An analysis of the inflated business potential of the Internet.

This is a sceptical history of the internet/stock market boom. John Cassidy argues that what we have just witnessed wasn't simply a stock market bubble; it was a social and cultural phenomenon driven by broad historical forces. Cassidy explains how these forces combined to produce the buying hysteria that drove the prices of loss-making companies into the stratosphere. Much has been made of Alan Greenspan's phrase irrational exuberance, but Cassidy shows that there was nothing irrational about what happened. The people involved - fund managers, stock analysts, journalists and pundits - were simply acting in their own self-interest.

Why do stock and housing markets sometimes experience amazing booms followed by massive busts and why is this happening more and more frequently? In order to answer these questions, William Quinn and John D. Turner take us on a riveting ride through the history of financial bubbles, visiting, among other places, Paris and London in 1720, Latin America in the 1820s, Melbourne in the 1880s, New York in the 1920s, Tokyo in the 1980s, Silicon Valley in the 1990s and Shanghai in the 2000s. As they do so, they help us understand why bubbles happen, and why some have catastrophic economic, social and political consequences whilst others have actually benefited society. They reveal that bubbles start when investors and speculators react to new technology or political initiatives, showing that our ability to predict future bubbles will ultimately come down to being able to predict these sparks.

With his singular gift for turning complex financial events into eminently readable stories, Roger Lowenstein lays bare the labyrinthine events of the manic and tumultuous 1990s. In an enthralling narrative, he ties together all of the characters of the dot-com bubble and offers a unique portrait of the culture of the era. Just as John Kenneth Galbraith’s The Great Crash was a defining text of the Great Depression, Lowenstein’s Origins of the Crash is destined to be the book that will frame our understanding of the 1990s.

An analysis of the inflated business potential of the Internet.

Seminar paper from the year 2012 in the subject Business economics - Banking, Stock Exchanges, Insurance, Accounting, grade: 1,3, Technical University of Applied Sciences Mittelhessen, language: English, abstract: The Dotcom bubble, also known as the ‘Internet bubble’ or the ‘Information technology bubble’ was a speculative bubble of stock prices of mainly American Internet companies during the time from 1995 until 2000 when many investors believed that a ‘new era’ was upon them. In only two years, the Internet sector grew over 1000% of its public equity and equalled nearly 6% of the market capitalization of the United States and over 20% of all public traded equity volume in the US. It had its peak on March 10, 2000 with a NASDAQ score of 5,048.62. This period was characterized by lots of establishments of companies in the Internet sector. They were called ‘Dotcom Companies’ because of the ‘.com’ in the end of an URL that comes from the word ‘commercial’. The bubble burst during the years 2000 until 2002 when the NASDAQ lost nearly 80% of its value, many companies like Pets.com failed completely and over $7 trillion in market value were destroyed. With this paper, the author tries to explain the rise and fall of Internet stock prices during that period. For this purpose, the general causes and characteristics of financial bubbles get described before the application to the Dotcom bubble follows. Additionally, some company examples and survivors and losers of the bubble like pets.com, Webvan or Ebay get introduced. Because the bubble mainly took place in the United States, the author will focus on American company examples and the American stock exchange.

The authors challenge this view here and develop two alternative interpretations. Both are based on the notion that a bubble (the "dot-com" bubble) has been driving the stock market, but differ in their assumptions about the interactions between this bubble and fiscal policy (the "Bush" deficits). The "benevolent" view holds that a change in investor sentiment led to the collapse of the dot-com bubble and the Bush deficits were a welfare-improving policy response to this event. The "cynical" view holds instead that the Bush deficits led to the collapse of the dot-com bubble as the new administration tried to appropriate rents from foreign investors. The authors discuss the implications of each of these views for the future evolution of the U.S. economy and, in particular, its net foreign asset position."