Preemption and prevention are different concepts. To preempt is to attempt to strike first against an enemy who is in the process of preparing, or is actually launching, an attack against you. Preemption is not controversial. The decision for war has been taken out of your hands. Prevention, however, is a decision to wage war, or conduct a strike, so as to prevent a far more dangerous context maturing in the future. To decide on preventive war is to elect to prevent a particular, very threatening strategic future from coming to pass. Despite much legal argument, there is no legal difficulty with either concept. The UN Charter, with its recognition of the inherent right of sovereign states to self-defense, as generally interpreted around the world does not require a victim or target state to suffer the first blow. To strike preventively in self-defense is legal, though it will usually be controversial. Preventive war is simply war, distinguishable only by its timing, and possibly its motivation.

Preemption has been, and remains, a leading concept of this decade. But despite its ubiquity in public discourse and its policy relevance, it is a source of great confusion. The term is misused, in some cases deliberately one suspects, but it must be admitted that strategic theorists have offered very little worthwhile reading on the subject. This monograph clarifies the meaning of preemption and distinguishes it from prevention and precaution. It critically reviews the principal charges leveled against preventive warfare and uses that analysis to provide at least the bare bones of strategic theory, more strictly of an alternative to theory relevant to such warfare. The analysis concludes with a set of policy and strategy relevant implications for the United States. Preemption is not controversial; legally, morally, or strategically. To preempt means to strike first (or attempt to do so) in the face of an attack that is either already underway or is very credibly imminent. The decision for war has been taken by the enemy. The victim or target state can try to disrupt the unfolding assault, or may elect to receive the attack before reacting. In truth, military preemption will not always be feasible.

Preemption has been, and remains, a leading concept of this decade. But despite its ubiquity in public discourse and its policy relevance, it is a source of great confusion. The term is misused, in some cases deliberately one suspects, but it must be admitted that strategic theorists have offered very little worthwhile reading on the subject. This monograph clarifies the meaning of preemption and distinguishes it from prevention and precaution. It critically reviews the principal charges leveled against preventive warfare and uses that analysis to provide at least the bare bones of strategic theory, more strictly of an alternative to theory relevant to such warfare. The analysis concludes with a set of policy and strategy relevant implications for the United States. Preemption is not controversial; legally, morally, or strategically. To preempt means to strike first (or attempt to do so) in the face of an attack that is either already underway or is very credibly imminent. The decision for war has been taken by the enemy. The victim or target state can try to disrupt the unfolding assault, or may elect to receive the attack before reacting. In truth, military preemption will not always be feasible.

How have the September 11th terrorist attacks and the subsequent U.S. led war on terrorism impacted American foreign policy at home and abroad? The consistent theme throughout this collection of essays is that September 11th was a watershed event, which sparked a redefinition and reassessment of U.S. foreign policy, governmental institutions, and the public's sense of internal and external security. The Bush Administration's endeavor to remake American foreign policy with an emphasis on a preemptive, first strike doctrine and its attempt to build an internal security apparatus are not only consequential in the war on terrorism, such efforts are challenging the very fundamentals of American political life and its perception throughout the world.

The dramatic declaration by U.S. President George W. Bush that, in light of the attacks on 9/11, the United States would henceforth be engaging in "preemption" against such enemies as terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction forced a wide-open debate about justifiable uses of military force. Opponents saw the declaration as a direct challenge to the consensus, which has formed since the ratification of the Charter of the United Nations, that armed force may be used only indefense. Supporters responded that in an age of terrorism defense could only mean "preemption." This volume of all-new chapters provides the historical, legal, political, and philosophical perspective necessary to intelligent participation in the on-going debate, which is likely to last long beyondthe war in Iraq. Thorough defenses and critiques of the Bush doctrine are provided by the most authoritative writers on the subject from both sides of the Atlantic.Is a nation ever justified in attacking before it has been attacked? If so, under precisely what conditions? Does the possibility of terrorists with weapons of mass destruction force us to change our traditional views about what counts as defense? This book provides the most comprehensive assessment to date of the justifiability of preemptive or preventive military action. Its engaging debate, accompanied by an analytic Introduction, focuses probing criticism against the most persuasiveproponents of preemptive attack or preventive war, who then respond to these challenges and modify or extend their justifications.Authors of recent pivotal analyses, including historian Marc Trachtenberg, international relations professor Neta Crawford, law professor David Luban, and political philosopher Allen Buchanan, are confronted by other authoritative writers on the nature and justification of war more broadly, including historian Hew Strachan, international normative theorist Henry Shue, and philosophers David Rodin, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, and Suzanne Uniacke. The resulting lively and many-sided exchanges shedhistorical, legal, political, and philosophical light on a key policy question of our time. Going beyond the simple dichotomies of popular discussion the authors reflect on the nature of all warfare, the arguments for and against it, and the possibilities for the moral to constrain the military andthe political in the face of grave threat.This book is a project of the Oxford Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War.