Two Airbus accidents at Nagoya, Japan and Toulouse, France in April and June 1994 highlighted the problem of the highly-automated airplane and its interface with pilots. As technologies in the engineering design progress so quickly in airplane automation, training philosophies toward the 'glass cockpit' may need to be re-evaluated. Many pilots, young and old, praise the advantages brought by the new technology. On the other hand, many have complained about the increasing workload and the danger of automation features which are not in their control. In this thesis, I evaluate the accidents of the highly-automated airplane and the probable solutions which can be applied in the training phase to reduce the accident rates. The training philosophies given to the crewmembers remaining in the cockpit of highly-automated airplanes should guarantee flying safety with limited time and resources in the absence of rigorous regulations. Air transportation surely is the most popular business today and in the future. The machine has been updated to include more automatic controls. Now our concern is to upgrade the human capability to stay abreast of technology and keep flying safe. That is the reason for this thesis, whose contribution to aviation safety is to recommend adequate training philosophies for highly-automated airplane users.

The advent of very compact, very powerful digital computers has made it possible to automate a great many processes that formerly required large, complex machinery. Digital computers have made possible revolutionary changes in industry, commerce, and transportation. This book, an expansion and revision of the author's earlier technical papers on this subject, describes the development of automation in aircraft and in the aviation system, its likely evolution in the future, and the effects that these technologies have had -- and will have -- on the human operators and managers of the system. It suggests concepts that may be able to enhance human-machine relationships in future systems. The author focuses on the ability of human operators to work cooperatively with the constellation of machines they command and control, because it is the interactions among these system elements that result in the system's success or failure, whether in aviation or elsewhere. Aviation automation has provided great social and technological benefits, but these benefits have not come without cost. In recent years, new problems in aircraft have emerged due to failures in the human-machine relationship. These incidents and accidents have motivated this inquiry into aviation automation. Similar problems in the air traffic management system are predicted as it becomes more fully automated. In particular, incidents and accidents have occurred which suggest that the principle problems with today's aviation automation are associated with its complexity, coupling, autonomy, and opacity. These problems are not unique to aviation; they exist in other highly dynamic domains as well. The author suggests that a different approach to automation -- called "human-centered automation" -- offers potential benefits for system performance by enabling a more cooperative human-machine relationship in the control and management of aircraft and air traffic.

"One of the first cohesive works on glass cockpit equipment (digital instrumentation being implemented in more aircraft), this book focuses on limiting in-flight issues and advancing the safe operation of highly automated aircraft"-Provided by publisher.

Though we routinely take to the air, for many of us flying remains a mystery. Few of us understand the how and why of jetting from New York to London in six hours. How does a plane stay in the air? Can turbulence bring it down? What is windshear? How good are the security checks? Patrick Smith, an airline pilot and author of Salon.com's popular column, "Ask the Pilot," unravels the secrets and tells you all there is to know about the strange and fascinating world of commercial flight. He offers: A nuts and bolts explanation of how planes fly Insights into safety and security Straight talk about turbulence, air traffic control, windshear, and crashes The history, color, and controversy of the world's airlines The awe and oddity of being a pilot The poetry and drama of airplanes, airports, and traveling abroad In a series of frank, often funny explanations and essays, Smith speaks eloquently to our fears and curiosities, incorporating anecdotes, memoir, and a life's passion for flight. He tackles our toughest concerns, debunks conspiracy theories and myths, and in a rarely heard voice dares to return a dash of romance and glamour to air travel.

The increasing complexity and automation of flight control systems pose a challenge to federal policy regarding aircraft certification and pilot training. Despite significant commercial aviation safety improvements over the past two decades, flight control automation and aircraft complexity have been cited as contributing factors in a number of major airline accidents, including two high-profile crashes overseas involving the recently introduced Boeing 737 Max variant in 2018 and 2019. These crashes have directed attention to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) oversight of aircraft type certification and pilot training practices for transport category aircraft, particularly as they pertain to complex automated flight control systems. As aircraft systems have evolved over the past three decades to incorporate new technologies, Congress has mandated FAA to streamline certification processes, with the primary motivation being to facilitate the development of new safety-enhancing technologies. Modern commercial aircraft rely on "fly-by-wire" flight control technologies, under which pilots' flight control inputs are sent to computers rather than through direct mechanical linkages to flight control systems. The fly-by-wire software contains flight control laws and logic that, in addition to optimizing performance efficiency, protect the aircraft from commanded actions that could put the airplane in an unsafe state. Automated flight control systems have largely been viewed as having a positive effect on safety, and accident rates have improved considerably over the past two decades. However, the increasing complexity of automated flight systems has sometimes caused confusion and uncertainty, contributing to improper pilot actions during critical phases of flight and in some cases leading pilots to unintentionally place an aircraft in an unsafe condition. Besides designing these systems in a manner that minimizes pilot errors and the consequences of those errors, aircraft designers and operators face challenges regarding maintaining piloting skills for flight crews to be able to take over and manually fly the aircraft safely if critical systems fail. They also face challenges regarding documentation and pilot training effectiveness in building accurate mental models of how these complex systems operate. The primary goals of ongoing efforts to address these challenges are to enhance pilot situation awareness when using automation and reduce the likelihood of mode errors and confusion, while at the same time not overburdening pilots with intricate systems knowledge beyond what is necessary. In the ongoing investigations of two Boeing 737 Max crashes, Lion Air flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines flight 302, concerns have been raised about the design of an automated feature called the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) and its reliance on a single angle-of-attack sensor even though the aircraft is equipped with two such sensors. These concerns led to the worldwide grounding of all Boeing 737 Max aircraft until the MCAS safety concerns can be resolved, significantly impacting both U.S. and foreign airlines that operate the aircraft. These recent aviation accidents have prompted reviews of the manner in which modern transport category aircraft are certified by FAA and its foreign counterparts, and in particular, the roles of regulators and manufacturers in the certification process. The challenges of certifying increasingly complex aircraft are largely being met by delegating more of FAA's certification functions to aircraft designers and manufacturers. This raises potential conflicts between safety and quality assurance on the one hand and competitive pressures to market and deliver aircraft on the other. Under Organization Designation Authorization (ODA), FAA can designate companies to carry out delegated certification functions on its behalf.

The Air Force has purchased its first new generation of airlift aircraft with the acquisition of the C-17. More than just replacing the C-141 as the workhorse of the Air Force, the C-17 has also replaced part of the crew with inertial navigation systems, computers, and automation. The reliance on the automation of the C-17 demands a smooth interface between crew and automation, the crew must stay informed of the progress of the systems, and remain prepared to assume manual control should the automation fail. To accomplish this, the automation must be designed for ease of use and the crew must be trained to work in harmony with each other and the automation. Each aircraft manufacturer has a particular philosophy about how its aircraft are automated, and each aircraft operator has a philosophy about operating those aircraft. An understanding of these philosophies and the knowledge of problems associated with automation are valuable tools for pilots. This paper will discuss those philosophies, including the philosophies of the design and operation of the C-17. Fortunately, civilian aviation has had over ten years of experience dealing with the many intricacies of these highly automated aircraft. Pilot reports and academic research have identified specific problems, or pitfalls associated with automated aircraft. This paper presents pitfalls to be avoided by Air Force operators.