The first systematic look at the different strategies that states employ in their pursuit of nuclear weapons Much of the work on nuclear proliferation has focused on why states pursue nuclear weapons. The question of how states pursue nuclear weapons has received little attention. Seeking the Bomb is the first book to analyze this topic by examining which strategies of nuclear proliferation are available to aspirants, why aspirants select one strategy over another, and how this matters to international politics. Looking at a wide range of nations, from India and Japan to the Soviet Union and North Korea to Iraq and Iran, Vipin Narang develops an original typology of proliferation strategies—hedging, sprinting, sheltered pursuit, and hiding. Each strategy of proliferation provides different opportunities for the development of nuclear weapons, while at the same time presenting distinct vulnerabilities that can be exploited to prevent states from doing so. Narang delves into the crucial implications these strategies have for nuclear proliferation and international security. Hiders, for example, are especially disruptive since either they successfully attain nuclear weapons, irrevocably altering the global power structure, or they are discovered, potentially triggering serious crises or war, as external powers try to halt or reverse a previously clandestine nuclear weapons program. As the international community confronts the next generation of potential nuclear proliferators, Seeking the Bomb explores how global conflict and stability are shaped by the ruthlessly pragmatic ways states choose strategies of proliferation.

Finally, the book assesses the contribution of international assistance programmes to the denuclearization process under way in the former Soviet Union.

The Independent Nuclear State: The United States, Britain and the Military Atom is a chronological account and overview of the 40-year history of British military research, development and production work in atomic energy. The United Kingdom's efforts in this field have always had close links with equivalent activities in the United States, and have often been conducted on a mutually co-operative basis. Through its description of these secret Anglo-American interactions, this study serves to highlight the degree to which the public debate in Britain over nuclear weapons has been conducted in a vacuum, as has American public policy-making over its nuclear links with the United Kingdom. This book contains descriptions of the technical evolution of British nuclear weapon designs and production models, estimates of annual output figures for fissile material and weapon types, and indications of the nature of the weapon-testing programme. Decision points are charted, such as the H-bomb development, and the factors that led to existing plans being changed are identified. The demonstrative nature of the programme until the late 1950s is illustrated, together with the rapidity with which the stockpile targets were met at the turn of that decade. The impact of the agreements with the United States, both upon weapon development and production programmes and upon stockpiling is analysed, as well as their effects upon the nuclear submarine programme. The consequences of the mid-1960s termination of weapon development are discussed, as it the later decision to restart it for the Chevaline programme. The impact of these events upon Anglo-American relations is identified, together with the recent British attempts to move to a closer political association with Europe. The study concludes by evaluating the essential nature of four decades of United Kingdom military nuclear development, and identifying the practical limits imposed by past policies upon any attempt by a British government to implement a policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament.

The definitive guide to the history of nuclear arms control by a wise eavesdropper and masterful storyteller, Michael Krepon. The greatest unacknowledged diplomatic achievement of the Cold War was the absence of mushroom clouds. Deterrence alone was too dangerous to succeed; it needed arms control to prevent nuclear warfare. So, U.S. and Soviet leaders ventured into the unknown to devise guardrails for nuclear arms control and to treat the Bomb differently than other weapons. Against the odds, they succeeded. Nuclear weapons have not been used in warfare for three quarters of a century. This book is the first in-depth history of how the nuclear peace was won by complementing deterrence with reassurance, and then jeopardized by discarding arms control after the Cold War ended. Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace tells a remarkable story of high-wire acts of diplomacy, close calls, dogged persistence, and extraordinary success. Michael Krepon brings to life the pitched battles between arms controllers and advocates of nuclear deterrence, the ironic twists and unexpected outcomes from Truman to Trump. What began with a ban on atmospheric testing and a nonproliferation treaty reached its apogee with treaties that mandated deep cuts and corralled "loose nukes" after the Soviet Union imploded. After the Cold War ended, much of this diplomatic accomplishment was cast aside in favor of freedom of action. The nuclear peace is now imperiled by no less than four nuclear-armed rivalries. Arms control needs to be revived and reimagined for Russia and China to prevent nuclear warfare. New guardrails have to be erected. Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace is an engaging account of how the practice of arms control was built from scratch, how it was torn down, and how it can be rebuilt.

The debate about appropriate purposes and policies for U.S. nuclear weapons has been under way since the beginning of the nuclear age. With the end of the Cold War, the debate has entered a new phase, propelled by the post-Cold War transformations of the international political landscape. This volume--based on an exhaustive reexamination of issues addressed in The Future of the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Relationship (NRC, 1991)--describes the state to which U.S. and Russian nuclear forces and policies have evolved since the Cold War ended. The book evaluates a regime of progressive constraints for future U.S. nuclear weapons policy that includes further reductions in nuclear forces, changes in nuclear operations to preserve deterrence but enhance operational safety, and measures to help prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. In addition, it examines the conditions and means by which comprehensive nuclear disarmament could become feasible and desirable.

Dissects the aftermath of the war in Southeast Asia, the refugee problem, the Vietnam/Cambodia conflict, and the Pol Pot regime.

The SIPRI Yearbook 1994 continues SIPRI's review of the latest developments in nuclear weapons, world military expenditure, the international arms trade and arms production, chemical and biological weapons, the proliferation of ballistic missile technology, armed conflicts in 1993, and nuclear and conventional arms control. It is the most complete and authoritative source available for up-to-date information in war studies, strategic studies, peace studies, and international relations.