Previously unpublished analysis of why and how the Italians foughtA look at the role the Italian Army played in North Africa as part of the Deutsches Afrika Korps (German Afrika Korps)In spite of poor leadership, the Italian soldier performed well against all odds in North AfricaProfusely illustrated with many rare and unpublished images ‘The German soldier has impressed the world, however, the Italian Bersagliere soldier has impressed the German soldier.’ Erin Rommel aka ‘The Desert Fox’ When most people think of the Italian Army in North Africa during the Second World War, they tend to believe that the average Italian soldier offered little resistance to the Allies before surrendering. Many suggest that the Italian Army performed in a cowardly manner during the war: the reality is not so simple. The question remains as to whether the Italians were cowards or victims of circumstance. While the Italian soldier’s commitment to the war was not as great as that of his German counterpart, many Italians fought bravely. The Italian Littorio and Ariete Divisions earned Allied admiration at Tobruk, Gazala and EI Alamein. The Italian Army played a significant role as part of the German Afrika Korps and made up a large portion of the Axis combat power in North Africa during 1941 and 1942. In the interest of determining how the Italian Army earned the reputation that it did, it is necessary to analyse why and how the Italians fought.

Focusing on the Italian Army in North Africa during World War II, which fought alongside the Afrikakorps under Rommel versus Montgomery and Patton, this title combines with the previous Warrior series books on the subject (and other Osprey titles) to complete the picture of the War in the Desert. Despite the attention paid to the Afrikakorps over the years, it was the numerically far superior forces of the Italian Army that held the line and formed the bulk of the fighting power available to the Axis powers during the War in the Desert from 1941 through to 1943. Their performance has been unfairly criticized over the years - the best units of the Italian Army were equal to those of the British and Germans - but they suffered from a lack of mobility and poor equipment that made it impossible for them to meet mobile British forces on anywhere near equal terms. Despite this, the Italian Army went through many changes through the period, with the introduction of a variety of elite units - armoured, mechanised and parachute divisions that did much to restore the fighting reputation of the Italian soldier in the Desert War. Their German allies belatedly acknowledged this with the redesignation of Panzerarmee Afrika as 1st Italian Army in February 1943._x000B_This title details recruitment, organisation and experience of the Italian forces in this theatre, casting new light on a force whose fighting power and capabilities have been unfairly ignored and maligned for too long.

Italian military historian Pier Paolo Battistelli examines the elite and specialforces units of the Italian Army during World War II. This includes a vast array of troop types, including paratroopers, assault engineers, sea-landing and swimmer units, long-range recce and ski units, and even hand-picked Fascist 'Mussolini' units. It also delves into the specialist tank and armoured units that were created to emulate the German armoured units. While the Italian units discussed enjoyed mixed success, the volume draws attention to the incredibly hard fighting done by some in the deserts of North Africa and the frozen wastelands of Russia. Illustrated with rare archival photographs and specially commissioned artwork, this is a fascinating insight into a little-studied aspect of Axis forces.

