What is grand strategy and what is it good for? What are great powers, and which states are great powers today? What are the grand strategies available to great powers? What are the conditions under which a certain strategy is suitable and when should it be rejected? What are the factors affecting the success or failure of a given grand strategy? The present volume provides answers to these questions by introducing a typology of great power grand strategies, as strategies of rising, status quo, and declining powers, as well as through historical illustrations of each type. The reader is thus exposed to strategies such as divide and conquer, biding your time, opportunity strike, primacy, semi-detachment, concert, and appeasement through the experiences of leaders such as Bismarck, Peter the Great, Metternich, Deng Xiaoping, Neville Chamberlain, and Stalin. This analysis is then brought to bear on present developments in the grand strategies of the United States, China, and Russia. The volume should be of interest to both the academic and foreign policy-making communities, and in particular to students of international relations, diplomacy, history, and current international affairs.

Great Powers, Grand Strategies offers the analysis of a dozen experts on the “big picture” approaches to the South China Sea dispute. By exploring the international dimensions of this regional hotspot, Gordon Chang, Bernard Cole, James Fanell, Bill Hayton, and others examine how the military, diplomatic, and economic strategies of the major global actors have both contributed to solutions and exacerbated the potential for conflict. As editor of this volume, Anders Corr seeks to juxtapose the grand strategies of the great powers to determine the likely outcomes of the South China Sea dispute, as well as evaluate the ways to possibly defuse tensions in the region.

Grand strategies can be thought of as overall survival strategies of all states. Great powers seek survival against other great powers seeking to undermine their power and position, determining prestige-seeking behavior as psychotic and destructive. Weak states suffer from systemic vulnerabilities and trade whatever political power they have to a great power for economic assistance. If enough weak states support a particular great power, then that great power will become more powerful relative to competitors. This forms an international system fashioned by these transactions.

Historians and political scientists re-examine the conventional wisdom of grand strategies pursued by the great powers during the interwar years.

Examines how the US, the Soviet Union and various European powers have developed their grand Strategies - how they have integrated their political, economic and military goals in order to preserve their long-term interests in times of war and peace.

Intro -- Contents -- List of Tables -- Preface -- Introduction. No Grand Strategy -- 1. Exploring Great Powers in Regions -- 2. The Nixon Administration's Twin Pillars -- 3. The Reagan Administration and the Iran-Iraq War -- 4. The Bush Administration and Constructive Engagement -- 5. The Iraq War of 1991 -- 6. The Clinton Administration and Saddam Hussein -- 7. Containment-Plus and Regime Change in Iraq -- 8. The Iraq War of 2003 -- 9. The Decline of Balance-of-Power Policy -- 10. The Balance Sheet, So to Speak -- 11. Theory, Strategy, and Realism -- Conclusion. Reactive Engagement -- Appendix: Core Interviews -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W.

A clearly articulated, well-defined, and relatively stable grand strategy is supposed to allow the ship of state to steer a steady course through the roiling seas of global politics. However, the obstacles to formulating and implementing grand strategy are, by all accounts, imposing. The Oxford Handbook of Grand Strategy addresses the conceptual and historical foundations, production, evolution, and future of grand strategy from a wide range of standpoints. The seven constituent sections present and critically examine the history of grand strategy, including beyond the West; six distinct theoretical approaches to the subject; the sources of grand strategy, ranging from geography and technology to domestic politics to individual psychology and culture; the instruments of grand strategy's implementation, from military to economic to covert action; political actors', including non-state actors', grand strategic choices; the debatable merits of grand strategy, relative to alternatives; and the future of grand strategy, in light of challenges ranging from political polarization to technological change to aging populations. The result is a field-defining, interdisciplinary, and comparative text that will be a key resource for years to come.