Traces the course of the constitutional controversy over the spending power and the role of that power in driving an expansion in federal activity and authority from 1787 forward.

The General Welfare Clause of the United States Constitution grants authority to the federal government to expend funds that provide for the general welfare. If one were to apply utilitarian economic theory to the General Welfare Clause, one might reasonably conclude that the government only has the authority to pass legislation that benefits some supermajority of the population. In other words, all special interest legislation is unconstitutional, and therefore not valid law. This paper explores the issue of legislation from the perspective of law and economics.

This paper examines the original understanding behind the U.S. Constitution's controversial "General Welfare Clause." Based on Founding-Era word usage, public representations by advocates of the Constitution, and other historical evidence, the paper concludes that the General Welfare Clause is a limitation on the taxing power. The position of the modern Supreme Court -- that the Clause authorizes spending for the general welfare -- is based on insufficient research and an anachronistic understanding of language.