The Evolution of Central Banks employs a wide range of historical evidence and reassesses current monetary analysis to argue that the development of non-profit-maximizing and noncompetitive central banks to supervise and regulate the commercial banking system fulfils a necessary and natural function. Goodhart surveys the case for free banking, examines the key role of the clearing house in the evolution of the central bank, and investigates bank expansion and fluctuation in the context of the clearing house mechanism. He concludes that it is the noncompetitive aspect of the central bank that is crucial to the performance of its role. Goodhart addresses the questions of deposit insurance and takes up the "club theory" approach to the central bank. Included in the historical study of their origins are 8 European central banks, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of England, and the Federal Reserve Board of the United States.

This book is the first complete survey of the evolution of monetary institutions and practices in Western countries from the Middle Ages to today. It radically rethinks previous attempts at a history of monetary institutions by avoiding institutional approach and shifting the focus away from the Anglo-American experience. Previous histories have been hamstrung by the linear, teleological assessment of the evolution of central banks. Free from such assumptions, Ugolini’s work offers bankers and policymakers valuable and profound insights into their institutions. Using a functional approach, Ugolini charts an historical trajectory longer and broader than any other attempted on the subject. Moving away from the Anglo-American perspective, the book allows for a richer (and less biased) analysis of long-term trends. The book is ideal for researchers looking to better understand the evolution of the institutions that underlie the global economy.

Offers a comprehensive analysis of the historical experiences of monetary policymaking of the world's largest central banks. Written in celebration of the 350th anniversary of the central bank of Sweden, Sveriges Riksbank. Includes chapters on other banks around the world written by leading economic scholars.

This 2005 treatment compares the central banks of Britain and the United States.

A leading economist and former central banker discusses the evolution of central bank communication from secretiveness to transparency and accountability. Central bank communication has evolved from secretiveness to transparency and accountability—from a reluctance to give out any information at all to the belief in communication as a panacea for effective policy. In this book, Otmar Issing, himself a former central banker, discusses the journey toward transparency in central bank communication. Issing traces the development of transparency, examining the Bank of England as an example of extreme reticence and European Central Bank's President Mario Draghi as a practitioner of effective communication. He argues that the ultimate goal of central bank communication is to make monetary policy more effective, and describes the practice and theory of communication as an evolutionary process. For a long time, the Federal Reserve never made its monetary policy decisions public; the European Central Bank, on the other hand, had to adopt a modern communication strategy from the outset. Issing discusses the importance of guiding expectations in central bank communication, and points to financial markets as the most important recipients of this communication. He discusses the obligations of accountability and transparency, although he notes that total transparency is a “mirage.” Issing argues that the central message to the public must always be that the stability of a nation's currency is the bank's priority.

The twentieth century has seen the rise of modern central banking. At its close, it is also witnessing the first steps in the decline of the role of some of the most famous of these institutions. In this volume, some of the world’s best known specialists examine the process whereby central banks emerged and asserted themselves within the economic and political spheres of their respective countries. Although the theory and the political economy that presided over their creation did not show great divergence across borders, a considerable institutional variety was nevertheless the result. Among the many factors responsible for this diversity, attention is drawn here not only to the idiosyncrasies of domestic financial systems and to the occurrence of political shocks with major monetary repercussions, such as wars, but also to the peculiarities of each economy and of the political and social climate reigning at the time when central banks were created or formalized. The twelve essays cover European, Asian and American experiences and many of them use a comparative approach.

The Changing Role of Central Banks derives lessons from current economic and financial challenges as well as failures in confronting them. Through this approach, it brings under perspective political and social reactions to major economic problems of the last ten years, particularly those pertaining to money and initiatives taken by central banks.