Former CIA Agent George Mueller arrives in Havana in August 1958, just months before the fall of Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista. He's looking into the activities of Toby Graham, a CIA officer suspected of putting weapons, covertly provided by the CIA to Batista, into the hands of Castro's forces. As the FBI, CIA, and State Department compete to influence the outcome of the revolution in the face of the brutal dictatorship's imminent collapse, Graham is troubled by the hypocrisy of a bankrupt US foreign policy, and has fallen in love with a married American woman.

"The untold story of a Latvian Nazi's gruesome crimes and an Israeli spy's epic journey to bring him to justice-a case that altered the fates of all ex-Nazis."--

Previous edition, 1st, published in 1971.

The chapters in this book analyze the relationship between core concepts of the common good and the work of American political philosopher John Rawls. One of the main criticisms that has been made of Rawls is his supposed neglect of central aspects of collective life. The contributors to this book explore the possibility of a substantive and community-oriented interpretation of Rawls’s thought. The chapters investigate Rawls’s views on values such as community, faith, fraternity, friendship, gender equality, love, political liberty, reciprocity, respect, sense of justice, and virtue. They demonstrate that Rawls finds a balance between certain individualistic aspects of his theory of justice and the value of community. In doing so, the book offers insightful new readings of Rawls. John Rawls and the Common Good will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in political, moral, and legal philosophy.

This ground-breaking handbook provides multi-disciplinary insight into Chinese morality, cognition and emotion by collecting in one place a comprehensive collection of essays focused on Chinese morality by world-leading experts from more than a dozen different academic fields of study. Through fifteen substantive chapters, readers are offered a holistic look into the ways morality could be interpreted in China, and a broad range of theoretical perspectives, including ecological, anthropological and cultural neuroscience. Offering a syncretic, multi-disciplinary overview that moves beyond the usual western-oriented perspective of China as a monolithic culture, research questions addressed in this book focus on morality as represented at the level of the individual, rather than at the group or institutional levels. Research questions explored herein include: What are the major contours of distinctively Chinese morality? What was the role of the ancient ecology, climate, and pathogen load in producing Chinese moral attitudes and emotions? Are ingredients of the good life in China different than ingredients of the good life elsewhere? How are children in China morally educated? How do findings from cultural neuroscience help us understand differences in the treatment of family members, or the treatment of strangers, in China and elsewhere? How do the protests in Hong Kong participate in, or stand apart from, the ongoing ethics of protest in historical China? The clear structure and accessible writing offer a rigorous assessment of the ways in which morality can be interpreted, shedding light on differences between China and Western cultures. The book also provides a timely window into Chinese forms of morality, and the pivotal role these play in social organization, family relationships, systems of government, emotion and cognition. Representing fields of study ranging from philosophy, linguistics, archaeology, history, and religion, to social psychology, neuroscience, clinical psychology, developmental psychology, and behavioral ecology, this is an essential text for students, academics, and others with wide interest in Chinese culture.

This essay is the product of years of distaste for, and dissatisfaction with, the efforts of moral philosophers. It can be tiresome to attend to details, to spell out the obvious, but moral philosophy is such an abysmally difficult subject that faster than a creeping slug is breakneck reckless speed. One simply must content oneself with a slow slimy trail painfully drawn and cautiously constrained. Generally speaking, philosophy, and, in particular, moral philosophy, is too hard fot philosophers. Even though publishing is spitting in the ocean, and even though my sour sweet spittle will not alter the ocean's salinity, I am somehow inclined to publish this essay. Acknowledgments: I began this essay in 1956. During the years, I have discussed many of the topics in this volume with a great many philosophers. I am indebted to all of them, especially those with whom I disagreed and those who disagreed with me. One learns nothing from agreement, whereas disagreement provokes one to look more closely and more carefully at what is at issue: if a philosopher is to profit from discussion, someone must be disagreeable.

Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.