Focused at the theoretical level, this volume seeks to clarify our understanding of various historical and contemporary concepts of human dignity. It examines the various meanings of the term ‘dignity’ before looking at the philosophical sources of dignity and both religious and secular attempts to provide a grounding for the notion. It also compares the merits and defects of older and newer concepts of dignity, including extensions of dignity to groups, animals, and machines.

Focused on the more practical level, volume 2 seeks to understand the work dignity may do as a foundation for law, how it is related to religious liberty, and how we should adjudicate religious liberty disputes at the individual and corporate level. What is the sphere of human dignity that the law should be trying to protect? Is the role of dignity helpful as a foundational legal concept, and if so, how exactly? What is the status of religious liberty as a component of human dignity, and how is it to be balanced with other individual rights, such as freedom of expression? And finally, to what extent can the law adjudicate corporate religious claims?

Confronting the evils of World War II and building on the legacy of the 1776 Declaration of Independence and the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, a group of world citizens including Eleanor Roosevelt drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Adopted by the United Nations in 1948, the Universal Declaration has been translated into 300 languages and has become the basis for most other international human rights texts and norms. In spite of the global success of this document, however, a philosophical disconnect exists between what major theorists have said a human right is and the foundational text of the very movement they advocate. In Inherent Human Rights: Philosophical Roots of the Universal Declaration, philosopher and political theorist Johannes Morsink offers an alternative to contemporary assumptions. A major historian of the Universal Declaration, Morsink traces the philosophical roots of the Declaration back to the Enlightenment and to a shared revulsion at the horrors of the Holocaust. He defends the Declaration's perspective that all people have human rights simply by virtue of being born into the human family and that human beings have these rights regardless of any government or court action (or inaction). Like mathematical principles, human rights are truly universal, not the products of a particular culture, economic scheme, or political system. Our understanding of their existence can be blocked only by madness and false ideologies. Morsink argues that the drafters of the Declaration shared this metaphysical view of human rights. By denying the inherence of human rights and their metaphysical nature, and removing the concepts of the Declaration from their historical and philosophical context, contemporary constructivist scholars and pragmatic activists create an unnecessary and potentially dangerous political fog. The book carefully dissects various human rights models and ends with a defense of the Declaration's cosmopolitan vision against charges of unrealistic utopianism and Western ethnocentrism. Inherent Human Rights takes exception to the reigning view that the Golden Rule is the best defense of human rights. Instead, it calls for us to "follow the lead of the Declaration's drafters and liberate the idea of human rights from the realm of the political and the juridical, which is where contemporary theorists have imprisoned it."

This book reassesses the relationship between human dignity, law, and specifically the ‘personalist’ school of agency. The work argues that a specific way of appreciating dignity is contained in how law understands the person, and so can be used to improve upon how we explain and interpret the law. Despite considerable differences between jurisdictions as regards human dignity in application, it is argued that the particular weight of human persons is the widely shared focal point. The central claim, therefore, is that the law recognises, and tries to foster, the status of personhood, and, drawing on the work of Karol Wojty?a, the author develops a ‘Status of Personhood Theory’. The book will be of interest to academics and researchers working in the areas of Legal Philosophy, Jurisprudence, Philosophy, Ethics and Political Theory.

This book is a contribution to African philosophy, by philosophers focusing specifically on the concept of human dignity in ethical theory. The concept of ‘human dignity’ denotes the intrinsic and superlative worth associated with human beings in virtue of which we owe them utmost moral regard. Although dignity is a foundational concept for African philosophy, there remains scant literature in African philosophy dedicated to critical and systematic reflection on the concept of human dignity. This volume responds to this lacuna by bringing together chapters that offer philosophical exposition, defense (or even rejection) and application of the concept of human dignity in light of intellectual resources in African cultures, such as ubuntu, personhood, and serithi.

Over the past two centuries, the concept of human dignity has moved from the fringes to the centre of the international legal system. This book is the first detailed historical, theoretical and legal investigation of human dignity as a normative value, the intellectual sources that shaped its legal recognition, and the main legal instruments used to give it expression in international law. Ginevra Le Moli addresses the broad historical and philosophical developments relating to the legal expression of dignity and the doctrinal geography of human dignity in international law, with a focus on international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international criminal law. The book fills a major lacuna in the literature by providing a comprehensive account of dignity within international law that draws on an extensive documentary and archival basis and a vast body of decisions of international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies.