By carrying out a groundbreaking analysis of their design and diffusion, this book covers all the major carbon market systems in operation: the EU, RGGI, California, Tokyo, New Zealand, Australia, China, South Korea and Kazakhstan.

Carbon markets are developing and expanding around the world, but how and to what extent is their design shaped by learning and interaction between them? How do these markets function and what is the role of design? Carrying out a ground-breaking analysis of their design and diffusion, this book covers all the major carbon market systems and processes around the world: the EU, RGGI, California, Tokyo, New Zealand, Australia, China, South Korea and Kazakhstan. It offers a systematic, in-depth discussion and comparison of the key design features in these systems with expert contributors exploring how, and to what extent, these features have been shaped by central policy diffusion mechanisms and domestic politics. By focussing on the specific design features of the instruments used, this volume makes important contributions to diffusion theory, highlighting how ETS diffusion processes more often have resulted in design divergence than convergence, and discussing the implications of this finding for the vision of linked systems in the post-Paris era. It will be of significant interest to a broad audience interested in the emergence, evolution, functioning and interaction of carbon markets.

Analysing the interactions between institutions in the climate change and energy nexus, including the consequences for their legitimacy and effectiveness. Prominent researchers from political science and international relations compare three policy domains: renewable energy, fossil fuel subsidy reform, and carbon pricing. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

Why the traditional “pledge and review” climate agreements have failed, and how carbon pricing, based on trust and reciprocity, could succeed. After twenty-five years of failure, climate negotiations continue to use a “pledge and review” approach: countries pledge (almost anything), subject to (unenforced) review. This approach ignores everything we know about human cooperation. In this book, leading economists describe an alternate model for climate agreements, drawing on the work of the late Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom and others. They show that a “common commitment” scheme is more effective than an “individual commitment” scheme; the latter depends on altruism while the former involves reciprocity (“we will if you will”). The contributors propose that global carbon pricing is the best candidate for a reciprocal common commitment in climate negotiations. Each country would commit to placing charges on carbon emissions sufficient to match an agreed global price formula. The contributors show that carbon pricing would facilitate negotiations and enforcement, improve efficiency and flexibility, and make other climate policies more effective. Additionally, they analyze the failings of the 2015 Paris climate conference. Contributors Richard N. Cooper, Peter Cramton, Ottmar Edenhofer, Christian Gollier, Éloi Laurent, David JC MacKay, William Nordhaus, Axel Ockenfels, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Steven Stoft, Jean Tirole, Martin L. Weitzman

Bridging theory and practice, this book offers insights into how Europe has experienced the evolution of modern electricity markets from the end of the 1990s to the present day. It explores defining moments in the process, including the four waves of European legislative packages, landmark court cases, and the impact of climate strikes and marches.