This Climate Note discusses the rationale, design, and impacts of border carbon adjustments (BCAs), charges on embodied carbon in imports potentially matched by rebates for embodied carbon in exports. Large disparities in carbon pricing between countries is raising concerns about competitiveness and emissions leakage, and BCAs are a potentially effective instrument for addressing such concerns. Design details are critical, however. For example, limiting coverage of the BCA to energy-intensive, trade-exposed industries facilitates administration, and initially benchmarking BCAs on domestic emissions intensities would help ease the transition for emissions-intensive trading partners. It is also important to consider how to apply BCAs across countries with different approaches to emissions mitigation. BCAs are challenging because they pose legal risks and may be at odds with the differentiated responsibilities of developing countries. Furthermore, BCAs provide only modest incentives for other large emitting countries to scale carbon pricing—an international carbon price floor would be far more effective in this regard.

Offers policy recommendations from Cato Institute experts on every major policy issue. Providing both in-depth analysis and concrete recommendations, the Handbook is an invaluable resource for policymakers and anyone else interested in securing liberty through limited government.

This paper discusses sectoral policies needed to achieve the ambitious greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction targets announced in the European Union's Green Deal, complementing the companion paper "EU Climate Mitigation Policy", which focuses on broader EU-level policies.

Emissions Trading and WTO Law examines the global trade issues that arise as a result of the introduction of emissions trading frameworks. The book focusses specifically on the rules of the WTO, as a tool to demonstrate where the boundaries exist for a

The difficulty of achieving and implementing a global climate change agreement has stimulated a wide range of policy proposals designed to favour the participation of a large number of countries in a global cooperative effort to control greenhouse gas emissions. This significant book analyses the viability of controlling climate change through a set of regional or sub-global climate agreements rather than via a global treaty. The authors argue that the principal challenge in devising a truly global architecture is in providing sufficient incentives for all party participation whilst also ensuring compliance, which raises global governance issues. The main purpose of this study is not to trace in detail the process of negotiation and implementation of international regimes, but rather to evaluate whether a series of regional or sub-global agreements is more likely to achieve climate change control than a global agreement attempted from the outset. From a political science perspective, the focus centres on institution building and governance. From an economic perspective it concentrates on incentives used to encourage participation in a global and non-fragmented agreement. Lessons from EU integration and actual global and regional trade agreements are employed in order to analyse the future prospects of climate change negotiations. The focus on climate change and more generally the management of environmental and resource problems will make this book essential reading for participants, observers and analysts of the public policy process as it concerns climate change and more generally the management of environmental and resource problems. In addition the rich combination of international relations theory and economic literature with findings from the policy process will appeal to both general readers and the academic community.

There's a simple, straightforward way to cut carbon emissions and prevent the most disastrous effects of climate change-and we're rejecting it because of irrational political fears. That's the central argument of The Case for a Carbon Tax, a clear-eyed, sophisticated analysis of climate change policy. Shi-Ling Hsu examines the four major approaches to curbing CO2: cap-and-trade; command and control regulation; government subsidies of alternative energy; and carbon taxes. Weighing the economic, social, administrative, and political merits of each, he demonstrates why a tax is currently the most effective policy. Hsu does not claim that a tax is the perfect or only solution-but that unlike the alternatives, it can be implemented immediately and paired effectively with other approaches. In fact, the only real barrier is psychological. While politicians can present subsidies and cap-and-trade as "win-win" solutions, the costs of a tax are immediately apparent. Hsu deftly explores the social and political factors that prevent us from embracing this commonsense approach. And he shows why we must get past our hang-ups if we are to avert a global crisis.

Schwarz on Tax Treaties is the definitive analysis of tax treaties from United Kingdom and Irish perspectives and provides in-depth expert analysis of the interpretation and interaction of those treaty networks with the European Union and international law. The sixth edition significantly develops the earlier work with enhanced commentary and is updated to include the latest UK, Irish domestic and treaty developments, international and EU law, including: Covered Tax Agreements modified by the BEPS Multilateral Instrument; judicial decisions of Ireland, the UK and foreign courts on UK and Irish treaties; Digital Services Tax; treaty binding compulsory arbitration; Brexit and the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement; taxpayer rights in exchange of information; taxpayer rights in EU cross-border collection of taxes; attribution of profits to permanent establishments; and EU DAC 6 Disclosure of cross-border planning. Case law developments including: UK Supreme Court in Fowler v HMRC; Indian Supreme Court in Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence Private Limited and Others v CIT; Australian Full Federal Court in Addy v CoT; French Supreme Administrative Court in Valueclick; English Court of Appeal in Irish Bank Resolution Corporation v HMRC; JJ Management and others v HMRC; United States Tax Court in Adams Challenge v CIR; UK Tax Tribunals in Royal Bank of Canada v HMRC; Lloyd-Webber v HMRC; Esso Exploration and Production v HMRC; Glencore v HMRC; McCabe v HMRC; Padfield v HMRC; Davies v HMRC; Uddin v HMRC; English High Court in Minera Las Bambas v Glencore; Kotton v First Tier Tribunal; and CJEU in N Luxembourg I, and others (the ‘Danish beneficial ownership cases’); État belge v Pantochim; College Pension Plan of British Columbia v Finanzamt München; HB v Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale. About the Author Jonathan Schwarz BA, LLB (Witwatersrand), LLM (UC Berkeley), FTII is an English Barrister at Temple Tax Chambers in London and is also a South African Advocate and a Canadian and Irish Barrister. His practice focuses on international tax disputes as counsel and as an expert and advises on solving cross-border tax problems. He is a Visiting Professor at the Faculty of Law, King’s College London University. He has been listed as a leading tax Barrister in both the Legal 500, for international corporate tax, and Chambers’ Guide to the Legal Profession, for international transactions and particular expertise in transfer pricing. He has been lauded in Who’s Who Legal, UK Bar for his ‘brilliant’ handling of cross-border tax problems. In Chambers Guide, he is identified as ‘the double tax guru’ with ‘extraordinary depth of knowledge and experience when it comes to tax treaty issues and is a creative thinker and a clear and meticulous writer’.