State Department Publication 10316. Edited by C. Thomas Thorne, et al. General Editor: Glenn W. LaFantasie. One of a series of volumes on the foreign policy of the Truman administration. Also advertised with the subtitle: Intelligence and Foreign Policy. Includes high-level governmental plans, discussions, administrative decisions, and managerial actions that established institutions and procedures for the central coordination of intelligence collection and analysis and covert action. Documentsthe advice, actions, and initiatives of principals and groups in other departments and agencies, who helped to lay the foundations for the centralized intelligence bureaucracy.

CIAs historiske baggrund, dets udvikling, basale funktioner, medlemmer, omdømme, forhold til kongressen. Bogen indeholder også en kort gennemgang af det engelske efterretningsvæsen og til sidst en generel analyse og problematisering af beaukratiet indenfor efterretningsvæsen som sådan og endelig en konklusion.

“A comprehensive exploration of spying in its myriad forms from the Bible to the present day . . . Easy to dip into, and surprisingly funny.” —Ben Macintyre in The New York Times Book Review The history of espionage is far older than any of today’s intelligence agencies, yet largely forgotten. The codebreakers at Bletchley Park, the most successful WWII intelligence agency, were completely unaware that their predecessors had broken the codes of Napoleon during the Napoleonic wars and those of Spain before the Spanish Armada. Those who do not understand past mistakes are likely to repeat them. Intelligence is a prime example. At the outbreak of WWI, the grasp of intelligence shown by US President Woodrow Wilson and British Prime Minister Herbert Asquith was not in the same class as that of George Washington during the Revolutionary War and eighteenth-century British statesmen. In the first global history of espionage ever written, distinguished historian and New York Times–bestselling author Christopher Andrew recovers much of the lost intelligence history of the past three millennia—and shows us its continuing relevance. “Accurate, comprehensive, digestible and startling . . . a stellar achievement.” —Edward Lucas, The Times “For anyone with a taste for wide-ranging and shrewdly gossipy history—or, for that matter, for anyone with a taste for spy stories—Andrew’s is one of the most entertaining books of the past few years.” —Adam Gopnik, The New Yorker “Remarkable for its scope and delightful for its unpredictable comparisons . . . there are important lessons for spymasters everywhere in this breathtaking and brilliant book.” —Richard J. Aldrich, Times Literary Supplement “Fans of Fleming and Furst will delight in this skillfully related true-fact side of the story.” —Kirkus Reviews “A crowning triumph of one of the most adventurous scholars of the security world.” —Financial Times Includes illustrations

President Harry Truman created the job of director of central intelligence (DCI) in 1946 so that he and other senior administration officials could turn to one person for foreign intelligence briefings. The DCI was the head of the Central Intelligence Group until 1947, when he became the director of the newly created Central Intelligence Agency. This book profiles each DCI and explains how they performed in their community role, that of enhancing cooperation among the many parts of the nationÆs intelligence community and reporting foreign intelligence to the president. The book also discusses the evolving expectations that U.S. presidents through George W. Bush placed on their foreign intelligence chiefs. Although head of the CIA, the DCI was never a true national intelligence chief with control over the governmentÆs many arms that collect and analyze foreign intelligence. This limitation conformed to President TrumanÆs wishes because he was wary of creating a powerful and all-knowing intelligence chief in a democratic society. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress and President Bush decided to alter the position of DCI by creating a new director of national intelligence position with more oversight and coordination of the governmentÆs myriad programs. Thus this book ends with Porter Goss in 2005, the last DCI. Douglas GarthoffÆs book is a unique and important study of the nationÆs top intelligence official over a roughly fifty-year period. His work provides the detailed historical framework that is essential for all future studies of how the U.S. intelligence community has been and will be managed.

"As conceived, this history was aimed at satisfying the need of employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, especially new or young professional ones, for a comprehensive and detailed account of the agency's origin. It was completed in 1975, classified SECRET, and reproduced in sets of 2 volumes each. The security classification has recently been reviewed, and the manuscript, shorn of no more than six typewritten pages of material, is now declassified. Thus released for leisurely reading outside the office, and printed in one volume, this history should better serve its original purpose."--Preface.

With terrorism still prominent on the U.S. agenda, whether the country's prevention efforts match the threat the United States faces continues to be central in policy debate. Does the country need a dedicated domestic intelligence agency? Case studies of five other democracies--Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and the UK--provide lessons and common themes that may help policymakers decide.