Written from the perspective of a former active participant in the U.S. anti-drug policy formulation and implementation efforts, Cocaine Quagmire is an in-depth analysis of why the U.S. drug war in Colombia is failing. While frequent anti-drug battles are won, dynamic socioeconomic and political factors have created a quagmire of countervailing obstacles leading to strategic foreign policy defeat in the North Andes. The Clinton Administration focused on combating narcotrafficking and yet misunderstood how a strong international demand and immense profits provide the basic incentives that keep the Colombian cocaine traffickers in business. This book is important in that it fills a significant gap in our knowledge of U.S. foreign policy and its application in the drug wars of the South American country of Colombia.

This thesis examines the reason for the failure of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy, and the Andean Initiative. Its scope is limited to cocaine trafficking from the Andean nations of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, to the United States. It provides the background of those strategies, and analyses various explanations for failure. Based on this analysis, the thesis provides policy recommendations for antidrug efforts, which include increased emphasis on demand-related issues, judicial system consistency and harsher penalties, improvement in domestic and international coordination, and expanded restrictions on U.S. government agencies conducting covert operations. In conclusion, this thesis proposes that any real solution to the drug problem lies not with supply interdiction, and not with expanded foreign assistance, but with targeting user accountability in the United States.

Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO evaluated the scope, purpose, and effectiveness of U.S. narcotics control efforts in Colombia and Bolivia. GAO found that U.S.-supported crop control, enforcement, and interdiction efforts in Colombia and Bolivia have not produced major reductions in coca and marijuana production and trafficking, and it is questionable whether the efforts will achieve major reductions in the near future. GAO found that Colombia's large-scale efforts have had little effect due to the: (1) unprecedented level of violence associated with narcotics control; (2) lack of an enforceable extradition treaty with the United States for narcotics offenses; (3) general reluctance of the Colombian military forces to become involved in narcotics enforcement; and (4) lack of safe and effective means of chemically eradicating coca. GAO also found that Bolivia's efforts have had little effect due to: (1) the lack of clear legislation in Bolivia outlawing coca cultivation and supporting government control and eradication programs; (2) an inexperienced and ineffective special narcotics police force; (3) limited Bolivian government funding for program objectives; and (4) generalized corruption. In addition, GAO found that the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM): (1) did not systematically evaluate program and project performance to assess progress against established goals and objectives or to redirect activities; and (2) does not have guidelines which clearly establish the responsibility for ensuring that INM units perform evaluations. GAO also found that the Agency for International Development's development and narcotics awareness programs in Bolivia have not been effective due to the unwillingness or inability of the Bolivian government to introduce and implement effective coca control and enforcement measures.