Many political commentators, both liberal and conservative, have argued that the 1980s were a period of fundamental conservative change. Some of them believe that the changes have been so important that the 1980s should be seen as a watershed period in American political history as significant as the 1930s. Schwab argues here that politics and policy have not fundamentally changed in a conservative direction, but have actually moved in the opposite direction. This book is a timely and comprehensive analysis of the Reagan years, of interest to all readers interested in politics and national policy.

This book presents a provocative perspective on the impact of the Reagan administration. Many political commentators, both liberal and conservative, argue that the 1980s was a period of fundamental conservative change. Some of them believe the changes have been so important that the 1980s should be seen as a watershed period in American political history as significant as the 1930s. Schwab denies this thesis and points out that politics and policy did not fundamentally change in a conservative direction. Instead, he demonstrates how policy developments and the political system actually moved in the opposite direction. In the realm of public opinion, Schwab points out that sentiment tends to shift toward the left rather than the right. Support for social and environmental programs remained high and even increased during the Reagan era, whereas support for defense programs dropped to a near-record low. Instead of a New Right conservative shift in public opinion on social issues, Americans became more liberal on women’s rights, minority rights, and sexual behavior issues. Schwab’s critique extends as well to Reagan’s political success and popularity. Rather than being one of the most successful presidents in leading Congress, he was one of the least successful. His conservative ideology lessened support for him among many voters and congressional liberals gained more voter support during the 1980s’ elections than conservatives.

"This book presents a provocative perspective on the impact of the Reagan administration. Many political commentators, both liberal and conservative, argue that the 1980s was a period of fundamental conservative change. Some of them believe the changes have been so important that the 1980s should be seen as a watershed period in American political history as significant as the 1930s. Schwab denies this thesis and points out that politics and policy did not fundamentally change in a conservative direction. Instead, he demonstrates how policy developments and the political system actually moved in the opposite direction.In the realm of public opinion, Schwab points out that sentiment tends to shift toward the left rather than the right. Support for social and environmental programs remained high and even increased during the Reagan era, whereas support for defense programs dropped to a near-record low. Instead of a New Right conservative shift in public opinion on social issues, Americans became more liberal on women's rights, minority rights, and sexual behavior issues.Schwab's critique extends as well to Reagan's political success and popularity. Rather than being one of the most successful presidents in leading Congress, he was one of the least successful. His conservative ideology lessened support for him among many voters and congressional liberals gained more voter support during the 1980s' elections than conservatives."--Provided by publisher.

This book presents a provocative perspective on the impact of the Reagan administration. Many political commentators, both liberal and conservative, argue that the 1980s was a period of fundamental conservative change. Some of them believe the changes have been so important that the 1980s should be seen as a watershed period in American political history as significant as the 1930s. Schwab denies this thesis and points out that politics and policy did not fundamentally change in a conservative direction. Instead, he demonstrates how policy developments and the political system actually moved in the opposite direction. In the realm of public opinion, Schwab points out that sentiment tends to shift toward the left rather than the right. Support for social and environmental programs remained high and even increased during the Reagan era, whereas support for defense programs dropped to a near-record low. Instead of a New Right conservative shift in public opinion on social issues, Americans became more liberal on women's rights, minority rights, and sexual behavior issues. Schwab's critique extends as well to Reagan's political success and popularity. Rather than being one of the most successful presidents in leading Congress, he was one of the least successful. His conservative ideology lessened support for him among many voters and congressional liberals gained more voter support during the 1980s' elections than conservatives.

Michael Meeropol argues that the ballooning of the federal budget deficit was not a serious problem in the 1980s, nor were the successful recent efforts to get it under control the basis for the prosperous economy of the mid-1990s. In this controversial book, the author provides a close look at what actually happened to the American economy during the years of the "Reagan Revolution" and reveals that the huge deficits had no negative effect on the economy. It was the other policies of the Reagan years--high interest rates to fight inflation, supply-side tax cuts, reductions in regulation, increased advantages for investors and the wealthy, the unraveling of the safety net for the poor--that were unsuccessful in generating more rapid growth and other economic improvements. Meeropol provides compelling evidence of the failure of the U.S. economy between 1990 and 1994 to generate rising incomes for most of the population or improvements in productivity. This caused, first, the electoral repudiation of President Bush in 1992, followed by a repudiation of President Clinton in the 1994 Congressional elections. The Clinton administration made a half-hearted attempt to reverse the Reagan Revolution in economic policy, but ultimately surrendered to the Republican Congressional majority in 1996 when Clinton promised to balance the budget by 2000 and signed the welfare reform bill. The rapid growth of the economy in 1997 caused surprisingly high government revenues, a dramatic fall in the federal budget deficit, and a brief euphoria evident in an almost uncontrollable stock market boom. Finally, Meeropol argues powerfully that the next recession, certain to come before the end of 1999, will turn the predicted path to budget balance and millennial prosperity into a painful joke on the hubris of public policymakers. Accessibly written as a work of recent history and public policy as much as economics, this book is intended for all Americans interested in issues of economic policy, especially the budget deficit and the Clinton versus Congress debates. No specialized training in economics is needed. "A wonderfully accessible discussion of contemporary American economic policy. Meeropol demonstrates that the Reagan-era policies of tax cuts and shredded safety nets, coupled with strident talk of balanced budgets, have been continued and even brought to fruition by the neo-liberal Clinton regime." --Frances Fox Piven, Graduate School, City University of New York Michael Meeropol is Chair and Professor of Economics, Western New England College.

Challenges popular conceptions about the 40th president's administration and legacy, arguing that subsequent presidents and conservative policymakers have exploited the country's misunderstandings of Reagan's achievements to promote risky agendas. Reprint.

Few question the “right turn” America took after 1966, when liberal political power began to wane. But if they did, No Right Turn suggests, they might discover that all was not really “right” with the conservative golden age. A provocative overview of a half century of American politics, the book takes a hard look at the counterrevolutionary dreams of liberalism’s enemies—to overturn people’s reliance on expanding government, reverse the moral and sexual revolutions, and win the Culture War—and finds them largely unfulfilled. David Courtwright deftly profiles celebrated and controversial figures, from Clare Boothe Luce, Barry Goldwater, and the Kennedy brothers to Jerry Falwell, David Stockman, and Lee Atwater. He shows us Richard Nixon’s keen talent for turning popular anxieties about morality and federal meddling to Republican advantage—and his inability to translate this advantage into reactionary policies. Corporate interests, boomer lifestyles, and the media weighed heavily against Nixon and his successors, who placated their base with high-profile attacks on crime, drugs, and welfare dependency. Meanwhile, religious conservatives floundered on abortion and school prayer, obscenity, gay rights, and legalized vices like gambling, and fiscal conservatives watched in dismay as the bills mounted. We see how President Reagan’s mélange of big government, strong defense, lower taxes, higher deficits, mass imprisonment, and patriotic symbolism proved an illusory form of conservatism. Ultimately, conservatives themselves rebelled against George W. Bush’s profligate brand of Reaganism. Courtwright’s account is both surprising and compelling, a bracing argument against some of our most cherished clichés about recent American history.