Completing the twenty year International Energy Agency history, this volume makes available in convenient form the texts of the major policy decisions discussed in volumes one and two - institutional aspects and operational activities. It also includes highlights of major IEA developments.

Volume II of the History of the International Energy Agency takes up the energy policies and actions of the Agency during its first twenty years, from 1974 to 1994 inclusive. While the weak institutional situation of the industrial countries in the 1973-1974 crisis period made it all but impossible for them to adopt decisive and effective responses, when the time for action came, the reasons for their vulnerability to the oil producer countries were perhaps less their underdeveloped institutions than their essentially optimistic and passive oil management policies during the years preceding the crisis. Other policy choices which might have prevented or softened the crisis were available to them, as Volume II shows.

The world's energy structure underpins the global environmental crisis and changing it will require regulatory change at a massive level. Energy is highly regulated in international law, but the field has never been comprehensively mapped. The legal sources on which the governance of energy is based are plentiful but they are scattered across a vast legal expanse. This book is the first single-authored study of the international law of energy as a whole. Written by a world-leading expert, it provides a comprehensive account of the international law of energy and analyses the implications of the ongoing energy transformation for international law. The study combines conceptual and doctrinal analysis of all the main rules, processes and institutions to consider the past, present and likely future of global energy governance. Providing a solid foundation for teaching, research and practice, this book addresses both the theory and real-world policy dimension of the international law of energy.

This book demonstrates that under the leadership of President Ronald Reagan and through the mechanism of his National Security Council staff, the United States developed and executed a comprehensive grand strategy, involving the coordinated use of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power, and that grand strategy led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. In doing so, it refutes three orthodoxies: that Reagan and his administration deserve little credit for the end of the Cold War, with most of credit going to Mikhail Gorbachev; that Reagan’s management of the National Security Council staff was singularly inept; and that the United States is incapable of generating and implementing a grand strategy that employs all the instruments of national power and coordinates the work of all executive agencies. The Reagan years were hardly a time of interagency concord, but the National Security Council staff managed the successful implementation of its program nonetheless.