“Much fresh material . . . an excellent historical narrative of the events leading up to the Great Scuttle, the terrible day itself and its aftermath.” —Warships: International Fleet Review On June 21, 1919, the ships of the German High Seas Fleet—interned at Scapa Flow since the Armistice—began to founder, taking their British custodians completely by surprise. In breach of agreed terms, the fleet dramatically scuttled itself, in a well-planned operation that consigned nearly half a million tons, and 54 of 72 ships, to the bottom of the sheltered anchorage in a gesture of Wagnerian proportions. This much is well-known, but more than a century after the “Grand Scuttle” many questions remain. Was von Reuter, the fleet’s commander, acting under orders or was it his own initiative? Why was June 21 chosen? Did the British connive in or even encourage the action? Could more have been done to save the ships? Was it legally justified? And what were the international ramifications? This new book analyzes all these issues, beginning with the fleet mutiny in the last months of the war that precipitated a social revolution in Germany and the eventual collapse of the will to fight. The Armistice terms imposed the humiliation of virtual surrender on the High Seas Fleet, and the conditions under which it was interned are described in detail. Meanwhile the victorious Allies wrangled over the fate of the ships, an issue that threatened the whole peace process. Using much new material from German sources and a host of eyewitness testimonies, the circumstances of the scuttling itself are meticulously reconstructed, while the aftermath for all parties is clearly laid out. The story concludes with “the biggest salvage operation in history” and a chapter on the significance of the scuttling to the postwar balance of naval power. This is an important reassessment of the last great action of the First World War.

Anglo-German naval rivalry before 1914 had been expected to culminate in a cataclysmic fleet action in the North Sea once war was declared, a battle upon which the outcome of the war would depend: yet the two fleets met only once, at Jutland in 1916, and the battle was far from conclusive. ??In his own account of the war in the North Sea, first published in 1920, Admiral Scheer, the German commander at Jutland, gives his own explanation for the failure of either fleet to achieve the decisive victory expected of it, particularly the failure of his own operation plans that resulted in the battle of Jutland. ??This book is an invaluable account of one of the most important theatres of the First World War, written by one of its most senior commanders.

The German High Seas Fleet was one of the most powerful naval forces in the world, and had fought the pride of the Royal Navy to a stalemate at the battle of Jutland in 1916. After the armistice was signed, ending fighting in World War I, it surrendered to the British and was interned in Scapa Flow pending the outcome of the Treaty of Versailles. In June 1919, the entire fleet attempted to sink itself in the Flow to prevent it being broken up as war prizes. Of the 74 ships present, 52 sunk and 22 were prevented from doing so by circumstance and British intervention. Marine archaeologist and historian Dr Innes McCartney reveals for the first time what became of the warships that were scuttled, examining the circumstances behind the loss of each ship and reconciling what was known at the time to what the archaeology is telling us today. This fascinating study reveals a fleet lost for nearly a century beneath the waves.

“A compelling, dramatic account of the Royal Navy's last great sea battle.” —Robert K. Massie, Pulitzer Prize–winning and New York Times–bestselling author of Dreadnought More than a century later, historians still argue about this controversial and misunderstood World War I naval battle off the coast of Denmark. It was the twentieth century’s first engagement of dreadnoughts—and while it left Britain in control of the North Sea, both sides claimed victory and decades of disputes followed, revolving around senior commanders Admiral Sir John Jellicoe and Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty. This book not only retells the story of the battle from both a British and German perspective based on the latest research, but also helps clarify the context of Germany’s inevitable naval clash and the aftermath after the smoke had cleared.

While bookshelves groan with works on the capital ships of the German Third Reich, there is little in English devoted to their predecessors of the Second Reich, so this new book will fill a clear gap in its study of German cruisers of the period, from wooden-hulled corvettes, through the fusion of ‘overseas’ and ‘home’ vessels into the modern small cruisers that evolved and fought in the First World War. The book covers the full range of cruising vessels operated or ordered by the Imperial German Navy between 1871 and 1918, excluding the large cruisers, previously covered by the author’s companion volume The Kaiser’s Battlefleet. These include corvettes, avisos, sloops, torpedo cruisers, III- and IV-class cruisers and small cruisers, and are described and arranged in a chronological narrative. This includes both design and operational histories, the latter continuing down to the end of ships’ service after the fall of Imperial Germany, and it is accompanied by an extensive selection of many rare photographs. The ships’ technical details are tabulated in the second half of the book which also includes sketches of ships’ internal layouts and armour and changes in appearance over time. The authors have made extensive use of archival material, particularly relating to the political and technical background to design and procurement, and present a developmental history of this ship class which is unique in the English language. It will have huge appeal to all those with an interest in the German navy and to those who have been waiting avidly for the sequel to The Kaiser’s Battlefleet.