This account of the Khobar Towers bombing tells the story of the horrific attack and the magnificent response of airmen doing their duty under nearly impossible circumstances. None of them view their actions as heroic, yet the reader will marvel at their calm professionalism. All of them say it was just their job, but the reader will wonder how they could be so well trained to act almost instinctively to do the right thing at the right time. None of them would see their actions as selfless, yet countless numbers refused medical attention until the more seriously injured got treatment. Throughout this book, the themes of duty, commitment, and devotion to comrades resoundingly underscore the notion that America's brightest, bravest, and best wear her uniforms in service to the nation. This book is more than heroic actions, though, for there is also controversy. Were commanders responsible for not adequately protecting their people? What should one make of the several conflicting investigations following the attack? Dr. Jamieson has not shied away from these difficult questions, and others, but has discussed them and other controversial judgments in a straightforward and dispassionate way that will bring them into focus for everyone. It is clear from this book that there is a larger issue than just the response to the bombing. It is the issue of the example set by America's airmen. Future airmen who read this book will be stronger and will stand on the shoulders of those who suffered and those who made the ultimate sacrifice.

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are a type of unconventional explosive weapon that can be deployed in a variety of ways, and can cause loss of life, injury, and property damage in both military and civilian environments. Terrorists, violent extremists, and criminals often choose IEDs because the ingredients, components, and instructions required to make IEDs are highly accessible. In many cases, precursor chemicals enable this criminal use of IEDs because they are used in the manufacture of homemade explosives (HMEs), which are often used as a component of IEDs. Many precursor chemicals are frequently used in industrial manufacturing and may be available as commercial products for personal use. Guides for making HMEs and instructions for constructing IEDs are widely available and can be easily found on the internet. Other countries restrict access to precursor chemicals in an effort to reduce the opportunity for HMEs to be used in IEDs. Although IED attacks have been less frequent in the United States than in other countries, IEDs remain a persistent domestic threat. Restricting access to precursor chemicals might contribute to reducing the threat of IED attacks and in turn prevent potentially devastating bombings, save lives, and reduce financial impacts. Reducing the Threat of Improvised Explosive Device Attacks by Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals prioritizes precursor chemicals that can be used to make HMEs and analyzes the movement of those chemicals through United States commercial supply chains and identifies potential vulnerabilities. This report examines current United States and international regulation of the chemicals, and compares the economic, security, and other tradeoffs among potential control strategies.

Report by the Sec. of Defense on the threat of sophisticated organized terrorism against U.S. overseas forces. He announces major changes in the approach to force protection, and the placement of the threat of terrorism as one of the important considerations to be weighed when deciding how best to undertake a deployment. Appendix contains the Downing Report; the Defense Special Weapons Agency Report of the Khobar Towers Bomb Damage; the memo assigning responsibility for force protection, etc. Includes an 11-page report by Sen. Arlen Specter after a fact-finding trip to Saudi Arabia and a staff review of materials, concluding that there was no intelligence failure prior to the June 25 deadly bombing of the Khobar Towers complex.

The most comprehensive account to date of the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon and aftermath, this volume includes unprecedented details on the impact on the Pentagon building and personnel and the scope of the rescue, recovery, and caregiving effort. It features 32 pages of photographs and more than a dozen diagrams and illustrations not previously available.

Hezbollah — Lebanon’s ‘Party of God’ — is a multifaceted organisation: it is a powerful political party in Lebanon, a Shia religious and social movement, Lebanon’s largest militia, a close ally of Iran, and a terrorist organisation. Drawing on a wide range of sources, including recently declassified government documents, court records, and personal interviews with intelligence officials, Matthew Levitt examines Hezbollah’s beginnings, its first violent forays in Lebanon, and then its terrorist activities and criminal enterprises abroad in Europe, the Middle East, South America, Southeast Asia, Africa, and finally in North America. He also discusses Hezbollah’s unit dedicated to supporting Palestinian militant groups and the group’s involvement in training and supporting insurgents who fought US troops in post-Saddam Iraq. The book concludes with a look at Hezbollah’s integral and ongoing role in Iran’s ‘shadow war’ with Israel and the West, including plots targeting civilians around the world. Levitt shows convincingly that Hezbollah’s willingness to deploy violence at home and abroad, its global reach, and its proxy-patron relationship with the Iranian regime are all matters worthy of the utmost concern.

How can the United States avoid a future surprise attack on the scale of 9/11 or Pearl Harbor, in an era when such devastating attacks can come not only from nation states, but also from terrorist groups or cyber enemies? Intelligence and Surprise Attack examines why surprise attacks often succeed even though, in most cases, warnings had been available beforehand. Erik J. Dahl challenges the conventional wisdom about intelligence failure, which holds that attacks succeed because important warnings get lost amid noise or because intelligence officials lack the imagination and collaboration to “connect the dots” of available information. Comparing cases of intelligence failure with intelligence success, Dahl finds that the key to success is not more imagination or better analysis, but better acquisition of precise, tactical-level intelligence combined with the presence of decision makers who are willing to listen to and act on the warnings they receive from their intelligence staff. The book offers a new understanding of classic cases of conventional and terrorist attacks such as Pearl Harbor, the Battle of Midway, and the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The book also presents a comprehensive analysis of the intelligence picture before the 9/11 attacks, making use of new information available since the publication of the 9/11 Commission Report and challenging some of that report’s findings.

Over the last ten years, journalist and al-Qa'ida expert Abdel Bari Atwan has cultivated uniquely well-placed sources and amassed a wealth of information about al-Qa'ida's origins, masterminds and plans for the future. Atwan reveals how al-Qa'ida's radical departure from the classic terrorist/guerrilla blueprint has enabled it to outpace less adaptable efforts to neutralize it. The fanaticism of its fighters, and their willingness to kill and be killed, are matched by the leadership's opportunistic recruitment strategies and sophisticated understanding of psychology, media, and new technology - including the use of the internet for training, support, and communications. Atwan shows that far from committing acts of violence randomly and indiscriminately, al-Qa'ida attacks targets according to a decisive design underwritten by unwavering patience. He also argues that events in Iraq and Saudi Arabia are watershed moments in the group's evolution that are making it more dangerous by the day, as it refines and appropriates the concept of jihad and makes the suicide bomber a permanent feature of a global holy war. While Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri remain al-Qa'ida's figureheads, Atwan identifies a new kind of leader made possible by its horizontal chain of command, epitomized by the brutal Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi in Iraq and the bombers of London, Madrid, Amman, Bali, and elsewhere. Scholarly, analytical, objective, it is also intensely readable, being by far the best book on the subject.' -- Tony Benn 'This is a must-read book for anyone interested in understanding our increasingly scary world.' -- Gavin Esler 'What shines out ... is a profound desire to investigate and reveal the truth. Intelligent and informative.' -- Jason Burke, Guardian 'Deeply researched, well reported and full of interesting and surprising analyses. It demands to be read.' -- Peter Bergen, author of Holy War, Inc