries of its existence it was to find itself in a state of virtually constant war. This book examines the fascinating history of the Byzantine Empire and its armies from 1118-1461 AD.