The North African campaign was one of the hardest fought episodes of the Second World War, yet the vital part played by the Italian Army - and in particular, its Folgore Parachute Division on behalf of the Axis Alliance - is frequently overlooked. Initially created to emulate the German Fallschirmjäger in order to carry out the planned airborne attack against the British base of Malta, Folgore Airborne Division fought on the battlefields of North Africa - including the key Battle of El Alamein.This elite unit distinguished itself at El Alamein despite inadequate equipment and weapons while facing unfavorable odds. This book describes a paratroop unit that earned the respect of its Allied opponents during some of the hardest-fought engagements of North Africa. The key theme of the book is the paratroopers' involvement in the Axis war effort through an analysis of their training, weaponry and battle tactics.Another key focus is an assessment of the Folgore's specific role during the major battles of the North African campaign. It covers in detail, for example, the Folgore's first fierce military engagement against British and New Zealand troops during the Battle of Alam El Halfa in September 1942. It then details a number of smaller actions that preceded the Battle of El Alamein such as the counter-attack during the British 'Operation Beresford', which led to the capture of Brigadier General G.H. Clifton, commander of the New Zealand 6th Brigade, by a patrol of Folgore soldiers. The focus then shifts upon the Folgore's major engagement of the campaign during the Battle of El Alamein: 'Operation Lightfoot', which was launched by General Montgomery on 24 October 1942. It was designed to break through the Italian-held southern sector of the El Alamein line, where the Bologna, Brescia, Pavia and Folgore Divisions anchored the Axis right flank. While describing key events during this operation, the book also highlights how the Folgore used unusual tactics to repulse the massive enemy-armored attack. This included letting the enemy advance into a 'cul-de-sac' and then launching a counter-attack against its armored vehicles and infantry units from all sides and by a combination of fire from 47 mm anti-tank guns, mortars, hand grenades and other incendiary devices. It describes the desperate retreat in the desert of the Italian units as a result of the collapse of Axis military defenses in November 1942. Finally, it highlights the role of the paratroopers during the last battles in Tunisia - especially those in defense of the Mareth line and Takrouna in the spring of 1943.Illustrated with rare archival photographs, detailed maps and specially commissioned artwork, this volume offers a fascinating insight into a little-studied aspect of Axis forces. The volume draws heavily upon both Axis and Allied (Britain and New Zealand) archival sources such as the war diaries and the post-battle reports of the military units engaged in North Africa. It thus sheds new light into one of the most important campaigns of the Second World War. By drawing from archival sources from both sides, it also furnishes a more complete and balanced perspective on a critical juncture in the war such as the Battle of El Alamein.

Allied Fighting Effectiveness in North Africa and Italy, 1942-1945 offers a collection of scholarly papers focusing on heretofore understudied aspects of the Second World War. Encompassing the major campaigns of North Africa, Sicily and Italy from operation TORCH to the end of the war in Europe, this volume explores the intriguing dichotomy of the nature of battle in the Mediterranean theatre, whilst helping to emphasise its significance to the study of Second Word War military history. The chapters, written by a number of international scholars, offer a discussion of a range of subjects, including: logistics, the air-land battle, coalition operations, doctrine and training, command, control and communications, and airborne and special forces. Contributors are Matthew C. Ford, Simon Godfrey, John Greenacre, Andrew L. Hargreaves, James Hudson, Alan Jeffreys, Kevin Jones, Paul Lemaire, Ross Mahoney, Christopher Mann, Cesar Campiani Maximiano, Patrick J. Rose, and Grant T. Weller.

Vincere! presents an overview of the counterinsurgency operations carried out by the Italian Royal Army from 1922 to 1941 in Libya and Ethiopia. Based on ten years of study conducted in the Italian archives and on the ground, this volume looks at a period when the Italian Royal Army faced significant new challenges in the conduct of war. Facing new challenges in an atypical theater of war, Italian Royal Army forces learned significant lessons that would shape the conduct of future combat. In the period covered in this work, Italian Royal Army forces had to adapt to new terrain, while modifying their techniques and methods in relation to the local populations and the overall characteristics of the territories in Africa. Moving away from a reliance on heavy, slow battalions formed for the most part by Italian troops, the Italians instead turned to mobile units, lightly armed and composed primarily by African troops who were able to respond quickly to the needs of this kind of war. Men coming from the loyal Eritrean colony, from Somalia, Libya, from the countries on the Red Sea and even from Ethiopia, progressively replaced Italian troops. In Libya, warfighting and counterinsurgency operations were conducted mainly by regular infantry (Libyan battalions, Méharists, Saharian) and cavalry units (Savaris and Spahis), while in Ethiopia, regular and irregular bands were used. Vincere! offers a look at some of the earliest irregular warfare and counterinsurgency operations the modern Italian forces ever conducted. Italian forces faced local populations while conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in what was, for them, a new theater of war. In Libya, the rebellion was quelled in the space of ten years, at an admittedly high price for the regional forces. In Ethiopia, where COIN operations were interrupted by World War II, the available data suggests that military actions, accompanied by a more responsible policy toward the population, would have eventually defeated the insurgency. The use of airpower in Ethiopia made a huge difference, and its lessons were learned long before the French experience in Algeria. The Italians waged counterinsurgency operations over twenty years in two geographically separate theaters, and in two very different operational environments and much of value for current practitioners and scholars can be learned from these different experiences.