This paper reviews macroeconomic developments during the first year of the crisis in east Asia and draws some preliminary policy lessons. The crisis is rooted in the interaction of large capital inflows and weak private and public sector governance. At the same time, macroeconomic adjustment in these countries has resulted in some surprising outcomes, including severe economic contractions, low inflation, and rapid external adjustment. The lessons for crisis resolution include the importance of tight monetary policy early on for exchange rate stabilization, flexible fiscal policy, and comprehensive structural reform. Crises are avoided by prudent macroeconomic policies, diligent bank supervision, transparent data dissemination, strong governance, and forward-looking policymaking, even in good times.

To What Extent Does The East Asian Experience Provide Us With A Viable Model Of Economic Development? This Tract Seeks To Answer This Through A Careful Analysis Of The Long-Term Development Of The East Asian Economies And Their Recent Crisis. The Tract Shows The Contradictory Implications Of The Process Of Industrialisation And The Problems Of Unregulated Finance Which Makes Liberalised Economies Extra Sensitive To The Slightest Ripple In Investor Sentiments. To Understand The Specificities Of The East Asian Experience, The Tract Looks Carefully At The Histories Of Crises In Other Parts Of The World, And Provides A Powerful Critique Of The Imf Response To Them.

An IMF paper reviewing the policy responses of Indonesia, Korea and Thailand to the 1997 Asian crisis, comparing the actions of these three countries with those of Malaysia and the Philippines. Although all judgements are still tentative, important lessons can be learned from the experiences of the last two years.

Focuses both on specific regional organizations like ASEAN, The Asian Development Bank and APEC, as well as on key institutions such as East Asian legal systems, the media, organized labour, Asian business systems, and the developmental state.

The turmoil that has rocked Asian markets since the middle of 1997, and that is now having such deep effects on the economies in the region, is the third major currency crisis of the 1990s. This study explains how the Asian crisis arose and spread. It then outlines the corrective policy measures that could help end the crisis, and the shortcomings that have been revealed in the international financial system that require reform to reduce the chances of a recurrence.

The financial crisis that began in Thailand in mid-1997 has now become a global one. It has consumed governments upset defense planning and the regional standing of major powers in Asia, and is forcing us to rethink Asia's entire past and future political trajectory. The security implications go beyond merely the crash of unsound financial systems. Governments have fallen across Asia and in Russia. Civil violence is currently taking place in Indonesia, a key Asian state. Defense research, development and procurement have been postponed in most Asian countries. The crisis and its reverberations have shaken financial markets and governments as far away as Brazil. In order to assess the dangers posed by this crisis to Asian and U.S. security interests, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) cosponsored a conference with the National Bureau of Asian Research and the Reserve Officers Association in Seattle, Washington on June 9-10, 1998. This conference represented a unique opportunity to conduct such an assessment since it brought together participants from government the military, academia, international financial institutions, and Asia.