In this critical examination of recent accounts of the nature of science and of its justification given by Kuhn, Popper, Lakatos, Laudan, and Newton-Smith, Banner contends that models of scientific rationality which are used in criticism of religious beliefs are in fact often inadequate as accounts of the nature of science. He argues that a realist philosophy of science both reflects the character of science and scientific justifications, and suggests that religious belief could be given a justification of the same sort.

These essays represent an important contribution to modern philosophical theology. They begin with an appreciation of Basil Mitchell's work and then discuss the role of reason in the justification of Christian theism, giving special attention to the nature of informal reasoning in religion and science. The latter essays examine particular arguments raised by specific religious concepts, covering such topics as the problem of evil, conspicuous sanctity, atonement, and the Eucharist. Drawn from a wide spectrum of philosophers and theologians, the contributors include Maurice Wiles, Grace M. Jantzen, Gordon Kaufman, J.R. Lucas, Rom Harré, Richard Swinburne, and Michael Dummett.

Tiddy Smith argues that the conflict between science and religion is ultimately a disagreement about what kinds of methods we should use for investigating the world. Specifically, scientists and religious folk disagree over which belief-forming methods are reliable. In the course of justifying any scientific claim, scientists typically appeal to methods which generate agreement between independent investigators, and which converge on the same answers to the same questions. In contrast, religious claims are typically justified by methods which neither generate agreement nor converge in their results (for example, dreams, visions, mystical experiences etc.). This fundamental difference in methodologies can neatly account for the conflict between science and religion.

In this book, Basil Mitchell analyzes the reasoning involved in the continuing debate between Christian theism and its secular critics. Arguing that theism cannot be definitively proved or disproved, he shows how the case for theism, like the case for any secular alternative to it, must rely on the cumulative weight of a set of converging arguments that cannot be entirely formalized. He contends that this pattern of argument is not confined to religious questions, but is employed in a wide variety of disputes, from small-scale disagreements over history or critical exegesis to debate involving profound conceptual differences in such fields as natural science, political theory, and metaphysics. Mitchell concludes with a discussion of the rationality of faith as commitment to undemonstrable religious or political beliefs and the uniqueness of faith in God.

Contributions from an international conference held December 11-13, 2002, at the Institute for Philosophy of Religion at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt.