Excerpt from The Journal of Philosophy Psychology and Scientific Methods, Vol. 8: January 6, 1916 A thoroughgoing analysis of purpose is one of the prime needs of empirical science to-day. Every branch of natural science re quires a clarification of this notion. The newer conceptions of change and growth induced by the evolution theory make it essen tial to determine what scientific meaning shall be attached to the phenomenon of anticipation and the judgment of fitness. Psychologists and biologists alike are vitally concerned in the solu tion of the teleological problem. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.

Excerpt from The Journal of Philosophy Psychology and Scientific Methods, Vol. 8: January 6, 1916 They aim to interpret the evolution of species and organs in a strictly mechanistic manner. Among psychologists to-day there is a similar division into voluntarists and psychophysicists. The latter seek to minimize the efficiency of volition and to describe all human acts in terms of psychophysical activity. This would seem, in the last analysis, to involve an interpretation of purpose in physiological terms, as a series of physicochemical changes. These differences in standpoint can scarcely be attributed to carelessness of observation. They depend rather upon certain underlying concepts and modes of thinking which govern the scientist's interpretation of observed facts and determine the character of his world-view. Among these fundamental logical notions none is more deep-seated and persistent than the concept of Purpose. Notwithstanding the vigorous controversy that has recently waged between vitalists and mechanists, and the forceful arguments put forward in behalf of teleology and against it, neither side has so far given an adequate account of the nature of purpose itself. A thorough examination of its fundamental character might reveal a middle ground on which the two opposing parties could unite. If we rid teleology of its anthropomorphic accretions, as Hume removed the anthropomorphic notion of "necessity" from causation, there is no reason why the most thoroughgoing mechanist should not accept purposive events as a specific class of natural processes. It is possible, also, that when the scientific untenability of the traditional voluntarism is demonstrated, the vitalist will attach more weight to physicochemical processes in biological growth and activity. One obstacle to a thorough understanding of the nature of purpose is the present lack of coordination between the various sciences. Biologists for the most part assume an interpretation of human volition drawn from the psychology of a bygone generation. Psychologists still lay stress on the unscientific notions of "free will" and "responsibility" bequeathed to us by medieval philosophy. The data derived from cosmology, biology, and psychology have not yet been united into a consistent, scientific interpretation of voluntary, teleological action. A thoroughgoing analysis of purpose is one of the prime needs of empirical science to-day. Every branch of natural science requires a clarification of this notion. The newer conceptions of change and growth induced by the evolution theory make it essential to determine what scientific meaning shall be attached to the phenomenon of "anticipation" and the judgment of "fitness." About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.

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