The notion of the highest good used to occupy a primary role in ethical theorising, but has largely disappeared from the contemporary landscape. The notion was central to both Aristotle's and Kant's ethical theories, however--a surprising observation given that their approaches to ethics are commonly conceived as being diametrically opposed. The essays in this collection provide a comprehensive treatment of the highest good in Aristotle and Kant and show that, even though there are important differences in terms of content, there are also important similarities in terms of the structural features of Aristotle's and Kant's value theories. By carefully analysing Aristotle's and Kant's theories of the highest good, a team of experts in the field shed light on their respective ethical theories and highlight the richness, complexity, and fruitfulness of the notion of the highest good.

This major collection of essays offers the first serious challenge to the traditional view that ancient and modern ethics are fundamentally opposed. In doing so it has important implications for contemporary ethical thought, as well as providing a significant reassessment of the work of Aristotle, Kant and the Stoics. The contributors include internationally recognised interpreters of ancient and modern ethics.

The notion of the highest good used to occupy a primary role in ethical theorising, but has largely disappeared from the contemporary landscape. The notion was central to both Aristotle's and Kant's ethical theories, however—a surprising observation given that their approaches to ethics are commonly conceived as being diametrically opposed. The essays in this collection provide a comprehensive treatment of the highest good in Aristotle and Kant and show that, even though there are important differences in terms of content, there are also important similarities in terms of the structural features of Aristotle's and Kant's value theories. By carefully analysing Aristotle's and Kant's theories of the highest good, a team of experts in the field shed light on their respective ethical theories and highlight the richness, complexity, and fruitfulness of the notion of the highest good.

The idea of a final end of human conduct – the highest good – plays an important role in Kant’s philosophy. Unlike his predecessors Kant defines the highest good as a combination of two heterogeneous elements, namely virtue and happiness. This conception lies at the centre of some of the most influential Kantian doctrines such as his famous “moral argument” for the rationality of faith, his conception of the unity of reason and his views concerning the final end of nature as well as the historical progress of mankind. To be sure, the different treatments of the highest good in Kant’s work have led to a great deal of discussion among his readers. Besides Kant’s arguments for moral faith, recent debate has focused on the place of the highest good within Kant’s moral theory, on the antinomy of pure practical reason, and on the idea of the primacy of practical reason. This collection of new essays attempts to re-evaluate Kant’s doctrine of the highest good and to determine its relevance for contemporary philosophy.

This text looks at Aristotle's claims, particularly the much-maligned doctrine of the mean.

Anne Margaret Baxley offers a systematic interpretation of Kant's theory of virtue, whose most distinctive features have not been properly understood. She explores the rich moral psychology in Kant's later and less widely read works on ethics, and argues that the key to understanding his account of virtue is the concept of autocracy, a form of moral self-government in which reason rules over sensibility. Although certain aspects of Kant's theory bear comparison to more familiar Aristotelian claims about virtue, Baxley contends that its most important aspects combine to produce something different - a distinctively modern, egalitarian conception of virtue which is an important and overlooked alternative to the more traditional Greek views which have dominated contemporary virtue ethics.