Airpower remains the cornerstone of NATO’s military advantage, so maintaining the ability to win air superiority over peer opponents in a conflict is key to long-term deterrence stability in both Europe and the Pacific. This Whitehall Paper examines the various modernisation and future capability development efforts being undertaken within NATO, and analyses the major threat systems and overall modernisation trends of the West’s main peer-competitors – Russia and China. US airpower capability development efforts are increasingly focused on countering the growing challenge from the Chinese military in the Pacific. To meet this challenge, the Pentagon is planning to transform the way it operates across all domains over the next 15 years. New platforms, weapons systems and increasing automation of command and control threaten to leave NATO allies behind. Current acquisition and modernisation plans of European air forces may eventually close the capability gap with current US theatre entry standard capabilities, but by then the US will have leapt ahead once more. Furthermore, many of the airpower capabilities which the US is pursuing for the Pacific theatre are significantly less relevant for the demands of deterrence against Russia in Europe. Given continuing dependence on US enablers on the part of other NATO members, a significant divergence in capability plans threatens to undermine crucial Alliance interoperability if not recognised and managed early.

This study analyzes the need for changes to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) airpower doctrine to reflect current post-cold-war realities. NATO air doctrine does not yet reflect the actuality of today's operations, nor does it anticipate the probable future employment of NATO's airpower. Out-of-area operations and Partnership for Peace participation in NATO operations will have profound effects on combined doctrine, training, organizational structures, exercises, and employment of forces. NATO's tactical doctrine revision process served the alliance well during the cold war. But today, the international environment has drastically changed: Both the nature of the threat and the use of NATO airpower during conflict have changed. The current doctrinal revision process has proved too slow and cumbersome to provide adequate direction for air strategists during ongoing operations. There are many new doctrinal areas that must be thoroughly addressed so that NATO can chart a course for the future that in the end provides the best, most effective mix of forces.

In the future, NATO forces must be prepared to respond quickly to events in regions within and beyond its borders. This research addresses how this requirement will affect the organization of NATO forces, particularly airpower, by postulating two scenarios that would stress NATO to the extreme: (1) an attack by Russia on Poland, and (2) a Syria-Iraq attack on Turkey. The author uses these scenarios to develop operational concepts and alternative organizations that would enable NATO airpower to adapt to the uncertain post-Cold War environment. The report concludes that NATO's air reaction forces should be fully established in peacetime, prepared for operations independent from existing command structures, and that the future viability of these forces depends primarily on U.S. contributions.

Future NATO looks at the challenges facing NATO in the 21st century and examines how the Alliance can adapt to ensure its continued success For more than 70 years, the North Atlantic Alliance has helped to preserve peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. It has been able to adjust to varying political and strategic challenges. We must ensure that NATO continues to be effective in the future. This requires looking ahead, challenging habitual approaches, exchanging ideas, and advancing new thinking. I highly recommend Future NATO to policymakers, military professionals and scholars alike, as it offers necessary critical and constructive analysis of current and future challenges posed to our security and defence.Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, Minister of Defence, Germany Since 1949, NATO has successfully upheld common principles and adapted to new realities. As Future NATO examines, the Alliance is facing a new set of external and internal challenges in the decades to come. The Alliance and its partners need to remain committed to future changes. I recommend this excellent study to all, but especially to the younger generation of scholars and future policymakers. Trine Bramsen, Minister of Defence, Denmark Over the last 70 years, Europe has lived in peace and prosperity because of NATO, with unity as our most important weapon. We may have our differences, but we will continue to work on our common cause to promote peace, security and stability. To effectively do so, NATO needs to continuously adapt to changing security situations. An important current challenge is to ensure European Allies take more responsibility for their security. But we also need to look at future challenges and find innovative solutions for them. Future NATO offers a useful analysis that can help us prepare for what is to come for the Alliance. Ank Bijleveld, Minister of Defence, The Netherlands

Europe's air forces have the opportunity to make increasingly pronounced contributions to NATO's defense and deterrent posture in combat air campaigns, especially high-intensity operations requiring rapid and large-scale application of airpower.

In the future NATO will have to adapt to the realities of decreasing defense budgets and to changing and expanding the areas of responsibility brought on by German unification and the growing linkages with the former Warsaw Pact nations. NATO will need to have forces ready to manifest its new strategy of reaction to uncertainty. This new requirement for rapid reaction will greatly impact the nature of future NATO military organizations, especially those that will be needed to plan, deploy, and employ air forces across its regions-and-beyond. This research is focused on the concepts for these future organizations. To provide a basis for this work, we examined two major scenarios that would stress NATO to the extreme: (1) an attack by Russia on Poland, which would require NATO forces to deploy out of NATO's central region. From the scenarios, concepts of operations were developed for the employment of air forces that included basing, command, control, and communications (C3), and logistics. Requirements for air organization were derived fro these and were used as a basis for alternative organization concepts.